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Abstract
In this thesis, we investigate the influence of counterparty risk on financial stability in
a banking system. Banks are exposed among each other via loans, credit derivatives,
repayment agreements, commercial bonds and other financial products. Losses caused
by counterparty failure can potentially result in a bank’s insolvency since a bank cannot
expect to retrieve the full value of any obligation to an insolvent counterparty. The
interconnectedness between institutions, in the form of exposure from one institution to
another, can propagate insolvency from one bank to another, create further insolvencies,
and eventually bring down the entire financial system.
We study a cascade counterparty risk model of interacting banks using liabilities
and assets to define banks’ balance sheets, which are further divided into interbank
assets and liabilities, modelling direct dependencies between banks. We further assume
that the balance sheet parameters are random variables. We simplify the system by
assuming that banks can be in two states: solvent or insolvent. The state of a bank
changes from solvent to insolvent whenever its liabilities are larger than the bank’s
assets, the so-called balance sheet test of insolvency. This creates a stylized banking
system that is analogous to the Random Field Ising model, a well-known model in the
statistical physics literature.
We solve the counterparty risk model semi-analytically by applying a mean-field
assumption that homogenizes the banking system for different location-scale distribu-
tions. We call this simplified version of the counterparty risk model the mean-field
model. The mean-field assumption allows us to conduct an analysis of the balance
sheet parameters to evaluate the stability of the banking system. We observe the de-
velopment of a fragile state where small perturbations to banks’ capital reserves can
trigger a sudden system failure. The parameter analysis further allows us to calculate
minimum capital requirements for banks ensuring a stable system, and to quantify the
cost of rescuing a defaulted banking system.
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Two simulation models are used to test for the robustness of the results of the
mean-field model. For the first simulation model, we consider a highly stylized bank-
ing system and verify that the mean-field model is robust for a variety of standard
network topologies and random distributions. More specifically, we find that the in-
terbank network is essential for the insolvency propagation. However, the structure of
the interbank network does not play a critical role for the distribution of counterparty
insolvency. We further show that diversification does not necessary reduce the risk of
system failure.
We also compute the critical balance sheet values for the stylized banking system
in the mean-field model, at which the fragile state occurs. For the second simulation
model, we use UK regulatory data to initialize the model. We show that a more realistic
heterogeneous system with different bank types and a complex underlying interbank
network calibrated on UK data also has systemic failures around similar sized shocks
to banks’ capital as computed for the stylized homogeneous system.
A network analysis on the exposure networks created using regulatory reports re-
veals a core-periphery topology with large internationally operating banks in the center
of the exposure network and smaller regional banks in the periphery. By aggregating
the fraction of surviving banks to specific bank types, we show that the behaviour of
banks towards failure is independent of the size of their balance sheets or their posi-
tion in the interbank network. This shows that bank-size heterogeneity and network
complexity play a marginal role in the mechanism leading to systemic failure. How-
ever, we also observe significant differences. Insolvencies in the heterogeneous system
start at smaller sized shocks than in the homogeneous system, and the residual frac-
tion of surviving banks ends at a larger value in the heterogeneous system than in the
homogeneous system.
In conclusion, we demonstrate that a simple counterparty risk model replicates
the behaviour of more complex simulation-based stress test models of a heterogeneous
banking system. This is significant because it allows for a better understanding of
the spread of system-wide insolvency, to draw policy implications such as the cost of
rescuing an insolvent banking system, and to specify capital requirements that ensure a
stable banking system that can be computed analytically using the mean-field model.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, it became evident that the structure of the modern financial system can
cause sever danger to financial stability by spreading insolvency through obligations
on the interbank markets to other banks in the banking system (Haldane, 2009). The
risk that banks impose on others through interconnectedness is called counterparty risk
(Upper, 2011) and is the subject of this thesis.
In 2006, the US housing market started collapsing. This event induced a global
financial crisis with the aftermath still visible in 2015. Low interest rates provided by
the Federal Reserve enabled US banks to offer mortgages to people without deposits
and uncertain income. These mortgages were bundled with less risky mortgages and
sold as mortgaged backed securities to other banks and financial companies world-
wide. The idea was to diversify risk, grouping mortgage holders prone to failure with
less risky mortgage holders, thereby lowering the overall risk. In 2006, the Federal
Reserve raised its interest rate to 6% from a former low of 0.75% in 2002 (Kolb, 2010).
Banks raised interest rates of mortgages with adjustable interest rates as a consequence
to cover their increased cost of funding the mortgages. This caused numerous holders
of mortgages with adjustable interest rates to declare bankruptcy as they were not able
to maintain their mortgage payments. In turn, banks faced large losses due to credit
failure on their portfolios. The collapse of the US housing market resulted in a global
financial crisis.
Mortgage-backed securities became an alternative funding source in addition to
more traditional liabilities such as deposits and corporate bonds. In general, the market
for asset-backed securities increased tremendously. More specifically, the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission records in their report on the financial crisis:
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“By 1999, when the market was 16 years old, about $900 billion worth of
securitizations ... were outstanding.” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
and others, 2011)
Securitization was only one way to fund the excessive growth of banks’ balance sheets
and mergers of banks that happened in the 90s and early 2000s. Interbank loans and
particularly over-night loans also formed an integral part of banks’ funding strategy.
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission notes on the issue:
“For example, at the end of 2007, Bear Stearns had $11.8 billion in equity
and $383.6 billion in liabilities and was borrowing as much as $70 billion
in the overnight market.” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission and others,
2011)
Over-night loans were used to satisfy banks’ liquidity needs but were also used as
financing for assets with maturity dates in the far future. Other ways for banks to obtain
funding were repurchase agreements (repos). A bank sold a security to a counterparty
and agreed to buy the security at an agreed date. Finally, banks were highly exposed to
each other via derivatives. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission states that
“... the notional amount of OTC [Annot.: over-the-counter] derivatives out-
standing globally was $95.2 trillion, and the gross market value was $3.2
trillion. In the seven and a half years from then until June 2008, when the
market peaked, outstanding OTC derivatives increased more than seven-
fold to a notional amount of $672.6 trillion; their gross market value was
$20.3 trillion.” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission and others, 2011)
Banks and other financial firms were highly interconnected through interbank exposure
and overlapping portfolios with the health of one company depending on the solvency
of others. Losses from mortgage providers easily spread to other parts of the financial
industry via mortgage backed securities and resulted in major uncertainty about the
future of financial firms. As a result, governments started bail-out programs providing
capital for struggling banks, and central banks initiated quantitative easing programs to
inject liquidity into the system, but also to give banks time to restructure their portfolios
to less risky products. For example,
15
“the [Annot.: US] government ultimately committed more than $180 bil-
lion because of concerns that AIGs collapse would trigger cascading losses
throughout the global financial system.” (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commis-
sion and others (2011)
Even though the major banks were rescued and loans from governments to failing banks
were settled, the impact on the real economy and on society is still visible in 2015
with rates of unemployment high, and austerity measures in place intended to stabilize
economies (Kolb, 2010; Claessens et al., 2013).
In this thesis, we show that interconnectedness can accelerate the failure of a bank-
ing system. We restrict our investigation to how counterparty failure influences finan-
cial stability disregarding the influence of market risk. We acknowledge that market
risk played an important role during the financial crisis. However, for the moment, the
goal of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of how the insolvency cascade
process influences financial stability of a banking system. Having a better understand-
ing of this allows us to provide restrictions on banks’ balance sheet quantities to ensure
a more stable banking system.
An active literature modelling counterparty risk in banking systems using network
science and statistical modelling has emerged studying the impact of bank failure on
the stability of the banking system (Allen and Gale, 2000; Eisenberg and Noe, 2001;
Furfine, 2003; Nier et al., 2007; Gai and Kapadia, 2010; May and Arinaminpathy, 2010;
Cont et al., 2010; Battiston et al., 2012a; Fouque and Langsam, 2013). These models
are similar in that banks’ balance sheets consist of liabilities and assets. The balance
sheets are further divided into interbank assets and liabilities modelling direct depen-
dencies between banks. The interbank assets and liabilities create an interbank network
with banks being the nodes and interbank exposure forming the links of the network. In
these models, a bank is considered insolvent if its liabilities are larger than the bank’s
assets, which is called the balance sheet test of insolvency (Goode, 2010). The insol-
vency of a bank can be triggered by a random event (an initial bank failure, reduction
of asset values) that reduces banks’ loss absorbing capital and brings about counter-
party failure. In this thesis, we also introduce and study a cascade counterparty risk
model of interacting banks. In our model, banks can be in either of two states: solvent
or insolvent. This creates a stylized banking system that is analogous to the Random
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Field Ising model, a well-known model in the statistical physics literature. In our styl-
ized banking system, the balance sheet variables (assets, liabilities and loss absorbing
capital) are random variables. We also divide assets and liabilities into interbank and
non-interbank categories. The interbank assets and liabilities form the connection be-
tween banks. This allows us to also represent the interbank exposure using interbank
networks. We shock the system by lowering a fraction of all banks loss-absorbing cap-
ital initially. This causes some initial insolvencies. The interbank network propagates
the insolvency from one bank to another creating further insolvencies, and eventually
bringing down the entire system given a large enough shock.
We use a mean-field assumption to solve the insolvency cascade model semi-
analytically as well as numerically using simulation means. The mean-field assumption
homogenizes the banking system. This enables us to compute the equilibrium fraction
of surviving banks for fixed location and scale parameters of the balance sheet values
using a fixed point analysis. The fixed point analysis allows us to detail the parameter
ranges of balance sheet quantities that lead to a stable or unstable system. Because
of this, we can determine restricting ratios between loss absorbing capital and assets,
the leverage ratio, to ensure a stable banking system. We state this ratio for a variety of
location-scale distributions used to initialize banks’ balance sheets. The most dominant
feature of the mean-field solution is the occurrence of a fragile state, where one bank
can trigger the default of the entire banking system. This fragile state has been ob-
served in other studies (Gai and Kapadia, 2010; Amini et al., 2012; Hurd and Gleeson,
2011). We find that the important quantities regulating the fragile state are the ratios
of interbank assets to total assets, and loss absorbing capital to total assets. Moreover,
we quantify the costs of potential rescue attempts to re-direct an unstable system into
a stable region. We use balance sheet data for 2007 and 2012 to initialize the homoge-
neous counterparty risk model showing that the US and UK banking systems in 2007
were more prone to failure than in 2012.
To solve the counterparty risk model analytically, we make some restricting as-
sumptions. In particular, we assume an infinitely large banking system, where banks
are of similar size, and have equal-sized exposure to other banks. Additionally, we
assume that the value of non-interbank assets and liabilities do not change during the
insolvency propagation. To address the effects of these assumptions, we test for robust-
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ness and generality of the mean-field solution by solving the counterparty risk model
numerically. In particular, we change the structure of the exposure network and apply
different random distributions to initialize the balance sheet parameters. We argue that,
given a shock that causes the balance sheet parameters to shift into the unstable region,
the precise underlying topology of the exposure network is secondary for the propa-
gation of insolvency. Furthermore, we discuss how diversification of interbank assets
effects the fragile state. We do so by showing that if the reaction of banks to an external
shock to their balance sheet quantities results in similar losses of average capital, then
the fragile state can still be observed even for a highly diversified portfolio of interbank
assets. We also create banking systems of different sizes and compare the simulation
solution with the mean-field solution, concluding that for systems of all sizes the mean-
field solution is a fair approximation. Finally, we change the banks’ values of liabilities
and non-interbank assets during the insolvency propagation using (arbitrary) functions
to reduces non-interbank assets proportional to the fraction of surviving banks, and de-
crease the value of liabilities by injecting external capital into the banking system. We
discuss how the simulation results can be interpreted in the mean-field setting.
In the final part of this thesis, we use regulatory data of the UK banking system to
initialize both a simulation-based model as well as the mean-field model. Initializing
the simulation-based model with the UK regulatory data results in a highly heteroge-
neous banking system. Therefore, we call this model the heterogeneous model. The
heterogeneous model replicates a more realistic picture of a banking system than the
mean-field model. In both models, the system is stressed by artificially decreasing loss
absorbing capital. We observe in both models the occurrence of the fragile state and the
consequent systemic collapse and jump to a state where most banks are insolvent. We
demonstrate that in the heterogeneous model the systemic collapse happens around the
same values predicted by the mean-field model. Hence, we demonstrate that a simple
insolvency cascade model of a homogeneous banking system replicates the behaviour
of a more complex simulation-based stress test model of a heterogeneous banking sys-
tem. This is significant since it allows us to better understand the spread of system-wide
insolvency, to draw policy implications such as the cost of rescuing an insolvent bank-
ing system, and to specify capital requirements that ensure a stable banking system
from a simple counterparty risk model of a homogeneous banking system.
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As part of Chapter 6, we conduct a brief data analysis of the UK regulatory data
sets. The UK regulatory data sets consist of information about banks’ balance sheet
quantities used to initialize the model, namely, the value of banks’ total assets and Tier
1 capital. We conclude that the UK banking system consists of a wide variety of banks
with balance sheet sizes that differ by orders of magnitude. In addition, we examine
the structure of three exposure networks of the UK banking system constructed from
regulatory reports on bilateral exposure collected in 2011, 2012 and 2013. We show
that multinational banks are in the centre of the exposure network with regional banks
and small subsidiaries of foreign banks forming the periphery of the exposure network.
The results of the data analysis should be considered with caution as the data still
only provides a subset of the complete interbank network. Banks are required to only
report exposure to 20 counterparties worldwide. In the model, we only use the exposure
of UK banks to other UK banks to create the interbank network. The average links UK
banks have to other UK banks is seven. This reduces the ratio of interbank assets to
total assets considerably in comparison to values observed in other studies. For this
reason, the shock to banks’ loss absorbing capital has to be fairly large resulting in very
low leverage ratios ensuring a stable banking system. We address the low values of
interbank assets by increasing the exposure of banks artificially, thereby increasing the
average ratio of interbank assets to total assets of the entire system to values observed
in other studies.
We discuss in more detail the literature on cascade counterparty risk models in
Chapter 2, and we also state in more detail how the results in this thesis improve those in
on the literature in that chapter. The literature on cascade counterparty risk models can
be divided into two branches. The first branch solves the counterparty risk model using
simulations. Notable examples of studies of simulation-based cascade counterparty
risk models include Furfine (2003), Mu¨ller (2006), Nier et al. (2007) and Gai et al.
(2007). The second branch solves the model analytically. Notable examples of analytic
solutions of the model are Gai and Kapadia (2010), May and Arinaminpathy (2010),
Hurd and Gleeson (2011), Amini et al. (2012) and Glasserman and Young (2015).
The majority of studies (both simulation based and analytical) only investigate the
cascade process. That excludes shocks to banks’ capital caused by fluctuations in asset
and liability values. The initial shock in most studies is caused by a reduction of a bank’
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asset side of the balance sheet or one insolvent bank initially. In such studies the impact
of counterparty failure to the stability of the banking system is minimal (Mu¨ller, 2006;
Battiston et al., 2012c). Whereas solving the counterparty risk model using the mean-
field approach as done in this thesis can incorporate fluctuations to all banks’ capital.
This is significant because we are able to show that depending on the initial shock to
banks’ capital the banking system can shift into an unstable region, in which most of
the banks become insolvent. Using fluctuations to banks’ capital seems a more realistic
approach as the initial shock because shocks in financial markets are experienced by
most banks in the financial system.
Furthermore, in most studies, and simulation-based studies in particular, banks
have identical balance sheets. In these studies (Gai and Kapadia, 2010) diversification
of interbank assets lowers counterparty risk. However, we show that in a banking
system where banks have different ratios of capital to assets, diversification does not
necessary lower counterparty failure. This is in line with the results in Battiston et al.
(2012b) and Garnier et al. (2013). We argue that in a system where banks have multiple
counterparties, the probability of being connected to an insolvent bank also increases,
and therefore the risk of failure still exists.
We simulate the diversification of banks’ capital by assuming that the balance
sheet quantities are random variables during the initialization process. Because of that,
for each simulation we allow for small variations in banks’ capital. This seems like
a more reasonable assumption because it can be expected that banks’ balance sheets
change during daily business. Hence, even balance sheet data reported to regulators
most likely is outdated shortly after reporting. Thus, when using random distribution
of the balance sheet parameters, we can test the stability of the banking system for a
range of parameters close to the observed values.
Finally, we show that the UK interbank network has a core-periphery structure
using exposure data from the Bank of England. Other studies (Boss et al., 2004; Fricke
and Lux, 2015; van Lelyveld et al., 2012; Langfield et al., 2014) also determined that
interbank networks have a core-periphery structure. This result is not too surprising
as part of the dataset used in this thesis was also studied in Langfield et al. (2014).
Nonetheless, we extend on the study of Langfield et al. (2014) by providing more data
on the position of specific bank types in the interbank network.
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The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 summarizes the current literature on
studies on cascade counterparty risk models and on the topology of interbank networks
and how the results of this thesis compare with those in the literature. Furthermore,
we briefly outline work on other systemic risk measures not strictly related to cascade
insolvency risk models. We do this because counterparty risk is part of systemic risk,
i.e. risk that can contribute to system failure. This is followed by Chapter 3, where we
state the cascade counterparty risk model used in this thesis, the assumptions leading
to the homogeneous mean-field model and the algorithms used to propagate insolvency
failure in the simulation-based models. In Chapter 4, we discuss the results of the mean-
field model. A comparison of the mean-field model and the solution of simulation
counterparty risk models are given in Chapter 5. A description and analysis of the
regulatory data forms the first part of Chapter 6. The comparison of counterparty failure
in heterogeneous and homogeneous banking systems initialized with the UK data is
presented in the second part of Chapter 6. The conclusions are given in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Cascade Counterparty Risk Models
As stated in Staum (2013):
”via contagion, the default of one firm is a cause contribution to default of
another.”
To test direct contagion effects, a literature on stylised banking systems has emerged
using network science and stylized balance sheets, modelling the dependencies of in-
terbank relationships (Eisenberg and Noe, 2001; Furfine, 2003; Cifuentes et al., 2005;
Nier et al., 2007; Gai and Kapadia, 2010; May and Arinaminpathy, 2010). Assets and
liabilities of banks are divided into interbank and non-interbank categories. The inter-
bank assets and liabilities form the links between the banks, and henceforth, are the
channels of default contagion.
2.1.1 Simulation-Based Studies
Most of the studied cascade counterparty risk models are simulation-based. Banks’
balance sheets are initialized using an arbitrary algorithm and the underlying interbank
network is constructed artificially using a standard network structure (i.e. Erdo˝s-Re´ny,
Small-World (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) or Scale-Free (Baraba´si and Albert, 1999)
networks). Some influential studies, that use this theoretical approach are: Nier et al.
(2007); Gai et al. (2007); Heise and Ku¨hn (2012); Anand et al. (2012). Other studies,
for example, Furfine (2003); Upper and Worms (2004); Mistrulli (2005); Elsinger et al.
(2006); Van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006); Mu¨ller (2006); Iori et al. (2006); Degryse
and Nguyen (2007); Memmel and Stein (2008); Cont et al. (2010); Mistrulli (2011);
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Solorzano-Margain et al. (2013), use real world data of banks’ balance sheets and real-
world interbank networks to test for the resilience of a banking system.
2.1.1.1 This Thesis in Relation to the Literature on Simulation-Based
Studies of the Cascade Counterparty Risk Model
We also use simulation-based models in Chapters 5 and 6. The simulation-based risk
models in the later chapters use the same algorithm distributing insolvency through the
banking system as used in studies presented above, for example, Furfine (2003) and
Mu¨ller (2006). In Chapter 5, we show that the solution of the mean-field model can be
replicated with simulation-based models for various network topologies and underlying
random distributions for the balance sheet parameters.
Instead of using fixed values for assets and liabilities, we initialize our banking
system, assuming that the balance sheet quantities are random variables. This initial-
ization process of banks’ balance sheets differs from other studies. In some studies,
banking systems are initialized such that banks have the same balance sheets (for ex-
ample, Nier et al. (2007); Gai et al. (2007)). This initialization process creates highly
homogeneous banking systems. Real world banking systems, however, consist of banks
that vary largely in size. In other studies, real-world balance sheet values are extracted
from banks’ annual reports and used to initialize the cascade process. We also use real-
world balance sheet data in Chapter 6. However, in our initialization process, the real-
world balance sheet data are used as the mean-values of the random distribution used to
initialize the balance sheets. The stochasticity in our model allows us to introduce some
diversity in banks’ initial capital, and causes banks to react slightly differently in each
stress test simulation. Because of the stochasticity, a shock can have different effects to
the banking system depending on the distribution of banks’ initial capital, whereas in
deterministic initialization processes the same shock will lead to the same result. The
stochastic method is more realistic because banks’ balance sheets and capital reserves
change continuously during operation. Because of this, any measurements of banks’
balance sheets are already inaccurate the next day.
In simulation-based stress tests, it is easy to add extra algorithms to make the styl-
ized banking system more realistic. For instance, Cifuentes et al. (2005), Mu¨ller (2006)
and May and Arinaminpathy (2010) test the effects of liquidity shortage; in Gai et al.
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(2011) unsecured claims, repurchase agreements and haircuts are included in the simu-
lation; and in Anand et al. (2012) banks can choose to withdraw their funds (foreclose)
early to a counterparty to limit losses in the event of insolvencies. We also use addi-
tional functions to change the values of interbank assets and liabilities in Section 5.5.
As in the literature, we observe that a reduction in the value of interbank-assets dur-
ing the insolvency cascade can result in or accelerate system failure. Additionally, we
explain the effects of the functions in our mean-field setting.
2.1.2 Analytic Solutions of the Cascade Counterparty Risk Model
Simplifying the model set-up allows one to extract information about the insolvency
propagation analytically. For example, in Gai and Kapadia (2010) banks’ balance
sheets are said to be identical. The interbank network is the source of randomness in
their model. That is, the total interbank assets of a bank are divided by the out-degree
of the bank creating different weighted exposure links between banks. Applying this
simplification, they used a method combining probability generating functions of de-
gree distributions with the probability of a bank being connected to an insolvent bank
(discussed in more detail in Watts (2002)) to determine the probability of default of
the banking system conditional on the out-degree of banks. They show that if banks
diversify their interbank assets to many other banks, then the probability of default
of the entire banking system is reduced. The result in Gai and Kapadia (2010) is to
some extent confuted by Battiston et al. (2012b) and Garnier et al. (2013), where they
allow balance sheet quantities (non-interbank assets and liabilities) to differ. The het-
erogeneity causes diversification of interbank exposure and does not necessarily stop
the system from defaulting. This was also indicated in Iori et al. (2006), where both
models of homogeneous and heterogeneous banking systems were studied using sim-
ulation means calibrated on data of the Italian Money Market. In Amini et al. (2012)
and Amini et al. (2013), they generalise the results of Gai and Kapadia (2010) using
asymptotic analysis on insolvency cascades on networks. They show that there exists
a point, at which one bank can trigger entire system default. Another investigation of
the influence of diversification is found in Hurd and Gleeson (2011). There, they find
that the size of a shock to the capital that causes system failure. Glasserman and Young
(2015) also use connection probabilities to evaluate banks’ risk of insolvency. They
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compare these to banks’ idiosyncratic risk of failure due to market effects. They de-
termine that only if the idiosyncratic risk is high, interbank connectivity can result in
insolvency propagation.
InMay and Arinaminpathy (2010), a mean-field approach homogenizing the bank-
ing system is used to determine the fraction of insolvent banks after 3 rounds of insol-
vency. Gleeson et al. (2013) constructs an iterative cascade model and replicates the
results of Nier et al. (2007), Gai et al. (2007) and May and Arinaminpathy (2010) by
finding some fixed points of an iteration function. The conclusions relevant for regu-
lators based on the model discussed in May and Arinaminpathy (2010) are discussed
in Haldane and May (2011). In that paper, they argue for new sets of leverage/capital
ratios and increasing the regulatory requirements of systemically important banks.
Finally, some measures of systemic risk have been proposed using as their foun-
dation the cascade counterparty risk model. For example, Debtrank (Battiston et al.,
2012c) determines the impact of a single or multiple banks insolvency on the rest of
the banking system using an iterative process. This causes the overall losses due to
counterparty risk to be relatively small. In addition to pure counterparty failure, the
contagion index (Cont et al., 2010) also includes external shocks to banks capital re-
serves, which leads to a risk measure that incorporates potential capital losses that
increases the probability of insolvency of single banks.
2.1.2.1 This Thesis in Relation to the Literature on Analytic Solutions
of the Cascade Counterparty Risk Model
The counterparty risk model studied in this thesis is based on the balance sheet model
used by Nier et al. (2007) and Gai et al. (2007). Futhermore, we assign a state to each
bank that determines whether a bank is insolvent or not, which bears similarities to the
set-up in Solorzano-Margain et al. (2013). More specifically, we say, bank i is solvent
if its state is one, and zero if the bank is insolvent. Because of that the model presented
in this thesis is analogous to the Lattice Gas model (Griessen, 1983), (Richards, 1984),
a model used to represent the motion of atoms. The state of the banks depends on
interbank exposure but also the values of non-interbank assets and liabilities. This
assumption leads to a stylized banking system that is analogous to the Random Field
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Ising model (Dahmen and Sethna, 1996), (De Dominicis and Giardina, 2006).1 The
application of this kind of model in the context of economic and financial behaviour
has been reviewed in Bouchaud (2013), and its application to credit default models has
been discussed in Hatchett and Kuehn (2009). RFIM can be solved analytically using
a mean-field assumption as is done in this thesis. The solution of the RFIM adopted
to represent the dynamics in a banking system in this thesis is a modified version of
the Curie-Weiss solution of the RFIM. The Curie-Weiss solution at zero temperature of
the RFIM shows a first order phase transition (de Matos and Perez, 1991), (Bouchaud,
2013) that in the context of the adaptation of the model to a banking system explains
the fragile state where the majority of banks change their state from solvent to insolvent
or vice versa.
In general, the mean-field approach allows us to calculate the stability of the bank-
ing system for a wide variety of balance sheet parameters. In Chapter 4, we apply a
mean-field assumption that is similar to the one simplifying the cascade model in May
and Arinaminpathy (2010). Thereby, we assume that the interbank exposure between
banks is the same, disregard the interbank network, and consider banks with similar
sized balance sheets only. In our model, liabilities and non-interbank assets are random
variables, and because of this, our banking system differs from the banking system
constructed in May and Arinaminpathy (2010). In May and Arinaminpathy (2010), the
balance sheet quantities of banks are the same values for all banks. Assuming random
assets and liabilities allows us (i) to determine the fraction of banks that survive an
external shock to their balance sheets and (ii) to conduct a parameter analysis, which
reveals the regions, where a fragile state becomes possible. Our results are in line with
the findings in Gai and Kapadia (2010), Amini et al. (2012) and Hurd and Gleeson
(2011). We also observe a fragile state, at which the majority of banks in banking
system change from solvent to insolvent, given a shock to banks’ initial capital.
Furthermore, we replicate the results of Gai and Kapadia (2010) in Chapter 5 and
discuss diversification of interbank assets within the setting of our methodology. We
show that for a particular range of parameters, diversification becomes less significant
in order to prevent the fragile state.
1The Ising model (Ising, 1925) was first used to model ferromagnetic spins that can either be in two
states: up or down. The lattice Gas model is a specific version of the Ising model where the state is either
one or zero.
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Most of the models (Gai and Kapadia, 2010; May and Arinaminpathy, 2010)
studying counterparty risk consider counterparty risk on its own, disregarding the in-
fluence of potential losses in system-wide capital (notable exceptions are Elsinger et al.
(2006), Cont et al. (2010), Amini et al. (2012), Hurd and Gleeson (2011) and Glasser-
man and Young (2015)). Instead, they discuss counterparty risk given that the initial
shock is represented by the loss of one bank in the banking system or a value reduction
of one banks assets. A reason why it is important to consider considerable capital losses
when dealing with not only counterparty risk but systemic risk in general is formulated
in Acharya et al. (2014):
“If a firm fails in isolation, other financial firms will step in and take over
its activities. However, in a period of aggregate stress where the whole fi-
nancial sector is undercapitalized, financial firms cannot find the resources
to take over other firms activities; thus, failing firms impose negative ex-
ternalities to the real economy.”
In Glasserman and Young (2015), they even show that without shocks to banks’
capital reserves system-wide, the insolvency hardly ever propagates through the in-
terbank network. Furthermore, we calculated the size of the average shock to banks’
capital that causes a system crash, and we find that only within the vicinity of the fragile
state one bank can trigger counterparty failure.
The results of the mean-field model are published in Birch and Aste (2014).
2.2 Literature on the Topology of Interbank Networks
Studies of direct contagion in a banking system are related to the study of the topology
of exposure networks. Interbank exposure networks can be constructed from informa-
tion on payments systems, interbank lending, or other exposure such as derivatives and
repayment products. Interbank exposure and its effects on counterparty risk have led to
an active study of interbank exposure networks, where direct obligations between banks
are depicted as graphs. Among the first theoretical studies on interbank markets are the
works conducted by Rochet and Tirole (1996), Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al.
(2000). The networks in these early studies are relatively small consisting of only a
small number of banks. Basic concepts such as risk diversification and liquidity needs
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are discussed theoretically. Since then, multiple studies on the structure of real-world
interbank networks - consisting of a couple of hundred banks, were carried out, e.g. in
Mu¨ller (2006) and Upper (2011). Some of these studies challenged the results of these
early studies. For example, when increasing the number of banks and considering a
heterogeneous system, diversification of interbank assets does not always lead to a sta-
ble system (Battiston et al., 2012b; Garnier et al., 2013) as suggested in Allen and Gale
(2000).
This highlights the importance of empirical studies of the topology of interbank
networks. However, studies of real world interbank networks are restricted due to lim-
ited access to bilateral exposure data. Bilateral exposure data are mostly collected by
banking regulators and are not publicly available, since they are classified as market
changing information. Langfield and Sorama¨ki (2014) state regarding the opaqueness
of interbank exposure data:
“...links between financial institutions are typically unobserved by market
participants. Banks chief risk officers know their employer’s counterparty
risk exposures, but not the counterparty risk exposures of their employer’s
counterparties. Large broker-dealers typically have some information re-
garding their clients’ exposures, but uncertainty nonetheless dominates.”
In particular, banks report their bank-to-bank exposure2 to their regulatory authority.
Other sources of bilateral exposure include electronic trading platforms such as e-MID
(electronic market for interbank deposits) (e MID, 2014; Iori et al., 2006) or the Fed-
wire Funds Services (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2014; So-
rama¨ki et al., 2007). Regulatory reports and credit registers have restricted access due
to their sensitive nature. Thus, most studies on interbank lending are conducted by
central banks or bank regulators sometimes in cooperation with academics (for exam-
ple, Hungary (Lublo´y, 2005), Italy (Mistrulli, 2005, 2011; Delpini et al., 2013; Bargigli
et al., 2015), Austria (Elsinger et al., 2006), Mexico (Solorzano-Margain et al., 2013;
Martı´nez-Jaramillo et al., 2014) and Brazil (Cont et al., 2010)). In most cases, the in-
terbank networks created from regulatory data contain information on banks belonging
to the country of the regulators, excluding foreign banks because these do not fall into
2For example, in the UK the Prudential Regulation Authority, a division of the Bank of England, is
responsible for collecting bilateral exposure reports.
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the geographic area of the regulator’s responsibility. When studying the topology of
interbank networks, the exclusion of foreign banks can cause distortions. For exam-
ple, in the European Union an active cross-border market is present. However, each
country collects information on bilateral exposure for banks only that are situated in its
jurisdiction (European Systemic Risk Board, 2015).
In other studies of country specific interbank networks, datasets are used to con-
struct interbank networks of a variety of financial products (i.e. interbank credit, deriva-
tives, repayment products and other securities), which are restricted either by a limit on
the number of counterparties that banks have to report, or only include exposure above
a certain threshold. Thus, the incomplete information on interbank networks restricts
studies on the influence of interbank exposure on counterparty risk. This is because
models calibrated with incomplete interbank networks underestimate counterparty risk.
Examples of studies of incomplete interbank networks include the UK (Langfield et al.,
2014), Germany (Van Lelyveld and Liedorp, 2006; Memmel and Stein, 2008; van
Lelyveld et al., 2012), Switzerland (Mu¨ller, 2006), and Austria (Boss et al., 2004).
In Chapter 6, we use UK interbank exposure data first studied in Langfield et al. (2014)
to calibrate both the mean-field model as well as a heterogeneous simulation model of
counterparty risk.
Datasets on payment flows are used to reconstruct payment and money market
networks in the USA (Sorama¨ki et al., 2007; Bech and Atalay, 2010; Battiston et al.,
2012a) using data on Fedwire; in Denmark (Amundsen and Arnt, 2005; Rørdam and
Bech, 2008) using regulatory reports; and in the Euro-area (Arciero et al., 2014) using
TARGET2 (Trans European Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer) data. In
these datasets, transactions between banks are monitored. That is, if a bank A conducts
a transfer to a bank B, and bank B returns that transfer (plus interest) at a later time,
then it is assumed that bank A was exposed to bank B.
The literature on interbank networks suggests that there exists a core-periphery
structure with internationally operating banks forming the core of the interbank net-
work and a periphery consisting of smaller banks that operate on a national basis (Boss
et al., 2004; De Masi et al., 2006; Craig and Von Peter, 2010; Wetherilt et al., 2010;
Langfield et al., 2014). Specifically, it has been observed that the density of interbank
networks are relatively low with small clustering coefficients and disassortative mixing
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of the degree (Upper, 2011). In Cocco et al. (2009), it is argued that the core-periphery
structure in a country specific interbank market occurs because smaller regional banks
have limited access to international markets and tend to use the domestic interbank
markets via large internationally operating banks.
Another category of studies on interbank networks uses banks’ balance sheet re-
ports and algorithms to infer interbank networks. An early algorithm used to construct
an approximated interbank network is the entropy maximization algorithm, as used by
Upper andWorms (2004) and Degryse and Nguyen (2007). Information about banks to-
tal interbank assets and liabilities to or from other banks is distributed using maximum
entropy. This creates an interbank network where obligations are spread as equally
as possible creating a fully connected graph. However, this algorithm disregards any
community structure and low density as observed in real networks, and therefore was
not deemed suitable to create interbank networks, as it underestimates the impact of
counterparty risk (Mistrulli, 2011; Mastromatteo et al., 2012). The maximum entropy
algorithm is tweaked in Mastromatteo et al. (2012) where they adopt the maximum
entropy algorithm by tuning the degree of sparsity by bounding the maximum possible
degree of sparsity to create a more realistic network.
In Musmeci et al. (2012), a bootstrapping method is used to reconstruct the topol-
ogy of financial networks. This algorithm can be used provided there is information
given about the connectivity of a small subset of nodes. To construct the network, they
use an exponential random graph model that has to satisfy constraints provided from
the initial seed network and other information.
The core-periphery algorithm in an interbank setting (Craig and Von Peter, 2010)
is also used to construct exposure networks. The algorithm creates a network, where
banks can be classified into two groups: core and periphery banks. In a perfect
core-periphery network, periphery banks are only connected to core banks. Whereas,
core banks are connected to periphery banks but also other core banks. The core-
periphery algorithm was studied in Craig and Von Peter (2010), Fricke and Lux (2015)
and Langfield et al. (2014). The studies reveal that the networks produced using the
core-periphery algorithm provide a better fit to real world networks than networks con-
structed using the maximum entropy algorithm.
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2.2.0.1 This Thesis in Relation to the Literature on Interbank Networks
We refrain from using any of the algorithms discussed above to construct the interbank
network, as we were able to obtain real-world exposure data to construct our networks
in Chapter 6. Nonetheless, we think that due to a lack of publicly available data, al-
gorithms are needed to replicate the the core-periphery form of interbank networks.
Hence, we intend to redirect our future research to the fine tuning of these algorithms
and, for this and other reasons, provide more network measures in Section 6.1.3 to
obtain a better understanding of the topology of interbank networks.
In alignment with the literature on interbank networks, we find that the exposure
data studied in this thesis also produces core-periphery interbank networks. This is not
surprising because part of the data (2011) used to produce the interbank networks was
already studied in Langfield et al. (2014).
2.3 Short Overview of Other Systemic Risk Models
Financial contagion can occur via indirect and direct channels. Insolvency propagation
via interbank exposure is only one (direct) channel of insolvency contagion in a banking
system. An other channel is asset price fluctuations. In this thesis, we focus on the
effects of direct exposure from one bank to another and how this effects the stability of
a banking system. For completeness, this section gives a brief overview of works on
systemic risk, where asset price fluctuation and correlated portfolios are considered the
source for an unstable banking system. Fouque and Langsam (2013) provide a more
detailed collection of papers and an extensive review of the most current literature on
systemic risk.
Influential studies examining indirect channels include, for example, the measure:
Conditional Value at risk (CoVar) by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), a variation of
the Value at Risk (VaR3). CoVar uses the quantile function, measuring whether a bank
is at its VaR conditional on other institutions being at their VaR. The Systemic Ex-
pected Shortfall (SES) by Acharya et al. (2010), a variation of the Expected Shortfall
(ES4), measures “... the amount a bank’s equity ... drops below its target level ... in
3VaR states the value of a quantile function of loss distributions that a bank is likely to lose over a
time period given a certain confidence interval.
4Acharya et al. (2010) defines ES as: “... the expected shortfall is the average of returns on days
when the portfolio’s loss exceeds its VaR limit.”
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case of a systemic crisis” (Acharya et al., 2010). The distress insurance premium mea-
sure introduced by Huang et al. (2009) and Huang et al. (2012) is “based on credit
default swap (CDS) spreads of individual banks and the co-movements in banks equity
returns”(Huang et al., 2012). The three measures rely on time series analysis of banks’
portfolios.
In Billio et al. (2012) correlation and causality measures on financial institutions’
returns are used to quantify systemic risk. They conclude “that linkages within and
across all four sectors [Annot.: banking, insurance companies, hedge funds and bro-
ker/dealers] are highly dynamic over the past decade, varying in quantifiable ways
over time and as a function of market conditions. Over time, all four sectors have be-
come highly interrelated, increasing the channels through which shocks can propagate
throughout the finance and insurance sectors” (Billio et al., 2012).
Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) calculate the banking system’s portfolio multi-
variate density, which characterizes “both the individual and joint asset value move-
ments of the portfolio of banks representing the banking system” (Segoviano and Good-
hart, 2009), by computing the joint probability of distress of the banking system. A
similar approach is used in Tsatskis (2012), where he solves for the distribution of in-
solvent banks using multi-name latent variable models. Specifically, he uses normal
distributions for the underlying balance sheet variables. The outcome in both papers
depends on the choice of the underlying copulas used to combine the default probabil-
ities of single banks and might vary greatly for different random distributions.
Banks and asset classes form the set of nodes of bipartite networks in Caccioli
et al. (2014), where the Galton-Watson process is used to determine the influence of
overlapping portfolios on financial stability. In both Tsatskis (2012) and Caccioli et al.
(2014), asset prices are reduced proportional to the number of insolvent banks. This
causes the banking system to turn from a stable system to an unstable system, given
variations in capital. Thus, the interconnectedness of banks causes a fragile state similar
to the one observed in the cascade counterparty risk models.
Agent-based models have been used to model banking and other financial systems
(Lux and Marchesi, 2000; Hommes, 2006; Farmer and Geanakoplos, 2009). In agent-
based models of systemic risk, banks (or other financial companies) form the agents.
An algorithm models the strategy and interaction of banks in the system. This results
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in macro-economic observable behaviour of the banking system. The simulation-based
nature of agent-based models allows for testing of different strategies, for example
banks having additional information on other banks’ systemic risk influence (Thurner
and Poledna, 2013), the inclusion of a central bank (Geanakoplos et al., 2014), or test-
ing new regulations such as the influence of a transaction tax (Poledna and Thurner,
2014), or the effects of a bail-out of an insolvent bank (Klimek et al., 2014).
Finally, stress test platforms like the Systemic Risk Monitor (Boss et al., 2006),
the Risk Assessment Model for Systemic Institutions (Alessandri et al., 2009) and the
V-Lab (Acharya et al., 2014) incorporate cascade models based on balance sheets and
interbank networks, and various other risk measures, like CoVar and SES, when evalu-
ating the stability of financial systems.
Chapter 3
The Cascade Counterparty Risk
Model
Summary The chapter details a description of the counterparty risk model studied in
this thesis. Stylized balance sheets contain information about banks’ assets, liabilities
and capital. If banks’ assets are smaller than banks’ liabilities, the bank is said to be in-
solvent. The insolvency propagates through an interbank exposure network. Insolvent
banks reduce the asset side of their counterparties causing further insolvencies. The
chapter also includes the assumptions and derivations of the mean-field model - a vari-
ation of the counterparty risk model that can be solved semi-analytically by creating a
homogeneous banking system. Finally, the assumptions and the insolvency algorithm
of a simulation-based counterparty risk model are described.
3.1 Counterparty Risk Model
The counterparty risk model studied in this thesis investigates the insolvency propaga-
tion caused by counterparty failure in a banking system following an initial shock to
banks’ assets or liabilities.
In our model, we consider N banks. A bank i is assigned a state, Si(t), displaying
whether the bank is solvent or insolvent at time t:
Si(t) =
8<: 1 if bank i is solvent0 if bank i is insolvent . (3.1)
We adopt the stylized balance sheet introduced by Nier et al. (2007) and Gai et al.
(2007), considering liabilities and assets. A schematic diagram of a simple balance
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Figure 3.1: This figure represents a stylised balance sheet of bank i. The total liabilities of
bank i at time t, Li(t), is the sum of the bank’s non-interbank liabilities, Lˆi(t), and
interbank funding,
PN
j=1 gji. The total assets of bank i at time t, Ai(t), is the sum
of non-interbank assets, Aˆi(t) and interbank exposure,
PN
j=1 gij(t)Sk(t). Addi-
tionally, the value of exposure to an insolvent bank is considered by introducing a
recovery rate, qij(t) such that the term
PN
j=1 qij(t)gij(t)(1 Sj(t)) states the value
of any exposure to insolvent banks j. The difference in the bank’s total assets and
liabilities is the bank’s capital Ei(t) = Ai(t)   Li(t). A bank is said to solvent if
Ai(t)   Li(t). If Ai(t) < Li(t), the bank is said to be insolvent.
sheet of a bank ‘i’ is given in Figure 3.1.
The balance sheet quantities are divided into interbank and non-interbank quan-
tities. The exposure matrix G = {gij(t)}1i,jN describes the interbank network at
time t; interbank exposure is modelled by adding all the exposures of banks j at time
t to a bank i, and multiplying each exposure to bank j with the state of bank j, i.e.PN
j=1 gij(t)Sj(t). The state of a bank j indicates whether bank j is able to fulfill any
obligation to bank i. In the event of a bank being insolvent and not being able to return
the full amount of exposure to any loaner banks, the loaner bank can usually expect
a reduced amount of the original value of the exposure during insolvency procedures.
The fraction of the amount of exposure, that bank i receives from an insolvent bank,
is called the recovery rate. In particular, we say matrix Q(t) = {qij(t)}1i,jN , where
qij(t) 2 [0, 1] contains the recovery rates qij(t) at time t for any exposure gij(t) from
bank i to bank j, such that an additional term
PN
j=1 qij(t)gij(t)(1   Sj(t)) models the
value of an exposure of bank i to bank j at time t, when bank j is insolvent. The to-
tal assets of bank i at time t are the sum of non-interbank assets, Aˆi(t), and interbank
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Table 3.1: The table states a list of variables of bank i at time t used in the balance sheet
model. Si(t) describes the state of bank i, gij(t) models the loan from bank i
to bank j. Similarly, gji(t) is the loan from bank j to bank i. The recovery
rate of any defaulted exposure from bank i to bank j is given as qij(t). The
total interbank exposure from bank i to bank j is
PN
j=1 gij(t)Sj(t), and bank
i receives funding on the interbank market of a total amount of
PN
j=1 gji from
banks j. The value of defaulted exposure is
PN
j=1 qij(t)gij(t)(1   Sj(t)). The
non-interbank assets are represented by Aˆi(t), and Lˆ(t) denotes non-interbank de-
posits, and Ei(t) denotes the bank’s loss absorbing capital. The total assets are
Ai(t) = Aˆi(t) +
PN
j=1
✓
gij(t)Sj(t) + qij(t)gij(t)(1   Sj(t))
◆
, and the total lia-
bilities are Li(t) = Lˆi(t) +
PN
j=1 gji(t).
Variable Description of variables
Si(t) State of bank i
Ai(t) Total assets
Li(t) Total liabilities
Ei(t) Capital
Aˆi(t) Non-interbank assets of bank i at time t
Lˆi(t) Non-interbank liabilities
gij(t) Interbank loan from bank i to bank jPN
j=1 gij(t)Sj(t) Total interbank exposurePN
j=1 qij(t)gij(t)(1  Sj(t)) Total value of defaulted exposurePN
j=1 gji(t) Total interbank funding
assets at time t:
Ai(t) = Aˆi(t) +
NX
j=1
✓
gij(t)Sj(t) + qij(t)gij(t)(1  Sj(t))
◆
. (3.2)
Similarly, the liabilities are the sum of non-interbank liabilities Lˆi(t) and interbank
liabilities
PN
j=1 gji(t) such that the total liabilities of bank i at time t are:
Li(t) = Lˆi(t) +
NX
j=1
gji(t). (3.3)
The loss absorbing capital of bank i at time t is the difference between total assets and
total liabilities, i.e.
Ei(t) = Ai(t)  Li(t). (3.4)
The above equation is the Balance Sheet Equation. Table 3.1 summarizes the variables
used in this model.
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The stress criteria are modelled by using the balance sheet test to determine insol-
vency, as outlined in Goode (2010). Namely, a bank is said to be insolvent if assets are
less than liabilities at time t, i.e. the Insolvency Condition is:
Ai(t) < Li(t). (3.5)
In legal terms, a bank defaults if it is not able to pay back a loan upon maturity. Whereas
insolvency occurs if a bank’s liabilities are larger than a bank’s assets (Goode, 2010).
Thus, insolvency and default are not synonyms but describe two legal processes that
can result in the bankruptcy of a bank. Nonetheless, we sometimes refer to “default”
in this thesis when the correct term is insolvency. In particular, we use default if most
banks of the entire banking system are insolvent and say the banking system defaulted.
Given that the state of a bank i is determined by the Insolvency Condition, Eq. 3.5,
consequently the state of a bank at time t+ 1 is
Si(t+ 1) = Hc(Ai(t)  Li(t)), (3.6)
where Hc(x) = 1 for x   c and Hc(x) = 0 for x < c. For the purpose of this
thesis, we set c to zero and omit writing the subscript from now on. In some countries,
solvency procedures are started when the capital of a bank is still positive but when
capital reaches a certain threshold of total assets.1 In this case, c should be adjusted to
the value at which solvency procedures start.
Note that, an insolvent bank (Si(t) = 0) can recover and change its state to Si(t+
1) = 1 if the difference between liabilities and total assets is positive: Ai(t) > Li(t).
This possibility can occur whenever capital is introduced to a distressed bank, as done
via quantitative easing (QE) or government bail-outs. The cost of returning to a stable
system as well as more details about capital injections are discussed in Chapter 4.
Finally, the fraction of surviving banks, pt+1 2 [0, 1], at time t+ 1 is given by
pt+1 =
1
N
NX
i
H(Ei(t))). (3.7)
In the Ising model literature describing spin systems, Ei(t) = Ai(t)   Li(t) is
1For example, see regulations in Mexico (Solorzano-Margain et al., 2013).
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called the ‘incentive function’ (De Dominicis and Giardina, 2006). The probability of
bank i to be in a particular state, using the logit rule (which is a standard choice to
determine the probability of a spin being in a particular state) is:
P (Si(t) = 1|Ei(t  1)) = 11+exp(  Ei(t 1)) , (3.8)
where   is the inverse temperature of the spin system. When   tends to zero (infinite
temperature limit) the incentive does not influence the state of the bank. Hence, bank
i is normally operating or under stress with probability 1/2. Conversely, when   tends
to infinity (zero temperature limit) then Eq. 3.6 is recovered. Thus, the map introduced
in Eq. 3.7 belongs to the Random Field Ising models (RFIM) at zero temperature, a
model in statistical physics that describes the spin of atoms (De Dominicis and Giar-
dina, 2006). In addition, RFIM have been used to investigate the behaviour of other
complex systems, where the state of actors can be modelled as a binary decision influ-
enced by other actors in the system. For example, Weidlich (1994) used the model to
study decision making, Newman (2002) for the development of epidemic spread and in
Heise and Ku¨hn (2012), it was used to investigate credit derivatives.
3.2 Mean-Field Model
The mean-field model is a simplified version of the counterparty risk model introduced
in Sec. 3.1. In order to obtain a closed form expression of the fraction of surviving
banks, assumptions are made that homogenize the banks in the banking system.
Furthermore, we are looking at the instantaneous stress imposed on a banking
system given a particular distribution of non-interbank assets and liabilities. Hence, any
change in the investment after the system is stressed is neglected. More specifically,
it is assumed that the time to counteract a shock using other investment strategies is
of larger order of time than the instantaneous stress imposed by insolvent banks to its
creditors. Therefore, we consider most of the balance sheet quantities to be constant in
time. Specifically, we consider that the process of stressing a bank and the consequent
loss of the interbank exposure are much more imminent than the distribution of any
assets belonging to an insolvent bank. Therefore, even if the creditor of a bank is
insolvent, the bank still has to pay any outstanding loans towards the insolvent bank.
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Furthermore, we assume that transfers of assets belonging to the insolvent bank to
counterparties are excluded. Hence, we say that the liabilities of bank i, Li(t) = Li are
constant in t and vary from bank to bank as drawn from a random distribution.
The non-interbank assets Aˆi(t) = Aˆi are also considered constant in t and drawn
from a random distribution. This represents different investment decisions, and hence,
different investment returns. Then Eq. 3.7 can be written as
pt+1 =
1
N
NX
i=1
H(Aˆi   Li +
NX
j=1
✓
gijSj(t) + qijgij(1  Sj(t))
◆
). (3.9)
For interbank loans, we assume a mean-field, i.e. the average amount bank i is
exposed to all other banks,
PN
j=1 gijSj(t), is approximated with zgpt, where z is the
average number of banks that bank i is exposed to and assumed to be very large, g is
the average loan borrowed from one bank to another and pt 2 [0, 1] is the fraction of
solvent banks at a given time t as before. Similarly, the recovery rate is averaged and
constant in t: qij(t) = q. Then Eq. 3.9 changes to
pt+1 =
1
N
NX
i=1
H(Aˆi   Li + zgpt + zqg(1  pt)). (3.10)
A probability distribution belongs to the family of location-scale distributions, if
for any random variable X with distribution function from such a family, one can find
another random variable Y = µ +  X , where µ 2 R and   > 0, with distribution
function also in that family (Rinne, 2011). The parameter µ is called the location
parameter and   is the scale parameter. Furthermore, if X’s location parameter equals
zero and it has a scale parameter of one, X is called the standardized variable.
Let us use the assumption here that Aˆi and Li are independent and follow dis-
tributions in the location-scale family with location parameters µAˆ and µL, and scale
parameters  Aˆ and  L, respectively. The random variable Aˆi Li therefore has location
parameter µ = µAˆ   µL and scale parameter   =
q
 2
Aˆ
+  2L.
Normal distributions belong to the family of location-scale distributions. If Aˆi
and Li are drawn from Normal distributions, the location parameter, µ, is the mean of
the non-interbank assets minus the mean of liabilities and   is the standard deviation,
which represent the level of uncertainty of the expected value for non-interbank assets
and liabilities.
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To transform the CDF into a standard location-scale CDF, let Aˆi   Li = µ +  ✏i,
where the standardized variable ✏i is taken from a standard location-scale distribution.
Then Eq. 3.9 changes to
pr =
1
N
NX
i=1
P (µ   ✏i + zqg >  zg(1  q)pr 1), (3.11)
and the Insolvency Condition becomes
✏i <
 µ  zqg
 
  zg(1  q)
 
pr 1. (3.12)
For convenience, let us introduce the following two variables:
a =
 µ  qzg
 
, (3.13)
and
b =
zg(1  q)
 
. (3.14)
By using the above assumptions and assuming that N is very large, we can simplify
Eq. 3.11 and write the fraction of solvent banks after r rounds of insolvency as
pr = F (pr 1), (3.15)
where F (x) = 1   P (a   bx) is a cumulative distribution function (CDF). The term
a   bpr 1 states the average capital of a bank in round r. The function described in
Eq. 3.15 is a monotone increasing function on a compact set. This ensures that the map
in Eq. 3.15 has at least one stable fixed point (Smith, 2008). We present a more detailed
analysis of the fixed points in Chapter 4. Given an initial fraction, p0, of surviving banks
(note that p0 can differ from one), the solution of Eq. 3.15 is a fixed point probability
satisfying p = F (p|p0). Hence, the fraction p represents the probability of the survival
of the banking system.
In the RFIM literature, the parameter b models the influence of agents on other
agents. In our model, b describes the average exposure minus the average expected
value of defaulted exposure divided by the scale parameter,  , of the sum of non-
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interbank assets and liabilities, and hence b is always positive. When b is negative,
banks would have to pay their loaners to keep the exposure. When b equals zero, then,
whether a bank is insolvent, depends solely on the distributions of the non-interbank
assets and liabilities. If the standardized variable ✏i is drawn from a standard Normal
distribution, it is to be expected that half the banks are insolvent when a and b equal
zero. Conversely, when b becomes larger, i.e. when the average total interbank expo-
sure becomes larger, or when the recovery rate becomes smaller, or the scale parameter
of the sum of non-interbank assets and liabilities becomes smaller, then, for a fixed a,
the system is more resilient. However, we will see in Chapter 4, there exists a criti-
cal value bc, at which the behaviour of the system changes from a smooth decline in
normally operating banks to a sudden decrease, which we call the fragile state of the
banking system.
The parameter a is the difference between the location parameters of liabilities
and non-interbank assets, µ, and the average recovery value of defaulted exposure,
qzg, divided by the scale parameter of non-interbank assets and liabilities,  . If a is
negative, then the location value of non-interbank assets and expected recovery term
are larger than the liabilities. The denominator of a is the scale parameter,  . If a is
negative and   tends to zero, then a tends to minus infinity, leading to a more stable
system. However, if a is positive, then   ⌧ 1 leads to a more unstable system. Instead,
if the location parameter of non-interbank assets is sufficient to counter the liabilities,
i.e. a⌧ 0, a large   would imply that for some banks, their non-interbank assets would
not be enough to satisfy the Solvency Condition, Eq. 3.5. Therefore, if the interbank
loans are not sufficient, these banks are insolvent. Conversely, if a   0, then a large
  is desirable, as this implies that for some banks, their non-interbank asset value is
higher than the expected value. Thus, these banks can satisfy the Solvency Condition,
Eq. 3.5, and will operate normally.
These assumptions homogenize the system, but it should be noted that banking
systems in most countries are far from a homogeneous system. Indeed, banks’ balance
sheets differ greatly. In particular, we discuss the size of UK banks in more detail in
Section 6.1, showing that some banks’ balance sheets only contain a few hundred Mil.
GBP, especially smaller regional building societies, and other banks’ assets are worth a
few trillion GBP (large internationally operating banks headquartered in the UK).
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We study a homogeneous system because it can be solved semi-analytically. A
reason why a homogeneous solution of a heterogeneous system can still be of interest is
the particular structure of the interbank network. It has been shown that in some coun-
tries the interbank network structure can be described as a tightly connected core with
international banks in the centre and smaller regional banks in the periphery (Mu¨ller,
2006; Fricke and Lux, 2015). We reach the same conclusion in Section 6.1, where we
investigate an interbank exposure network constructed from UK regulatory reports. In
the core-periphery structure, the larger international banks in the core are of similar
size. Therefore, we can argue that, for systemic risk, the most relevant part of the inter-
bank network is the homogeneous core network of large banks, which can be modelled
using the homogeneous mean-field model.
Furthermore, in Chapter 6, we compare a simulation-based model of a hetero-
geneous banking system with the homogeneous model solution, concluding that both
models lead to similar results: we show that a fragile state, at which most of the banks
in the banking system suddenly become insolvent occurs, for both models, with a sim-
ilar sized shock to their balance sheet quantities. This suggests that a simple model
of a homogeneous banking system sufficiently describes the main features of a more
complex model of a hetereogenous banking system.
3.2.1 The Ratio of Interbank Assets to Total Assets, ✓
For convenience, let us introduce here the ratio of interbank assets to total assets, ✓.
To derive the mean-field model solution containing ✓, we use the same assumptions as
above up to and including Eq. 3.10. We further assume Ai(0) is drawn from a location-
scale distribution with location parameter µA and scale parameter  A. We say that
zg = ✓Ai(0) and Aˆ = (1   ✓)Ai(0), and assume that p0 equals one. Furthermore,
we assume as before that Li is drawn from a location-scale distribution with location
parameter µL and scale parameter  L. Thus, we have
(1  ✓)Ai(0) + ✓Ai(0)  Li = µA   µL +
p
 2A +  
2
L✏i
= (1  ✓)µA + ✓µA   µL +
p
 2A +  
2
L✏i.
(3.16)
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Then Eq. 3.10 can be written for r = 1:
p1 =
1
N
NX
i=1
P
✓
(1  ✓)µA + ✓µA   µL +
q
 2A +  
2
L✏i < 0
◆
, (3.17)
where P (.), as before, is the CDF of the location-scale distribution. The fraction of
operating banks after r iterations then can be written as:
pr =
1
N
NX
i=1
P
✓
(1  ✓)µA + ✓µApr 1 + q✓µA(1  pr 1)  µL +
q
 2A +  
2
L✏i < 0
◆
,
(3.18)
For N !1, the above equation can be simplified further to:
pr = 1  P
✓
a
0   b0pr 1
◆
, (3.19)
where we reduced the multi-parameter system to the following two parameters given
 
0
=
p
 2A +  
2
L:
a
0
=
 (1  ✓)µA + µL   q✓µA
 0
, (3.20)
and
b
0
=
(1  q)✓µA
 0
. (3.21)
We have two reasons for introducing ✓. First, we use ✓ to calibrate the simulation-
based model of counterparty failure described in the next section. When comparing
the simulation solution with the solution of the mean-field model, a0 and b0 are used to
calculate the mean-field solution. Second, estimates for ✓ can be obtained from other
studies (Mu¨ller, 2006; Upper, 2011). Whereas it is more difficult to retrieve zp from
publicly available data.
3.3 Simulation-Based Counterparty Risk Model
The mean-field assumption of the interbank market implies that each bank lends the
same amount to all other banks and that the size of banks’ balance sheets are roughly
the same, with similar capital reserves to counteract a shock to banks’ non-interbank
assets and liabilities. In Chapter 5, we test the robustness of the results of the mean-
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field model by comparing it with a simulation-based model. In Chapter 6, we use two
regulatory datasets from the BoE to calibrate a simulation-based model.
The banking system discussed in Chapter 5 is still highly stylised using standard
network structures and random distributions to initialize the banking system. Whereas
when constructing the banking system studied in Chapter 6, we use real-world expo-
sure networks and balance sheet data. For this reason, the initialization processes of the
simulation-based models are stated in the beginning of Chapters 5 and 6 in more detail.
However, the assumptions about balance sheet variables during the insolvency propa-
gation are mostly the same in both simulation models and outlined in the following.
For both simulation-based models, the number of banks N is fixed and, as in the
general model layout, each bank i is assigned a state Si(0) 2 {0, 1}, stating whether
bank i is solvent (Si(0) = 1) or not (Si(0) = 0). As in the mean-field model, we also
consider the instantaneous impact of counterparty failure. Hence, we assume liabilities,
Li(t) = Li, non-interbank assets, Aˆi(t) = Aˆi, interbank exposure, gij(t) = gij , and
recovery rates, qij(t) = qij do not change in time. The total liabilities, Li, and the initial
value of total assets, Ai(0), of bank i are assumed to be random variables.
For the same reasons as in the mean-field model, we assume that interbank liabil-
ities to insolvent banks have to be returned also to an insolvent bank. Hence, we use
total liabilities, Li, in the simulation models only. Interbank assets are the sum of the
exposure from bank i to bank j multiplied by the state of banks j plus the recovery
value of the exposure:
PN
i=1 gijSj(0) + qijgij(1  Sj(0)). The total assets of bank i in
round r are then
Ai(r) = Aˆi +
NX
i=1
gijSj(r) + qijgij(1  Sj(r)) (3.22)
The insolvency cascade algorithm describes the propagation of insolvency of
banks in the banking system. Specifically, we use a similar algorithm as proposed
in Furfine (2003), where at each iteration round r:
1. The total assets, Ai(r), are calculated using Eq. 3.22 for each bank i.
2. For all banks i, the difference between total liabilities, Li, and total assets, Ai(r),
is calculated, simultaneously.
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3. For any bank i with negative capital, Ai(r) Li, the state of bank i is set to zero.
4. The iteration is repeated until no bank changes its state.
When the process stops, all surviving banks are counted and the fraction of surviv-
ing banks, p, is computed as the total number of surviving banks divided by the total
number of banks.
3.3.1 Differences in the Assumptions of the Simulation Models
In Chapter 5, each bank i is initially calibrated with liabilities Li and assetsAi(0) drawn
from random distributions with location µL and scale  L for liabilities, and location µA
and scale  A for total assets.
We construct the interbank network using standard network structures (Erdo˝s-
Re´ny networks, Small-World networks (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) and a Baraba´si-
Albert networks (Baraba´si and Albert, 1999)). The adjacency matrix of the standard
network, X = { 1ijN}, indicates whether a bank i is exposed to a bank j (i.e.
 ij = 1) or not (i.e.  ij = 0). The total interbank assets of a bank i are computed using
a fixed fraction, ✓ 2 (0, 1), of interbank assets to total assets, such that the total inter-
bank exposure is: ✓Ai(0). To extract the value gij of interbank assets from bank i to
bank j, ✓Ai(0) is divided by the degree of bank i, zi =
PN
j=1  ij . Hence, the individual
loan from bank i to its neighbouring banks j is ✓Ai ij/zi. The difference between total
initial assets, Ai(0), and total interbank assets, ✓Ai(0), are the non-interbank assets, Aˆi,
of bank i.
The recovery rate is constant for all exposures from bank i to bank j, such that
an element of the recovery matrix Q can be written as qij = q. Hence, the value of
recovered loans are given as q✓Ai(0)gij .
In Chapter 6, each bank i is initially calibrated with liabilities Li and assets Ai(0)
drawn from random distributions with location µLi and scale  Li for liabilities, and
location µAi and scale  Ai for total assets, i.e. µAi , µLi ,  Ai and  Li are chosen individ-
ually for each bank. This creates a highly heterogeneous banking system where banks
vary greatly in the size of their balance sheets.
The value of interbank exposure, gij , from bank i to bank j is taken from the
regulatory data. The non-interbank assets, Aˆi, are the difference between the total
initial assets, Ai(0), and the sum of bank i’s exposure to other banks,
PN
j=1 gij .
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We disregard the recovery rate, qij , in the simulation model of the heterogeneous
banking system. The reason for this is quite practical: we do not have data on the
recovery rate of exposure between specific banks. Thus, the recovery rate is set to zero.
3.3.2 Changes in the Value of Balance Sheet Quantities Over Time
Fire-sales, QE, bank runs and bail-outs are examples that potentially change the value
of banks’ balance sheet quantities during the insolvency propagation. To investigate the
effects of value changes in time of balance sheet quantities, we incorporate functions
that alter the value of assets or liabilities following the initial shock to banks’ balance
sheets.
For the simulation model in Chapter 5, we apply a function that changes the bal-
ance sheet values of a bank i at time t. If a bank becomes insolvent, its assets are
liquidated to satisfy debtors demands. This might cause a change in the price value of
specific assets due to an over supply of these assets. When mark-to-market accounting
is used to evaluate the value of the asset side of balance sheets, other banks experience
a shock to their balance sheets because of asset devaluation. In particular, we use an
inverse demand curve for the illiquid asset to simulate a reduction in the asset value
caused by the insolvency of banks:
Aˆi(r + 1) = exp( 1(1  pr))Aˆi(r), (3.23)
where 1 2 [0, 1] is a constant. Thus, exp( 1(1   pr)) reduces the value of non-
interbank assets of a bank i in round r proportional to the fraction of insolvent banks,
1  pr.
Eq. 3.23 captures the effect of asset value reduction by multiplying the initial value
of non-interbank assets with the exponential function. It should be noted that there is
no evidence that a price reduction indeed corresponds to an exponential function that
is proportional to the fraction of insolvent banks. We nonetheless use this form as it is
in accordance with the literature. Other studies (Cifuentes et al., 2005; Mu¨ller, 2006;
May and Arinaminpathy, 2010; Tsatskis, 2012) use the same function to investigate the
impact of price reduction of assets and liquidity shortages.
To model a reduction in the value of the liability side of the balance sheet, we use
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the following function:
Li(r + 1) = (1  2)Li(r), (3.24)
where 2 2 [0, 1] is a constant as before. Eq. 3.24 is a simple linear reduction of the
liability side of the balance sheet, which can be used to model a capital infusion to a
bank i as done during government bail-outs.
For the simulation model, any function describing the movement of the value of
the asset or liability side can be used. Other examples include the geometric random
walk (Webber and Willison, 2011), which is usually used to model the price movement
of assets. The functions used in this thesis are chosen to a certain extent arbitrarily
as there is no evidence that the precise form of an asset reduction or capital infusion
resembles an exponential or linear function. We chose the functions as they can be
easily included into our model set-up, and the effects of the functions to the stability of
the banking system can be explained using the equilibrium solutions of the mean-field
model.
3.4 The Initial Shock to Banks’ Balance Sheets
There are multiple ways to shock the banking system. Some studies consider the failure
of one or multiple banks initially (Battiston et al., 2012c; Gai et al., 2011). Other
studies (May and Arinaminpathy, 2010; Gai, 2013) shock banks’ capital by reducing
or increasing a fraction of banks asset or liability side of the balance sheet.
In this thesis, we vary the capital of banks to induce the initial shock. We do this
for technical convenience when comparing different model solutions. A negative shock
to banks’ capital decreases the amount of the bank’s capital by increasing the value of
liabilities or decreasing the asset side of the balance sheet. A positive shock to banks’
capital is achieved by a reduction of the bank’s liabilities or an increase in the value
of assets. In particular, we vary the liability side of banks’ balance sheets to induce a
shock to banks’ liabilities. However, we could have equally chosen to reduce the asset
side of banks’ balance sheets. All the calculations and simulations can be repeated
using a shock to banks’ asset side and will lead to the same solution.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we outlined the general counterparty risk model that we study in this
thesis to obtain a better understanding of counterparty risk in a banking system. We
mapped a counterparty risk model to a RFIM by assuming that a bank can be either
solvent or insolvent. Additionally, we use a mean-field assumption to simplify the
counterparty risk model and obtain an iterative map stating the fraction of surviving
banks in any iteration round. We call this simplified version the mean-field model. The
iteration map is governed by two parameters: a and b that contain the information of
the average balance sheet parameters of banks in the banking system. The parameter
a states the difference between the averages of liabilities, and non-interbank assets and
the recovery term of defaulted exposure divided by the variance of liabilities and non-
interbank assets. The parameter b states the average interbank exposure (excluding
the recovery value of exposure) of banks in the banking system divided by the vari-
ance of liabilities and non-interbank assets. Finally, we introduce the assumptions and
algorithm of a more heterogeneous simulation-based version of the counterparty risk
model.
Chapter 4
Mean-Field Model Results
Summary The chapter contains a discussion of the equilibrium solutions of the mean-
field counterparty risk model. A fixed point analysis of the iteration map describing the
insolvency propagation reveals the occurrence of a hysteresis cycle for the equilibrium
fraction of surviving banks. This implies that the solution of the iteration map is history
dependent and allows one to calculate the cost of rescuing a defaulted banking system.
Additionally, we conduct a parameter analysis of the balance sheet variables and their
influence on the stability of the banking system. We show that below a specific leverage
ratio, one bank can trigger the insolvency of most of the banks in the banking system.
The calculations are repeated for multiple location-scale distributions to show that the
results are robust. Finally, we use balance sheet data from UK and US banks to discuss
the stability of each banking system in the years 2007 and 2012.
4.1 Fixed Points
The counter party risk model presented in Chapter 3 is part of the Curie-Weis models.
The analysis presented in this chapter uses the equilibrium solution of the Curie-Weis
mean-field model at zero temperature to show a phase transition experienced by the
banking system, whereby the banking system changes from a stable to an unstable state
and vice versa. Curie-Weis models have been studied extensively in the past decades
and the reader is directed to Weidlich (1971), de Matos and Perez (1991), Sethna et al.
(1993), Dahmen and Sethna (1996), and Bouchaud (2013) for more details. To study
the behaviour of the iteration map in Eq. 3.15 (pr = 1  P (a  bpr 1) = F (pr 1)), we
investigate the fixed points, p, of the iteration map F (.). The fixed point of an iteration
map is reached when p = F (p). The propositions and lemmas used in this Section can
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be found in the Appendix, Chapter A. Using Lemma A.4.1 ensures that the iteration
map in Eq. 3.15 has at least one fixed point since pr, pr 1, ...p0 for ps 2 [0, 1] is a
monotone sequence, and [0, 1] is a compact set. Using Eq. 3.15 and assuming P (.) is a
standard Normal CDF, we can write:
F (x) = 1   (a  bx), (4.1)
where  (.) is the standard normal CDF. Using a Normal distribution as the underlying
random distribution for the balance sheet quantities is a standard choice in the RFIM
literature. Note that the following discussion can be repeated with other location-scale
distributions (see Section 4.7). The assumption to draw the random variables from
location-scale distributions is not necessary. The sudden decline in the fraction of sur-
viving banks can also be observed with other random distributions. For example, in
Chapter 5, we initialize the balance sheet variables with Lognormal and Loglogistic
distributions and obtained similar results. The advantage of using location-scale distri-
butions is that it allows one to reduce the multi-parameter model into a two-parameter
model, where the two parameters, a (the weighted average difference of liabilities, and
the sum of non-interbank assets and the value of interbank exposure of insolvent coun-
terparties) and b (the weighted average value of interbank assets minus the recovery
term of insolvent exposure) are defined as stated in Eqs. 3.13 and 3.14.
In order to investigate the fixed points, we report in Figure 4.1 (first row) various
plots of the iteration map pr = F (pr 1) for different values of a and b for r from r = 0
to r = 100. It becomes clear, that, given particular parameter values, and the same
starting value, the fixed points change. This is better illustrated in the second row of
Figure 4.1, where p  F (p) is plotted, which crosses zero at the fixed point. This is of
importance as the roots of p  F (p) are the fixed points of pr = F (pr 1).
In Lemma A.4.2, we see that x  F (x) undergoes a behavioural change at b = bc.
The critical parameter is a common result of the Curie-Weis solution leading to the first
order phase transition (Dahmen and Sethna, 1996), (Bouchaud, 2013). For the standard
Normal CDF, bc equals
p
2⇡. If b < bc, then x  F (x) is strictly increasing. However,
if b > bc, then x   F (x) has a maximum x1 and a minimum x2 as shown in Lemma
A.4.2. Depending on the position of x1   F (x1), x2   F (x2) and a, pr = F (pr 1) has
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Figure 4.1: The first row of this figure shows F (p) form Eq. 4.1 vs. p for r = 0, ..., 100
with various combinations of parameters a and b. The second row shows plots of
p F (p). The extreme values, x1 and x2, of p F (p) are indicated with a cross and
the corresponding fixed points,w1, w2 andw3 are the points where p F (p) crosses
zero. The arrows indicate which fixed point is reached starting at a particular p0.
up to three fixed points.
Substituting x1 = F (x1) and solving for a, allows one to determine a1 = b +q
2 ln bbc   b (
q
2 ln bbc ). Similarly, for x2 = F (x2), the weighted, average difference
of liabilities and non-interbank assets is a2 = b 
q
2 ln bbc   b ( 
q
2 ln bbc ).
To be more specific, say b > bc and a 2 (a1, a2), we have x1   F (x1) > 0 and
x2   F (x2) < 0. Thus, x   F (x) has three roots, and therefore, pr = F (pr 1) has
three fixed points: w1, w2 and w3, where w1 < x1 < w2 < x2 < w3. Furthermore, the
derivative of F (x) is
F 0(x) =
b
bc
exp
✓
  (a  bx)
2
2
◆
(4.2)
Note that F 0(x1) = 1 = F 0(x2). For x ! ±1, we have exp(  (a bx)22 ) ! 0. Thus,
for x < x1 or x2 > x, F 0(x) tends to zero and is less than one. Using Proposition
A.4.1, w1 and w2 are therefore stable fixed points. Because F 0(x) equals one only for
x = x1,2, F 0(w2) has to be larger than one. Hence, using Proposition A.4.2, w2 is an
unstable fixed point.
To summarize, if the starting value p0 is in the orbit [0, w1] or [w3, 1], then the
attracting fixed points are w1 or w3, respectively. If p0 2 [w1, w2], then w2 is a repelling
fixed point and w1 is the attracting fixed point that is eventually reached. Similarly, if
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Figure 4.2: The figure shows two subplots. In the first row, the first derivative of F (x), F 0(x),
is plotted against x. In the second row, the function x   F (x) is plotted against
x. The parameters a = 2.5 and b = 5 are fixed for each plot. Additionally,
the maximum (x1, vertical black line) and minimum (x2, vertical black line) of
x  F (x) as well as fixed points of pr = F (pr 1) (w1, w2 and w3, vertical purple
line) are indicated. It becomes clear that for the chosen values of a and b,w1 andw2
are stable fixed points and w2 is an unstable fixed point since F 0(w1), F 0(w3) < 1
and F 0(w2) > 1.
p0 2 [w2, w3], the fixed point eventually reached is w3.
To illustrate the occurrence of three fixed points, we plotted in Figure 4.2 F 0(x)
(first subplot) and x F (x) (second subplot) against x for fixed a = 2.5 and b = 5. For
b = 5, we have a = 2.5 2 (a1, a2). We marked the maximum (x1) and minimum (x2)
of x  F (x) with vertical, black lines as well as the fixed points of pr = F (pr 1) with
vertical, magenta lines. The horizontal, red line in the first subplot indicates where the
y-axis is equal to one. In the second subplot, the horizontal, red line indicates where
the y-axis equals zero. As in Figure 4.1, the intersections of x   F (x) with zero in
the second row represent the fixed points of pr = F (pr 1), namely w1, w2 and w3. It
becomes clear that F 0(w1) and F 0(w3) are less than one and F 0(w2) is larger than one
for a = 2 and b = 5. Hence, w1 and w2 are stable and w2 is unstable.
For b > bc and a < a1, x1 F (x1) and x2 F (x2) are less then zero. But x F (x)
tends to infinity as x tends to infinity. Hence, x   F (x) has only one root. Similarly,
for a > a2, x1   F (x1) and x2   F (x2) are larger then zero and x  F (x)!  1 for
x!  1. Thus, for a < a1 and a > a2, x  F (x) has one root and pr = F (pr 1) has
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one fixed point: w1, which is stable (by Lemma A.4.1).
For a = a1 and b > bc, x   F (x) has two roots with one root being x1. That is
because for a = a1, x1   F (x1) equals zero. Furthermore, x2   F (x2) is less then
x1   F (x1) because at x2, x   F (x) is at its local minimum. Note that @(x F (x))@a > 0
for all a, which implies that for increasing a and fixed x, x  F (x) increases. Let 0 <
✏ < a2   a1 and consider the case a = a1 + ✏ (then a 2 (a1, a2)). Thus, pr = F (pr 1)
has the three fixed points w1, w2 and w3. For ✏ ! 0, w2 tends to x1 since x   F (x)
decreases for decreasing a. Similarly, w1 tends to x1 for decreasing a. Eventually, w1
and w2 merge at x1 for ✏ = 0. Thus, the left-hand side of x1 is stable. Whereas the
right-hand side of x1 is unstable. Any iteration process with starting value p0 in the
orbit [0, w1 = w2] will reach the fixed point w1. However, if p0 2 [w1 = w2, w3], the
fixed point reached is w3, which is a stable fixed point. For p0 2 [w3, 1], the attracting
fixed point is again w3.
A similar argument can be used to show that for a = a2 and b > bc, we have
w2 = x2 = w3, i.e. w2 and w3 merge at x2 implying that if p0 2 [w1, w2 = w3], then w1
is the attracting fixed point. If p0 2 [0, w1] or p0 2 [w3, 1], then the fixed points reached
are w1 and w3, respectively.
Finally, if b < bc, x   F (x) is strictly monotonically increasing. Therefore, pr =
F (pr 1) has only one fixed point, w1. By Lemma A.4.1, w1 is stable.
In general, for at least three fixed points to become possible in the iteration process
pr = F (pr 1), the following conditions need to be satisfied: F 0(x) is a positive real-
valued, bell-shaped, continuous and differentiable probability distribution function; and
the balance sheet parameters can be tuned such that F 0(x) is larger than one.
In Figure 4.3, we illustrate how the number of roots of x F (x) depends on a. The
figure shows various plots of x F (x) for fixed b = 3 and varying a 2 [1.2228, 1.7772].
Note that for b = 3 > bc, we have a1 ⇡ 1.4228 and a2 ⇡ 1.5772. More specifically,
for the magenta coloured graphs, a 2 [1.2228, a1). For the red and blue line, a equals
a1 and a2, respectively. For a 2 (a2, 1.7772], the graphs are coloured cyan. In addition,
we plotted horizontal, dotted lines indicating the roots of the thicker graphs. It becomes
clear that for a 2 [1.2228, a1) and a 2 (a2, 1.7772], x   F (x) has one root. Hence,
pr = F (pr 1) has one fixed point. For a = a1 and a = a2, x F (x) has two roots, and
pr = F (pr 1) has two fixed points. The figure illustrated further that for a 2 (a1, a2),
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Figure 4.3: The figure shows x F (x) against x for fixed b = 3 > bc and a 2 [1.2228, 1.7772].
Note that for b = 3, we have a1 ⇡ 1.4228 and a2 ⇡ 1.5772. Magenta coloured
graphs indicate x   F (x) for a 2 [1.2228, a1), for the blue line a = a1, for the
green lines a 2 (a1, a2), for the red line a = a2, and for the cyan lines a 2
(a2, 1.7772]. The dotted horizontal lines indicate the roots of the ticker graphs. For
a 2 [1.2228, a1) and a 2 (a2, 1.7772], x   F (x) has one root. For a = a1 and
a = a2, x   F (x) has two roots, and for a 2 (a1, a2), x   F (x) has three roots.
This is important as the roots of x  F (x) are the fixed points of pr = F (pr 1).
x  F (x) has three roots, and pr = F (pr 1) has three fixed points.
In terms of the stability of the modelled banking system, we note that for b > bc
a barrier, represented by the unstable fixed point, can occur, such that the number of
operating banks does not decrease below a certain value (or increases above a certain
value). However, if there is a change in the parameter values, then it becomes possible
that the entire system suddenly collapses (or becomes fully functional again). Hence,
for b < bc, the system is reversible, but for b > bc, a hysteresis cycle occurs, such that
the system becomes irreversible, and depends on its history. The hysteresis cycle is a
well known phenomena in Curie-Weis models at zero temperature (Bouchaud, 2013).
Therefore, a large amount of lending on the interbank market (i.e. large b when p0 = 1)
can help to stabilize the system, if the corresponding value for liabilities and mean value
of non-interbank assets are such that a < a2, because, in this case the barrier prevents
an entire system failure.
4.2. Change in the Number of Surviving Banks Induced by One Bank Failure 54
4.2 Change in the Number of Surviving Banks Induced
by One Bank Failure
For a small change from pr to pr+1, the change in the number of surviving banks is given
byNF 0(pr) . Note that F 0(x) is the probability density function that ✏i = a bx. Thus,
the number of banks becoming distressed as a consequence of one bank changing from
operating normally to insolvent in the next iteration is (Dahmen and Sethna, 1996):
n = F 0(x). (4.3)
If n is less than one, any avalanche will eventually stop. This is because one insolvent
bank triggers on average less than one bank to become insolvent. Whereas, if n   1,
one bank’s insolvency can trigger an entire system failure. Starting with p0 = 1, for b >
bc and x = x1, n is precisely one. The maximum of F 0(x) is reached when x = a/b. At
this point the number of insolvent banks triggered by one bank in the following iteration
is of order z suggesting that all the neighbouring banks of the initially insolvent bank
become all insolvent as well.
4.3 Parameter Analysis
We have observed that when b becomes larger than the critical value bc, the system
passes from a reversible kind of dynamics to an irreversible one, where hysteresis cycles
emerge. This is illustrated in Figure 4.4, where the fixed point probability values are
plotted for varying a for various b ranging from b = 0, ..., 15. The solid blue lines
indicate the stable fixed points, whereas the blue dashed lines indicate the unstable
fixed points. The hysteresis cycle is indicated by the red arrows.
We can observe that at b = 0, when banks are not lending to each other, the
system is stable for negative values of a; fluctuations in the asset side of the balance
sheet equation can cause banks to fail and, at a = 0, half the banks in the system are
insolvent. By lending money from one bank to another (b > 0), the system becomes
more stable with smaller numbers of banks in distress for the same values of a.
If a increases further but b is kept constant, then more banks fail as the difference
between the banks non-interbank assets and liabilities increases. Hence, the capital in
the system is lowered (for constant   and q). If b is below its critical value, then the
4.3. Parameter Analysis 55
−10 −5 0 5 10 150
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
a
F
ra
ct
io
n
o
f
su
rv
iv
in
g
b
a
n
k
s,
p
a = a2 ≈ 5.04
cost
b = 15b = 7b = 0
a = a1 ≈ 1.96
Figure 4.4: This figure shows the fraction of surviving banks as a function of the parameter a
for given fixed values of b. The blue graphs are the solution of the iteration map 4.1
for different b values whereby b = 1, ..., 15. The solid lines indicate stable fixed
points whereas the dotted lines indicate unstable fixed points. If the fixed point is
unique as in the case for b = 1, 2, no hysteresis occurs for decreasing or increasing
a. For this value of b > bc and a particular range of a, three fixed points become
possible leading to a hysteresis cycle. The thick blue line indicates the fixed points
for b = 7. The red arrows indicate the hysteresis cycle that occurs for b = 7.
Starting from p0 = 1, the parameter a needs to increase to a = a2 ⇡ 5.04 for the
entire system to default. If the starting value is p0 = 0 then a needs to decrease to
a = a1 ⇡ 1.96 for the banks to be operating. Thus, the path is history depended.
system is reversible and all fixed points are stable. If b becomes larger than the critical
value bc and a < a2, almost the entire system is stable (if p0 = 1) because of the barrier.
However, if a increases above a2, then the whole system suddenly crashes. We call the
sudden system failure the fragile state.
If a is constant but b decreases, then a sudden jump becomes possible as well. Let
us here note that a decrease in b happens, if average interbank loans zg decrease, or
the variance   =
p
 Aˆ(t)
2 +  L(t)2 increases. In Iori et al. (2012), it was shown that
during the financial crisis, there was indeed a decrease in the amount of money loaned
but the interest rates for loans also increased. Thus, b decreased, and a increased due
to changes on the financial markets. In our stylized system, this is a mechanism that
would create disastrous consequences unless b < bc.
In order to return to a normally operating system after the crash, a needs to be re-
duced at least to a1. Then a sudden jump brings the whole system operative again.
Hence, the cost of rescuing a banking system is given by the difference between
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Figure 4.5: The figures show the fraction of operating banks for given a and b obtained by
numerically solving the Iteration Function 4.1 starting from an initial value p0 = 1
(plot A) and p0 = 0 (plot B). The hysteresis behaviour becomes visible form the
jump occurring in (A) at a = a2 and in (B) at a = a1.
a1(b(t)) and a2(b(t +  t)), where b(t) is the value of b at the beginning of the crisis
and b(t+  t) the value of b at the time of rescue.
To be more specific, let us here discuss the case b = 7 and starting from fully
operating banks (i.e. p0 = 1). Here, the infinite avalanche occurs when a reaches
a2 ⇡ 5.04. Whereas, if one starts with all banks insolvent, a would need to be lowered
to a1 ⇡ 1.96, in order to return to a stable system. In Figure 4.4, this cost is indicated
by the green arrow.
Figure 4.5 is a plot of the equilibrium fraction of surviving banks for different
parameter values. The figure contains two plots: A and B, and depicts the solution of
Eq. 4.1 for different values of a and b when the initial state of all banks is p0 = 1 (plot
A) or p0 = 0 (plotB). Whenever b = 0, the fraction of surviving banks depends only on
the CDF of non-interbank assets and liabilities. In the case of the standard normal CDF,
for a = 0, half of the banks are expected to be under stress; at a =  2.5, the equilibrium
fraction of operating banks is p ⇡ 0.9938; whereas for a = 2.5, the equilibrium fraction
of operating banks is p ⇡ 0.0062. If 0 < b < bc, the system becomes more stable,
which is obvious as the asset side of the balance sheet is increased and the interbank
loans act as an extra asset. If a is kept constant, then either extra capital is introduced
in the system or the values µL, µAˆ, q,  L and  Aˆ change such that a stays constant.
Further, for values of b in that range, the decline in the fraction of solvent banks for
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increasing a is still smooth. When b > bc, the fraction of solvent banks suddenly jumps
from almost all banks solvent to almost all banks insolvent, which happens because of
the occurrence of the multiple fixed points as outlined in Section 4.1.
4.4 Relation Between a and b
For fixed capital E(p), the parameters a and b are dependent on one another such that
the parameter a can be expressed in terms of b as:
a =  E(p)
 
+ bp. (4.4)
Thus, a change in a given a fixed b at the fixed point p can only happen when exter-
nal capital is introduced to the system. There are multiple ways of increasing capital
of a bank. For instance, a bank can raise capital by issuing shares (ECB, 2009; Fed,
2011a; Kollewe, 2011; ECB, 2011). Given the thread of insolvency, a government can
intervene by inducing capital into the insolvent bank via government bailouts. Further,
central banks use methods of QE by adjusting interest rates and lending to banks, or
buying assets using open market operations (Singh, 2010; The Federal Reserve Board,
2011). Hence, QE can ensure that liabilities are reduced using central bank loans with
smaller interest rates than otherwise required by the money market, and assets are liq-
uidated above the market value, ensuring that capital is not needed to overcome losses
when faced by liquidity shortages.
4.5 Leverage,  
For a stable system (i.e. p ⇡ 1) with b > bc, the ratios between assets and liabilities
should ensure that a  a2. Using a0 and b0 as defined in Eqs. 3.20 and 3.21,1 and
Eq. 4.4, the leverage ratio2 - the ratio of capital to total assets (i.e.   = µEµA , where
µE = µA µL), ensuring a stable banking system has to satisfy the following condition:
1As a reminder, the random variables used to derive a and b are non-interbank assets and liabilities.
Interbank assets are deterministic values. Whereas for a
0
and b
0
, the random variables are assets and
liabilities, with interbank assets being a fraction ✓ of the total assets.
2There exists numerous definitions of the leverage ratio. We decided to use the ratio of loss absorbing
capital to total assets in accordance with Acharya et al. (2014) and Bank for International Settlement
(2014). Specifically, the leverage ratio in Bank for International Settlement (2014) is stated as the ratio
of a capital measure to an exposure measure.
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Figure 4.6: The figure shows the minimum leverage,  min, for an average bank to ensure a
stable banking system as a function of the fraction of interbank assets ✓ for q = 0.
The different curves correspond to various  0’s. From the figure, we can see that the
larger  0 , the larger is ✓ at the instability and also the larger the minimum leverage.
     min = (1  q)✓c
bc
✓r
2 ln
✓
✓c
+
bc
✓c
✓ ( 
r
2 ln
✓
✓c
)
◆
, (4.5)
where ✓c =  
0
bc
(1 q)µA and q 6= 1. When Eq. 4.5 reaches equality, the smallest leverage
ratio,  min, is recovered, at which the banking system is stable. Figure 4.6 is a plot
of Eq. 4.5 depicting the minimum leverage,  min, at which the system is stable as a
function of ✓, of interbank assets to total assets for given values of  0 . The value of
 
0 is chosen to be a fraction of the mean total assets for each graph as applicable in
the accompanying legend. Any leverage value above and including  min ensures a safe
banking system given a particular  0 .
4.6 The Fraction of Mean Liabilities, fL
Eq. 4.5 can be further simplified, without any loss of generality, by assuming that  0
is a fraction,
p
2fA, of µA, i.e.  
0
=
p
2fAµA. We chose to represent  
0 in this way
because Eq. 4.5 then becomes independent of µA.
In Chapter 6, we use a fraction fL to stress the banking system. That is, we mul-
tiply µL by a fraction fL to vary the average value of capital in the system. Define the
parameter fMFL to be the fraction of mean liabilities, at which the fraction of surviving
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banks, p, jumps from almost all banks solvent to almost all banks insolvent. Using
Eq. 4.5, fMFL can be written as:
fMFL =
µA
µL
 p2fAµA
µL
s
2 ln
(1  q)✓p
2fAbc
  ✓µA
µL
(1  q) ( 
s
2 ln
(1  q)✓p
2fAbc
). (4.6)
Thus, the free model parameter becomes fA. The fraction of the mean liabilities, fMFL ,
is influenced by fA. The parameter, fA, indicates how big the uncertainty of capital is,
and thus indicates the size of a potential initial shock to banks’ capital.
For Eq. 4.6 to have a solution, ✓ needs to be larger than or equal to
p
2fAbc
1 q . The
maximal value of fA is reached if ✓ tends to one. Thus, fA tends to 1 qp2bc . If q = 0, then
fA tends to approximately 0.2821.
It should be noted that  0 is the variance of the average, initial capital in the sys-
tem. Therefore, for fA larger then 0.2821, the capital reserves of individual banks
differ greatly, such that some banks are safer than others. These banks form barriers
stopping the insolvency from spreading via interbank exposure failure. Because of this,
the interbank exposure network does not cause a sudden system failure, but rather the
stability of the banking system relies on changes in the market, influencing the value of
liabilities and assets.
If fA tends to zero, then fMFL tends to
µA
µL
. For fA equal to zero, all banks have
the same value of capital initially because their balance sheets are identical. Then the
initial shock causing one bank to become insolvent automatically causes all other banks
to become insolvent as well. Hence, the average capital for system failure to occur is
µA   µL = 0, which is equivalent to fMFL being equal to µAµL . Thus, in a banking
system with identical banks (i.e. all banks have the same balance sheet values), the
underlying exposure network becomes irrelevant for systemic failure because the initial
shock causes all banks to fail simultaneously.
4.7 Values for Other Location-Scale Distributions
The parameter analysis can be repeated with any location-scale distributions where
the PDF, F 0(x), satisfies the properties stated in Section 4.3. In Tables 4.1-4.4, we
state the iteration function, F (x); its first derivative, F 0(x); the critical parameters, bc
and ✓c; the extrema of x   F (x), x1,2; the parameters a1,2, at which the jump occurs;
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Table 4.1: The tables states the values of F (x), F 0(x), bc, x1,2, a1,2 and  min given that the
random variables Li and Aˆi are drawn from Normal distributions.
Normal Distribution
F (x) 12 + erf(
a bxp
2
)
F 0(x) bp
2⇡
exp(  (a bx)22 )
bc
p
2⇡
✓c
 
0
bc
(1 q)µA
x1,2 b 1(a⌥
q
2 ln bp
bc
a1,2 b±
q
2 ln bbc   b 
✓
±
q
2 ln bbc
◆
 min (1  q) ✓cbc
✓q
2 ln ✓✓c +
bc
✓c
✓ ( 
q
2 ln ✓✓c )
◆
Table 4.2: The tables states the values of F (x), F 0(x), bc, x1,2, a1,2 and  min given that the
random variables Li and Aˆi are drawn from Cauchy distributions.
Cauchy Distribution
F (x) 12   1⇡ arctan(a  bx)
F 0(x) b⇡(1+(a bx)2)
bc ⇡
✓c
 
0
bc
(1 q)µA
x1,2
a⌥
q
b
bc
 1
b
a1,2
b
2 ±
q
b
bc
  1  bbc arctan
✓
±
q
b
bc
  1
◆
 min (1  q) ✓cbc
✓
1
2
bc
✓c
✓ +
q
✓
✓c
  1 + ✓✓c arctan
✓
 
q
✓
✓c
  1
◆◆
Table 4.3: The tables states the values of F (x), F 0(x), bc, x1,2, a1,2 and  min given that the
random variables Li and Aˆi are drawn from Logistic distributions.
Logistic Distribution
F (x) 12   12 tanh
✓
a bx
2
◆
F 0(x) b4 sech
2
✓
a bx
2
◆
bc 4
✓c
 
0
bc
µA
x1,2
a⌥2 arccosh(
q
b
bc
)
b
a1,2 2
b
bc
⌥pb
q
b
bc
  1± 2 arccosh
✓q
b
bc
◆
 min (1  q) ✓cbc
✓
1
2
bc
✓c
✓  
q
bc
✓c
✓
q
✓
✓c
  1 + 2 arccosh(
q
✓
✓c
)
◆
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Table 4.4: The tables states the values of F (x), F 0(x), bc, x1,2, a1,2 and  min given that the ran-
dom variables Li and Aˆi are drawn from Student’s t distributions with two degrees
of freedom.
Student’s t Distribution, ⌫ = 2
F (x) 12   a bx2p2+(a bx)2
F 0(x) b
(2+(a bx)2)3/2
bc 23/2
✓c
 
0
bc
(1 q)µA
x1,2
a⌥
p
b2/3 2
b
a1,2
b
2 +
✓
⌥ b2/32 ± 1
◆p
b2/3   2
 min (1  q) ✓cbc
✓
1
2
bc
✓c
✓   (12( bc✓c ✓)2/3   1)
q
( bc✓c ✓)
2/3   2
◆
and the minimum leverage,  min, to ensure a stable system, given that the random
variables, (non-interbank) assets and liabilities, are drawn from Normal distributions
(Table 4.1), Cauchy distributions (Table 4.2), Logistic distributions (Table 4.3), and
Student’s t distributions with two degrees of freedom (Table 4.4).3 To calculate  min,
we used a0 and b0 as defined in Eqs. 3.20 and 3.21. For the rest, a and b are used as
defined in Eqs. 3.13 and 3.14.
Figure 4.7 shows in its first row plots of F 0(x) against x, and in its second row
plots of x   F (x) for different location-scale distributions. The different distributions
are indicated using different colour schemes with graphs equated using Normal dis-
tributions (N ) being red, Cauchy distributions (C) being green, Logistic distributions
(L) being blue and Student’s t distributions with two degrees of freedom (S) being ma-
genta coloured. In addition, we marked the positions of the fixed points (w⇤i , where
i = [1, 2, 3] and ⇤ = [N,C, L, S]) and the extrema of x   F (x) (x⇤i , where i = [1, 2]
and ⇤ = [N,C, L, S]) using horizontal lines. The parameters a and b are fixed at 2 and
4.5, respectively. For b = 4.5, bc is smaller than b for all distributions.
It becomes clear that for Normal and Student’s t distributions, three fixed points
occur with wN,S1 , w
N,S
3 being stable fixed points and w
N ;S
2 being an unstable fixed point
forming the barrier between wN ;S1 and w
N ;S
3 . For Cauchy and Logistic distributions,
only one fixed point exists: wC;S1 , which is a stable fixed point close to one indicating a
3A Student’s t distribution with one degree of freedom leads to the Cauchy distribution and if the
degree of freedom tends to infinity the Normal distribution is recovered.
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Figure 4.7: The figure shows two subplots. In the first subplot, F 0(x) is plotted against x for a
Normal distribution (N , red), Cauchy distribution (C, green), Logistic distribution
(L, blue) and Student’s t distribution (S, magenta). In the second row, x  F (x) is
plotted against x for the different distributions using the same colour scheme as in
the first row. The parameters a = 2 and b = 4.5 are fixed. We marked the one (first
row) and zero (second row) line, using a black, dotted line. In addition, we indi-
cated the positions of the fixed points (w⇤i , where i = [1, 2, 3] and ⇤ = [N,C,L, S])
and the extrema of x F (x) (x⇤i , where i = [1, 2] and ⇤ = [N,C,L, S]) using hor-
izontal lines.
stable banking system.
Therefore, for a starting value p0 in [wN ;S1 , w
N ;S
2 ] or [0, w
N ;S
1 ] and Li, Aˆi drawn
from Normal or Student’s t distributions, the banking system collapses. Whereas for p0
in [wN ;S2 , w
N ;S
3 ] or [w
N ;S
3 , 1] and Li, Aˆi drawn from Normal or Student’s t distributions,
the banking system stays stable. For Li, Aˆi drawn from Cauchy or Logistic distribu-
tions, the banking system always reaches wC;L1 given any starting value p0 2 [0, 1].
Because the fixed point, wC;L1 , is close to one, the banking system is stable.
Furthermore, note that xN1 < xS1 < xL1 < xC1 < xC2 < xL2 < xS2 < xN2 for a = 2
and b = 4.5. Thus, given p0 2 [w⇤3, 1], a = a⇤2 and b = 4.5, the jump from almost
all banks surviving to almost all banks insolvent is the largest if Li, Aˆi are drawn from
Normal distributions, and the smallest if Li, Aˆi are drawn from Cauchy distributions.
In Figure 4.8, we plotted a1,2 against b for the different distributions. We have
aC;L;S2 < a
N
2 . This implies that the initial capital needs to be reduced much further
if Li, Aˆi are drawn from Normal distributions in comparison to Li, Aˆi being drawn
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Figure 4.8: The figures show a1,2 plotted against b for different distributions as stated in Ta-
ble 4.1-4.4. In (A), a1,2 are pltted using the Normal distributions, in (B) represents
a1,2 for Cauchy distributions, in (C) the graphs for a1,2 are plotted for the Logistic
distributions and (D) a1,2 are shown for Student’s t distributions with two degrees
of freedom. In addition, we marked the critical parameter bc for each distribution
using a dotted horizontal line.
from Cauchy, Logistic or Student’s t distributions for the jump to occur. Hence, for the
latter distributions, the initial shock to the capital can be smaller for the fragile state
to occur. That said, the average interbank exposure for banking systems initialized
with Cauchy, Logistic or Student’s t distributions needs to be greater than the average
interbank exposure for banking systems initialized with Normal distributions for the
fragile state to become possible.
Figure 4.9 shows the minimum leverage ratio,  min, for Normal distributions (red),
Cauchy distributions (green), Logistic distributions (blue) and Student’s t distributions
(red) plotted against the average ratio of interbank exposure to total assets, ✓. The
recovery rate, q, is set to zero. The location parameter,  , for each distribution is set to
0.02µA. The vertical lines indicate ✓c for each distribution. The critical ratio of average
interbank exposure to total assets, ✓c, is the smallest for Normal distributions followed
by Student’s t, Cauchy and Logistic distributions. However, the minimum leverage for
Student’s t, Cauchy and Logistic distributions increases faster for increasing ✓ than  min
calculated for Normal distributions.
Specifically, for ✓ = 0.2, the minimum leverage to ensure a stable system for
Normal distributions is  Nmin(✓ = 0.2) = 0.0429, for Cauchy distributions  Cmin(✓ =
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Figure 4.9: The figure shows the minimum leverage for Normal distributions (red), Cauchy dis-
tributions (green), Logistic distributions (blue) and Student’s t distributions with
two degrees of freedom (magenta) plotted against the average ratio of interbank
lending, ✓. The coloured vertical lines inidcate ✓c for each distribution. Further-
more, the minimum leverage when ✓ = 0.2 is marked ( ⇤min(✓ = 0.2), where
⇤ 2 [N,C,L, S]) for each distribution.
0.2) = 0.0674, for Logistic distributions  Lmin(✓ = 0.2) = 0.0638, and for the Student’s
t distribution  Smin(✓ = 0.2) = 0.0571. For increasing ✓,  min for Student’s distribution
is about three times larger than  min for Normal distributions.
The reason for the difference in the size of the jump, the shock size resulting in the
fragile state and varying minimum leverage requirements can be found in the thickness
of the tail of the distributions. The tail for standard Cauchy distributions, Logistic
distributions and Student’s t distributions is wider than the tail of a standard Normal
distribution for the same location, µ, and scale,  , parameter (see Figure 4.7). This
implies that the difference between Li and Aˆi differs more greatly between individual
banks if Cauchy distributions, Logistic distributions and Student’s t distributions are
used to initialize the banking network (in comparison to Normal distributions). Thus,
some banks have more capital than others initially when Cauchy distributions, Logistic
distributions and Student’s t distributions are used. These banks’ larger capital reserves
stop them from being affected by the collapse of the rest of the banking system. Hence,
the difference between x1 and x2, and subsequently, the jump is smaller. Furthermore,
banks with large capital reserves form breaking points in the insolvency propagation.
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Thus, the probability of solvent banks being connected to insolvent banks is lower.
For the fragile state to become possible, the probability of banks being connected to
insolvent banks needs to increase. Hence, the critical interbank exposure parameter, bc,
has to increases.
On the other hand, some of the banks initialized with Cauchy distributions, Lo-
gistic distributions and Student’s t distributions have much less capital, which causes
the fragile state to happen at lower values of a2. This is also reflected in the minimum
leverage requirement, which is larger for Cauchy distributions, Logistic distributions
and Student’s t distributions than for Normal distributions for the same value of inter-
bank assets to total assets, ✓, and scale parameter,  .
4.8 Analysis of Real Banking Systems Using Balance
Sheet Data
Banks report their balance sheet quantities yearly as part of their financial statement
in their annual report. We used Bankscope (Bureau Van Dijk, 2014) to collect data
for US and UK banks.4 The data includes consolidated values for some banks and
unconsolidated values for others. Only using the values from consolidated balance
sheets would have reduced the list of banks considerably, mostly excluding foreign
subsidiaries of foreign banks. We chose the years 2007 and 2012 as reference years,
to determine the stability of the UK and US banking system during the recent financial
crisis and a non-crisis time. The parameters µA and µE represent the “true” of the
average value of total assets and capital per bank.
We also disregard any seniority of the debt and assume that the recovery rate is
set to zero. Hence, we consider the worst case scenario, where a creditor cannot expect
any payment for a defaulted loan. Furthermore, Normal CDFs are used for the iteration
process. Hence, µA and µL = µA   µE are the mean, and  A and  L represent the
standard deviation of the distributions.
Using a0 and b0 as defined in Eqs. 3.20 and 3.21 and assuming p0 = 1, the two
4The query settings were on “Status: Active Banks, Inactive Banks”, “Specialisation: Commercial
banks, Savings banks, Cooperative banks, Real Estate & Mortgage banks, Investment banks, Islamic
banks, Other non banking credit institutions, Bank holdings & Holding companies, Private banking /
Asset management companies” and “Ultimate Owner: Def. of the UO: min. path of 50.01%, known or
unknown shareh., closest quoted company in the path leading to the Ultimate Owner (if any); GUO and
DUO”
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Table 4.5: The table reports the mean value of total assets µA and Tier 1 capital of banks µE
and the standard deviations for the years 2007 and 2012 for the UK and US banking
system. The data is from Bankscope. We only considered banks that reported their
Tier 1 capital. The table additionally states the number of banks. To compare the
Tier 1 capital, we also stated the leverage ratio  , i.e. Tier 1 capital to total assets.
UK USA
2007 in GBP 2012 in GBP 2007 in USD 2012 in USD
µA 2.0287e+11 1.8307e+11 1.8505e+10 2.0247e+10
STD 4.7503e+11 4.2912e+11 1.3592e+11 1.5234e+11
µE 6.3032e+09 8.1836e+09 1.0615e+09 1.5829e+09
STD 1.3785e+10 2.0298e+10 6.6785e+09 1.1102e+10
Leverage,   0.0311 0.0447 0.0574 0.0782
No. banks 26 38 666 779
quantities that are decisive for the stability of the banking system in our model are the
mean of the total assets µA and the mean of loss absorbing capital µE = µA   µL. We
are using the “Tier 1 Capital” and “Total Assets” as reported in Bankscope. It should
be noted that the UK and US use different accounting systems.5 This causes different
estimations for the value of the same asset and liabilities. Hence, the value of total
assets, total liabilities and Tier 1 capital for UK and US banks reported in Bankscope
cannot be compared countrywise. However, it is possible to discuss changes in financial
stability of the banking systems in a country for different years. To compute the mean
values for µA and µE , we only use banks with Tier 1 capital larger than zero this reduced
the list of banks considerably (especially in 2007) as Bankscope does not report the Tier
1 capital value for all banks. The mean values as well as the number of banks used to
compute the values can be found in Table 4.5. To compare the values for Tier 1 capital
and total assets in the different years, we also included leverage,  , in the table. It
becomes clear that in 2007 the average leverage both in the US and UK was less than
it was in 2012 and henceforth already implies a less stable system in 2007.
The parameter  0 is a free model parameter that indicates the uncertainty about
the value of asset and liabilities. More precisely  A increases if the value for assets
is uncertain. Similarly, difficulties in obtaining funding from banks or other funding
sources are represented in an increased  L. In a way,  
0 measures the severity of the
5The firms in the UK as the rest of EU countries use International Financial Reporting Standards and
companies in the US use the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (Pricewaterhouse Coopers,
2014).
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shock, and hence, we tested for different values of  0 . To calibrate  0 , we use a variable
f 2 [0, 1] and say that  0 is a fraction of the mean value of the Tier 1 capital, µE , i.e.
 
0
= fµE .
Another parameter that cannot be easily obtained from the annual account data is
the average fraction of interbank assets, ✓. Banks report their lending to other banks
under “Loans and advances to banks” and “Deposits by banks” in their annual reports.
However, as it is pointed out in Langfield et al. (2014), loans and advances to banks are
not the only exposure banks have to other banks. Thus to monitor the UK interbank
market, the BoE collects data about other financial instruments that form part of the in-
terbank market. In particular, Langfield et al. (2014) list: “prime lending (...); holdings
of capital and fixed-income securities issued by banks; credit default swaps bought and
sold; securities lending and borrowing (...); repo and reverse repo (...); derivatives ex-
posure (...); settlement and clearing lines; asset-backed securities; covered bonds; and
short-term lending with respect to other banks and broker dealers”. The balance sheet
data reported in the annual reports do not differentiate between the interbank market
and products obtained from other financial institutions. Still, using only the values for
“Loans and advances to banks” or “Deposits by banks” to calibrate ✓ would underesti-
mate the average fraction of interbank lending. Henceforth, we use multiple values of
✓ to test the stability of the system.
Figures 4.10 and 4.12 show various plots of the fraction of surviving banks, p,
plotted against the fraction of  0 to the mean Tier 1 capital µE , f , for the UK and
US system, respectively. The fraction of surviving banks is calculated using the fixed
points of Eq. 4.1 and a standard normal CDF as before. The value of the fraction of
interbank exposure to total assets, ✓, is fixed and given above each subplot. The blue
crosses indicate the fraction of surviving banks for a banking system calibrated with the
2007 data and the black circles symbolize the fraction of surviving banks for a banking
system calibrated with the 2012 data.
For ✓ set to zero, the fraction of surviving banks in the UK banking system is
almost identical (Figure 4.10). The number of surviving banks declines for a larger
f . However, even for f tending to one, more than 85% of banks are operating in both
2007 and 2012. Note that ✓ equal to zero corresponds to no interbank exposure. The
number of insolvent banks is only due to the uncertainty of the value of liabilities and
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Figure 4.10: The subplots show the fraction of surviving banks for the years 2007 (blue
crosses) and 2012 (black circles) against the fraction of  0 to mean value of cap-
ital, f , for various values of the fraction of interbank assets to total assets, ✓. To
calibrate the model, the mean of total assets, µA, and the mean of Tier 1 capital,
µE , was used from banks from the UK banking system (q = 0). For ✓ = 0, banks
are not interconnected. In that case, for both years no systemic distress event hap-
pens. In order for a system failure to happen, ✓ needs to be non-zero. The sudden
system failure happens for the banking system calibrated with the 2007 UK data
for ✓ = 0.07 at which the banking system calibrated with 2012 UK data is still
in a stable state. For ✓   0.10, the banking system calibrated with 2012 UK data
also becomes unstable for a large enough f . However, f at which the systemic
distress happens for the 2007 UK data is smaller then the value for f at which the
systemic failure happens when the banking system is calibrated with the 2012 UK
data implying that the 2007 system is more prone to failure then the 2012 banking
system.
non-interbank assets caused by a large  0 . For the range of  0 from zero to the size of
µE , no systemic event, i.e. the entire failure of the banking system, becomes possible
in both years given that there is only a shock to the value of non-interbank assets or
liabilities.
For the next graphs in Figure 4.10, in the first row, ✓ is increased to 0.03 and 0.07.
It becomes clear that the fraction of surviving banks deviates for 2007 and 2012 with
p for 2007 being considerable less than p for 2012, implying that the banking system
2007 was much more prone to failure. For ✓ = 0.07 and the banking system calibrated
with the 2007 data set, a jump becomes visible for p for f around 0.5. The banking
system calibrated with the 2012 data set remains stable for ✓ set to either 0.03 or 0.07.
This changes when ✓ is further increased. In the second row of Figure 4.10, ✓ is set
to 0.10, 0.11 and 0.13. The sudden jump for banks calibrated with the 2007 data set
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Figure 4.11: The figure is similar to Figure 4.5 showing the fraction of surviving banks for
different values of a and b. In addition to the fraction of surviving banks for
particular values of a and b, we also plotted the particular values of the fraction of
surviving banks calibrated with the 2012 UK data for ✓ fixed at 0.10 for varying
f as indicated. It becomes clear that for increasing f , b decreases such that for
f = 0.90, b becomes less than bc. At the same time, p increases, explaining the
increase in p observed in Figure 4.10 for ✓ = 0.10 and ✓ = 0.11 for increasing f
for the 2012 UK data.
happens for f around 0.51 to 0.56 and increases even further in the third row when ✓
takes the values 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5 with a value of f around 0.31 - 0.46 being sufficient
to ensure an unstable banking system. For the banking system calibrated with the 2012
data set, a jump also occurs for values of ✓ above and including 0.1. For ✓ equal to
0.10, the jumps happens for f around 0.66. As with the 2007 data set, the jump moves
to a lower value of f for a larger ✓ with ✓ set to 0.5, f being around 0.36 for the jump
to happen.
For ✓ equal to 0.10 or 0.11, a jump occurs as well in the banking system calibrated
with the 2012 UK data set. However, after the jump, p increases for increasing f . This
can be explained using Figure 4.11. Figure 4.11 is the same plot of the contour lines
of surviving banks as plotted in Figure 4.5. The black symbols indicate the position of
p for fixed ✓ equal to 0.10 and varying f as indicated in the accompanying legend. It
becomes obvious that for increasing f , b decreases such that for f = 0.90 a jump does
not become possible any more and the system is in the reversible region. At the same
time, the value of p increases for decreasing b. Hence, we can observe an increase in p
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Figure 4.12: The figure is similar to Figure 4.12 except that US balance sheet data for the
years 2007 and 2009 were used to calibrate the model with the recovery rate for
interbank exposure set to zero. The sub plots show the fraction of surviving banks
for the years 2007 (cross) and 2012 (circle) against the fraction of  0 to mean value
of capital, f, for various values of the fraction of interbank assets to total assets,
✓. To calibrate the model, the mean of total assets, µA, and the mean of Tier 1
capital, µE , was used from banks from the US banking system. For ✓ = 0, banks
are not interconnected. In that case, for both years, no systemic distress event
happens. In fact, even for an increased ✓ of 0.10 the system is stable with only
some losses for large f but no system-wide failure. The sudden system failure
happens for the banking system calibrated with the 2007 US data for ✓ = 0.15.
However, we note that for the same value of ✓, the banking system calibrated with
2012 US data is still in a stable state. For ✓   0.17, the banking system calibrated
with 2012 US data also becomes unstable for a large enough f . For both years,  0
needs to be at least half of the size of banks capital in order for the system wide
failure to happen.
even though f , and therefore, the uncertainty,  0 , increases.
Figure 4.12 is similar to Figure 4.10 except that we used US banks to calibrate the
model with the blue crossed line representing the fraction of surviving banks in 2007
and the black circled line being the fraction of surviving banks in 2012. In Figure 4.12
the difference in the stability of the US banking system in 2007 and 2012 is less visible
suggesting that a shock to that similar sized as happened in 2007 would also cause
severe damage in 2012 if the ratio of interbank assets to total is also similar.
Figures 4.10 and 4.12 show that exposure to other banks played an important role
in the recent financial crisis. As we mentioned before, we cannot be certain about the
actual average fraction of interbank loan nor the size of  0 . However, an exposure of
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30% of total assets to other banks seems like a valid estimate. A  0 of 25% or 50% of the
bank’s capital only happens during a period of large uncertainty - which one can argue
happened during the 2008 meltdown of the financial sector. In particular, the Financial
Services Authority (FSA) stated in their report on “The failure of the Royal Bank of
Scotland” FSA (2011) that a mismatch in short-term funding and devaluation of long-
term assets, which potentially reduced the capital of RBS by 50%, played part of the
failure and eventual bail-out of the Royal Bank of Scotland by the UK government.
Hence, it can be assumed that other banks also faced capital losses of similar order that
according to our model would result in failure of the entire banking system.
Needless to say, in using the balance sheet test to determine insolvency, a bank
failure is always an option as capital is limited. The likelihood of such a large shock
happening is not part of this thesis but it can certainly be considered a rare event.
Nonetheless, the maximal economically feasible leverage ratio should be used as a
minimum to prevent entire system failure and taxpayer intervention.
4.9 Conclusion
In conclusion, simplifying the counterparty risk model using the mean-field assumption
allows us to solve the counterparty risk model semi-analytically for a variety of location
scale distributions. Additionally, we analysed the balance sheet parameters performing
a parameter analysis using the mean-field model to obtain the regions where the bank-
ing system is stable or unstable. We showed that the banking system can turn suddenly
from a stable system, where most of the banks survive a shock to their loss absorbing
capital, to an unstable system, where most of the banks become insolvent. We call
this shift in stability the fragile state. In particular, we calculated the size of the shock
that induces the fragile state. This allowed us to not only infer the cost of rescuing a
banking system but also to compute a restricting minimum leverage ratio that ensures
a stable banking system. Another advantage of the mean-field model is that one can
obtain data to initialize the model from banks’ annual reports. We did so by comparing
the stability of the US and UK banking system in 2007 and 2012. We determined that
the banking systems in 2012 were more stable than the systems in 2007 for the same
level of average counterparty exposure.
Banks in real banking system vary largely in the size of their balance sheets. The
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assumptions leading to the mean-field model reduce the banking system to a homoge-
neous system where only average balance sheet parameters are considered in order to
evaluate the stability of the banking system. Furthermore, the interbank network struc-
ture is disregarded and banks interbank exposure to other banks is assumed to be the
same in the mean-field model. These assumptions are unrealistic as they ignore the het-
erogeneity of real banking systems. For this reason are we testing in Chapters 5 and 6
the robustness of the mean-field model by comparing the solution of the mean-field
model to the solution of more realistic simulation based models of the counterparty
risk model.
Chapter 5
Comparison of Simulation and
Mean-Field Model of Stylized Banking
Systems
Summary: In this chapter, we use simulation means to test for the robustness of the re-
sults deduced from the mean-field model. Different random distributions and standard
network topologies are used to initialize banks’ balance sheets in a simulation-based
model. The equilibrium solution of the simulation model is compared to the fixed point
solution of the mean-field model. We find that both solutions are in agreement, which
suggests that indeed the results of the mean-field model are robust for different sized
banking systems initialized using a variety of random distributions, network topologies
and banking system parameters.
5.1 Initialization of Theoretical, Simulation-based
Banking System
In this chapter, we also construct a highly stylized banking system. The intention of
this chapter is to show the robustness and limitations of the mean-field model. We do
so by comparing the mean-field model to a simulation-based model testing for different
random distributions and network topologies to initialize the banking system.
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Table 5.1: The table reports the variables and values used for initializing banks’ balance sheets
and exposure structure in the simulation modelling a stylized banking system. The
banking system consists of N = 500 banks. The state of each bank is set to oper-
ating initially, i.e. Si(0) = 1 for all banks i. Two location scale distributions, the
Normal distribution and the Student’s t distribution, are used to calibrate the balance
sheets of banks with location parameters µA = 1000 and µL 2 [700, 1200] and
scale parameters  A = 30 and  L = 50. To compute the structure of the adjacency
matrix X = { 1i,jN}, three different network structures are used: Erdo˝s-Re´ny
networks, Small-World networks and a network structure with core and periphery
banks. For the Erdo˝s-Re´ny network, a link exists between two banks with proba-
bility ↵ = 0.1. To construct the Small-World network, we used the algorithm from
Watts and Strogatz (1998) with banks having c = 12 neighbours and a re-wiring
probability of each link of   = 0.1. To create the core-periphery network, we use
the algorithm from Baraba´si and Albert (1999) with an Erdo˝s-Re´ny seed network
with 50 banks and connection probability ↵ = 0.75 and 450 banks with 15 links
added with a preferential attachment to the existing banks. The weight for a loan
from bank i to bank j is ✓Aigij/zi, where ✓ is the fraction of interbank assets to
total assets. The recovery rate is set to zero. If not explicitly stated otherwise, the
values given in this table are used to initialize the simulations.
Variable Values used for initialization Description of variables
of bank i at time 0
N 500 Number of banks in
the stylised banking system.
✏A,Li ✏
A,L
i ⇠ N(0, 1) Standard normal random variables.
tA,Li t
A,L
i ⇠ T (⌫) Standard Student’s t random
variables with degree of freedom ⌫.
⌫ 2 Degree of freedom for
Student’s t distribution.
Si(t) Si(0) = 1 State, all banks
are solvent initially.
µA 1000 Location parameter for
total assets.
 A 30 Scale parameter
for assets.
µL 700 - 1200 Location parameter for liabilities.
 L 50 Scale parameter for liabilities.
✓ 0.0, 0.1, 0.3 Fraction for interbank assets.
↵ 0.1 Probability of bank i
being connected with bank j,
used to generate Erdo˝s-Re´ny network
and seed network for the
core-periphery network.
c 12 Neighbouring banks of all bank i
in Small-World network.
  0.1 Re-wiring probability for a link
in the Small-World network .
qij 0 Recovery rate for exposure from bank i to bank j.
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The location-scale distributions tested are Normal and Student’s t distribution. To
calibrate total assets and total liabilities with Normal distributions, random variables ✏i
are drawn from a standard normal distribution; the total assets are Ai(0) = µA +  A✏Ai
and the total liabilities are Li = µL +  L✏Li . Similarly, if the distribution used to
calibrate total assets and total liabilities is the Student’s t distribution, random variables
tLi , tAi are drawn from a standard Student’s t distribution with degree of freedom ⌫. The
total assets and liabilities are given by Ai(0) = µA +  AtAi and Li = µL +  LtLi . Note
that the random variables ✏L,Ai and t
L,A
i are different and independent.
We also use to initialize the balance sheets non-location-scale distributions,
namely Log-Normal and Log-Logistic. To calibrate the balance sheets, we start by
using the location, µNA , µNL , and scale parameters,  NA ,  NL , for Normal distributions.
We convert µNA , µNL and  NA ,  NL into the input variables of the other distributions such
that the arithmetic mean and standard deviation of the samples of banks’ balance sheets
constructed using Log-Normal, Logistic and Log-Logistic distributions are µNA , µNL , and
 NA ,  
N
L , by using the formulas stated in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: The table shows the input variables of Normal (N ), Log-Normal (LN ), Logistic (L)
and Log-Logistic distributions (LL) as derived from a Normal distribution’s mean
and standard deviation.
Distribution
Normal µN  N
Log-Normal µLN = log
✓
µNp
 N 2+µN 2
◆
 LN =
r
log( 
N 2
µN 2
+ 1)
Logistic µL = µN  L =
p
3
⇡  
N
Log-Logistic µLL = log
✓
µLp
 L2+µL2
◆
 LL =
r
log( 
L2
µL2
+ 1)
For constructing the underlying exposure network structure, we use an adjacency
matrixX to represent three different standard network types: the Erdo˝s-Re´ny network,
the Small-World network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) and a Baraba´si-Albert network
(Baraba´si and Albert, 1999), with a tightly connected seed network. For the Erdo˝s-
Re´ny network, a bank i is connected to a bank j with probability ↵. For the Small-
World network, we used an initial network, where each bank is connected to its c
closest neighbours and a probability   is used to re-wire any existing links between
the neighbouring banks to other banks creating the small-world effect. We call the
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Baraba´si-Albert network a core-periphery network as we use an Erdo˝s-Re´ny seed net-
work of banks with a high connection probability, ↵, to create the core and add ‘pe-
rioheral’ banks individually to the system using the preferential attachment algorithm
stated in Baraba´si and Albert (1999).1 Constructing a core-periphery network using
a Baraba´si-Albert network has the advantage of producing a network topology quite
different to the topology of the Erdo˝s-Re´ny and Small-World network. Thus, we test
for the influence of quite different network topologies on the stability of the banking
system.
We would like to stress that both the network structures as well as the distributions
are standard choices, whereas reality might differ greatly. The different structures and
distributions are intended to show that predictions of the mean-field model are robust
for a variety of assumptions. If not stated otherwise, the parameter values used to
initialize the simulation model can be found in Table 5.1.
5.2 Random Distributions
5.2.1 Normal and Student’s t Distributions
The effects of different underlying location-scale distributions are illustrated in Fig-
ures 5.1 and 5.2. The underlying network structure of the exposure network is, in both
figures, an Erdo˝s-Re´ny network.
In Figure 5.1, we report the average simulated fraction of surviving banks against
(µL   µA)/( 2A +  2L)1/2 and the fixed point solution of the iteration map, Eq. 3.15
(black line) against a0   b0 . For the simulated fraction, we varied µL and for the fixed
point solution, we changed a0 to satisfy (µL   µA)/( 2A +  2L)1/2 = a0   b0 . For each
µL, the simulation was repeated 100 times. In the figure, symbols represent average
fractions and vertical error bars are the standard deviations from the 100 simulations.
To test the behaviour of the simulation for different fractions of average interbank loans,
we changed ✓ from 0.0 (blue line), to 0.1 (red line) and 0.3 (green line). To compute
the equivalent fixed point solution for each value of ✓, we use Eqs. 3.20 and 3.21 to
compute a0 and b0 . The critical value for b0 for the Normal distribution is bc =
p
2⇡. For
the Student’s t distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, the critical value for b0 is reached
when bc = 23/2 (see Tables 4.1 and 4.4). Hence, ✓ = 0.1 leads to a value of interbank
1Note that this method is not the core-periphery algorithm as proposed by Craig and Von Peter (2010).
5.2. Random Distributions 77
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
0
0.5
1
Normal Distribution
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
0
0.5
1
F
ra
ct
io
n
of
su
ri
v
iv
n
g
b
an
k
s,
p
(µL − µA)/(σ2A + σ
2
L)
1/2 = a
′
− b
′
Student’s t Distribution, Degrees of Freedom ν = 2
θ = 0.3
θ = 0.1
θ = 0.3
(B)
(A)
θ = 0.1
θ = 0.0
θ = 0.0
Figure 5.1: The figure shows the fraction of surviving banks, p, evaluated by initializing the
liabilities and assets of banks’ balance sheets with Normal distributions (A) and
Students’t distributions with 2 degrees of freedom (B) with varying location, µL,
and scale parameter,  L, for liabilities, fixed location µA and scale parameter,  A,
for assets plotted against (µL   µA)/( 2A +  2L)1/2. Each symbol is the average of
the fraction of surviving banks of 100 simulations. The error bars are the standard
deviation of the 100 simulations. To compute the blue line, we set the average
fraction of interbank loans to zero, i.e. ✓ = 0.0, for the red line ✓ was set to 0.1
and for the green line ✓ was set to 0.3. The underlying structure of the exposure
networks are Erdo˝s-Re´ny networks. The black lines accompanying each plot are
the fixed points of the iteration map, Eq. 3.15 plotted against a0   b0 which is equal
to (µL µA)/( 2A+ 2L)1/2. Note that b
0 is changed to fit the equivalent ✓ value. A
steep decline in the fraction of surviving banks happens when ✓ equals to 0.3 in the
area of the predicted jump. For ✓ equal to 0.0 and 0.1 the simulation result for both
distributions are close to the fixed point solution of the iteration map, Eq. 3.15. The
parameter values used to initialize the system are stated in Table 5.1.
assets of bank i below the critical value and, conversely, setting ✓ = 0.3 creates a value
of interbank assets above the critical value, where a jump becomes visible.
The difference between Figures 4.4 and 5.1 is that in order to compute the fixed
point solution in Figure 4.4, the total assets of the banks are varied since the location
parameter of non-interbank assets is constant and a change in b0 implies that either
capital is changed to compensate a decrease or increase in total assets, or q, µL, µA,  L
and  A change accordingly such that a
0 is constant. Whereas, in Figure 5.1, the location
parameter of the total assets of banks is constant and a change in ✓ does not effect the
size of the balance sheet. Hence, capital stays constant for fixed values of q, µL,  L and
 A.
The fractions of surviving banks computed in Figure 5.1 uses Normal distributions
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(A) and Student’s t distributions (B) to initialize total assets and total liabilities. Sim-
ilarly, to compute the fixed point solutions, we use a standard Normal CDF in A and
a standard Student’s t CDF in B. We use Normal and Student’s t distributions as both
distributions are location-scale distributions. Hence, we can compare the simulation
results with the solutions of the iteration map, Eq. 3.15.
We note that for ✓ = 0.3, more banks become insolvent for the same values of
q, µA, µL,  A and  L than when ✓ = 0. The reason is that there exists no counterparty
risk when ✓ = 0.0. For both distributions a sudden decrease in the fraction of surviving
banks is observed for ✓ = 0.3. The jump starts earlier for the banking system with
banks initialized with Student’s t distributions than for banks initialized with Normal
distributions. Also, the simulation results for a banking system initialized with Normal
distributions are a closer fit to the fixed point solutions of the iteration map, Eq. 3.15,
nonetheless the simulated results initialized with the Student’s t distribution are also
close to the fixed points. In the proximity of the jump, the standard deviation of the
simulated fractions of surviving banks increases. This indicates that for the values of
q, µA, µL,  A and  L, at which the jump occurs, either most of the banks are operating
or most of the banks are insolvent with no intermediate state.
To investigate this behaviour for parameter values close to the jump, we plotted
the frequency distribution for fixed values of q, µA, µL,  A and  L in proximity of the
jump in Figure 5.2. We used different values of µL for the simulations when initializing
with Normal distributions (µL = 890) and Student’s t distribution (µL = 870). This is
because of the jump starting earlier for the Student’s t distribution than for the Normal
distribution. The value for ✓ is set to 0.3 again. To determine the frequency distribution,
we repeated the default algorithm for the fixed values of q, µA, µL,  A and  L 10,000
times and sum the occurrence of the same equilibrium fraction of surviving banks.
Subplot A shows the results for simulations using Normal distributions and subplot B
shows the results for simulations using Student’s t distributions.
For both distributions, two peaks occur. The peaks of the frequency distribution
for a banking system initialized with Normal distributions occur around p close to zero
and for p between 0.9 and 1.0. The first peak for the fraction of surviving banks for
a banking system with balance sheets initialized with Student’s t distributions happen
between 0.03 and 0.15 and the second peak for values of p between 0.65 and 0.95.
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Figure 5.2: This figure shows the frequency distribution of fractions of surviving banks p for
banks initialized with Normal (A) and Student’s t distribution (B) for fixed values
of q, µL, µA, L and  A. The fraction of interbank loans to total assets, ✓, is set to
0.3 and the underlying structure of the exposure network is an Erdo˝s-Re´ny network.
To observe the behaviour in the proximity of the jump the values for µL are set to
890 for the Normal distribution and 870 for the Student’s t distribution. To compute
the frequency distribution, we repeat the simulation 10,000 times. Two peaks occur
because of perturbations of the balance sheet values due to the randomness. The
two peaks are visible in both subplots at the end and beginning of the scale of
p indicating that most of the banks in the banking system either survive or are
insolvent. Intermediate fractions of surviving banks do not occur.
Values of fractions of surviving banks between the two peaks do not occur. The lack
of intermediate values is due to the stable and unstable fixed points. The unstable fixed
point forms a barrier between the stable fixed points. However, slight perturbations of
the values of banks’ assets and liabilities caused by the randomness of the simulation
either tip the banking system into distress or survival.
The number of banks defaulting before the sudden system failure happens when
initialized with Normal distributions and is less than for a banking system initialized
with Student’s t distributions. The Student’s t distribution is a fat tail distribution im-
plying that banks’ balance sheets differ more than when the balance sheet values are
distributed with a Normal distribution. Thus, after the jump some banks have a greater
chance of survival, as they have more capital, than other members of the banking sys-
tem. However, because of the greater diversity, some banks also have less capital than
other banks, causing the system failure to happen for a smaller location parameter
for liabilities in comparison to a more homogeneous banking system when initialized
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Figure 5.3: The figure shows the average fraction of surviving banks for varying leverage,
  = µA µLµA , for banking systems initialized with Normal (red), Logistic (magenta),
Log-Normal (green) and Log-Logistic (blue) distributions. We use 100 simulations
to determine the average fraction of surviving banks. The means and standard de-
viation of the Normal distributions are: µNA = 1000, µ
N
L 2 [800, 1000], NA = 30
and  NL = 50. The ratio of interbank assets to total assets, ✓, is set to 0.3 for all
simulations. The input variables for the other distributions are calculated as stated
in Table 5.2. The leverage,  , is calculated using the input variables for the individ-
ual probability distributions. A steep decline of p occurs for all banking systems
around similar leverage values of   = 0.1. This indicates that the banking system
is in the fragile state for these leverage values.
with Normal distributions. Thus, the more diverse system is more prone to failure but
chances of survival of some banks are larger than for a more homogeneous banking
system.
5.2.2 Non-Location Scale Distributions
To test the behaviour of a banking system calibrated with non location-scale distribu-
tions, we use Log-Normal and Log-Logistic distributions to initialize the balance sheets
of banks. In addition to the Log-Normal and Log-Logistic distribution, we also pro-
vide the solutions for the fraction of surviving banks for banking systems calibrated
with Normal and Logistic distribution. If a random variable X is drawn from a Nor-
mal or Logistic distribution, then exp(X) is the random variable of a Log-Normal or
Log-Logistic distribution.
Figure 5.3 shows a plot of the average fraction of surviving banks, p, against lever-
age,   = µA µLµA , for Normal (red cross), Logistic (magenta circle), Log-Normal (green
star) and Log-Logistic (blue cross) distributions. To produce the graphs in Figure 5.3,
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Figure 5.4: The figure shows the frequency distribution for the fraction of surviving banks, p,
for banking systems initialized with Normal (A), Logistic (B), Log-Normal (C)
and Log-Logistic (D) distributions. The parameters for the Normal distributions
were chosen such that all distributions cause the banking system to be in the range
of the fragile state. Namely, we fixed µNL = 895 and calculated the other input
variables accordingly. As before, we used 10,000 simulations for each distribution
to generate the frequency distribution. For each plot, two peaks occur close to
p = 0 and p = 0.8, which shows that indeed the banking system is in the fragile
state.
the mean, µNA,L, and standard deviation, µNA,L, of Normal distributions are used to cal-
culate the input variables for the other distributions using the formulas as stated in
Table 5.2. This has the effect that the samples of banks’ balance sheets have the same
arithmetic mean and standard deviation for the different random distributions. The
average was taken over 100 simulations. The leverage is calculated using the input
variables for the specific random distribution used to produce each graph, i.e. for sim-
ulations initialized with Log-Normal distribution, the leverage is:   = µ
LL
A  µLLL
µLLA
.
For the simulations, we set µNA = 1000, µNL 2 [800, 1000],  NA = 30 and  NL = 50
and calculated the input variables for the other distributions. The ratio of interbank
assets to total assets, ✓, is set to 0.3 to ensure that the jump becomes possible. Finally,
the underlying network structure is chosen to be an Erdo˝s-Re´ny network.
The fragile state in Figure 5.3 occurs for the distributions around a leverage of
  = 0.1. The banking system initialized with Normal and Log-Normal distributions
are the first to default, followed by Logistic and Log-Logistic. That said, the difference
between the values is marginal. To ensure that a jump from almost all banks solvent
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Figure 5.5: The figure shows the PDFs for the average initial capital of a bank given that the
banking system is initialized with Normal (red), Logistic (magenta), Log-Normal
(green) and Log-Logistic (blue) distributions. For the Normal distribution, the
means and standard deviations are µNA = 1000, µ
N
L = 895,  
N
A = 30 and  
N
L = 50.
The input variables for the other distributions are based on the ones for the Normal
distribution and calculated using the formulas in Table 5.2. All banks are assumed
solvent initially, i.e. p0 = 1. The FWHM for each PDF is also indicated by the
vertical and horizontal, dotted lines and the double arrows. The Log-Normal distri-
bution has the largest FWHM with FWHMLN = 133.89, followed by the Normal
distribution with FWHMN = 129.62. The Logsitic and Log-Logistic distributions
have a FWHM of FWHML = 119.25 and FWHMLL = 113.61. This implies that
the initial capital for banks initialized with Logistic and Log-Logistic distributions
are closer to the arithmetic mean than the initial capital of banks initialized with
Normal and Log-Normal distributions.
to almost all banks insolvent happens, the frequency distributions are plotted for fixed
µNL = 895 in Figure 5.4.
For all four distributions, two peaks occur close to p = 0 and p = 0.8 with inter-
mediate values missing. Thus, the fragile state indeed occurs. The graphs suggest that
for µL = 985, the banking systems calibrated with Log-Normal distributions followed
by Normal distributions are more likely to fail than systems calibrated with Logistic
and Log-Logistic distributions.
Note that the scale parameters for the Normal (  = 58.3095) and Logistic (  =
32.1477) distributions differ. This has the effect that the arithmetic standard deviation
of the samples of banks’ balance sheets is similar and results in a slimmer PDF for
the Logistic distribution than for the Normal distribution. The width of the PDFs of
each distribution is further described in Figure 5.5. The figure shows the Normal (red),
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Logistic (magenta), Log-Normal (green) and Log-Logistic (blue) PDF of (1  ✓)µA  
µL + ✓µAp0 (the initial average capital of a bank). To evaluate the Normal PDF, we
fix µNL = 895, and calculate µ
L,LN,LL
A,L and  
L,LN,LL
A,L accordingly to retrieve the input
variables for the other PDFs. The initial fraction of surviving banks, p0, is set to one.
The horizontal and vertical dotted lines indicate the position of the full width
at half maximum (FWHM). The FWHM for the Normal distribution is FWHMN =
129.62; for the Logistic, FWHML equals 119.25; for the Log-Normal, FWHMLN is
133.89, and for the Log-Logistic, FWHMLL equals 113.61. From the figure it becomes
clear that the Log-Logistic and Logistic distributions are slimmer than the Normal and
Log-Normal distributions. Hence, for a system initialized with Log-Logistic or Logis-
tic distributions, more banks have initial capital closer to the arithmetic mean than in a
system initialized with Log-Normal or Normal distributions. In systems initialized with
Normal and Log-Normal distributions, there exist more banks with less initial capital
that are more prone to failure. These banks start the insolvency at lower leverage values
making the total banking system less stable.
5.3 Network Influence
5.3.1 Size of the Banking System, N
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show the second norm of the difference of the fraction of surviving
banks computed using the fixed points of the iteration map, Eq. 3.15 and the average
fraction of surviving banks computed using 100 simulations. In the simulation, we use
Erdo˝s-Re´ny networks as underlying structures for the exposure networks, and Normal
distributions for liabilities and assets with varying mean liabilities, µL. The ratio be-
tween interbank assets and total asset, ✓, is set to 0.3. For this value of ✓, b0 is well
above its critical value and a jump is predicted. For the fixed point equation a0 is varied
to balance the changes in µL in the simulation. The colour scale in Figures 5.6 and 5.7
reports the error (second norm) between the predicted values and the value achieved
using the average from 100 simulations.
In Figure 5.6, the errors for different values of N 2 [11, 1000] are plotted. The
connection probability ↵ for the Erdo˝s-Re´ny networks is changed such that the average
degree for each N is z¯ = 102. To derive the fixed point solution for the iteration map,
2For an Erdo˝s-Re´ny network, the average degree is z = ↵(N   1).
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Figure 5.6: The figure shows the average error between the solution of the simulation and iter-
ation map, Eq. 3.15 of the fraction of surviving banks for varying bank population,
N . The figure reports the second norms of the difference between the fractions
of surviving banks of the fixed point solutions of the iteration map, Eq. 3.15, and
the fraction of surviving banks of an average of 100 simulations for fixed values
(µL   µA)/( 2A +  2L)1/2. The exposure network structures are Erdo˝s-Re´ny net-
works. The connection probability for each population size is adjusted such that
the average degree of a bank is z¯ = 10. Banks’ balance sheets are calibrated using
Normal distributions. An interbank exposure to total exposure ✓ = 0.3 is used.
To test the influence of the size of the banking system, the number of banks N is
varied between [11, 1011].
Eq. 3.15, we assume that N tends to infinity. Nonetheless, Figure 5.6 indicates that the
number of banks, N , does not affect the outcome of the simulation much. The error
close to the jump for N < 150 is visible for a wider range of µL. For larger N , the
error only becomes large close to the jump. For the same amount of average capital in
the system, the randomness allows for capital to vary among banks in the simulation
model. Close to the jump, this implies that small perturbation in banks’ individual
capital ensures a stable banking system, whereas in other cases the banking system
collapses (see Figures 5.2 and 5.4). Hence, close to the jump predicted in the iteration
map, Eq. 3.15, the error is the largest.
5.3.2 The Average Degree, z¯
In Figure 5.7, the errors for different connection probabilities ↵ are plotted for a bank-
ing system withN = 500. As expected, close to the jump the error is large but becomes
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Figure 5.7: The figure shows the average error between the solution of the simulation and the
iteration map, Eq. 3.15, of the fraction of surviving banks for varying average de-
grees of banks in the exposure network. The figure reports the second norm of
the difference between the average fraction of surviving banks of the fixed point
solutions of iteration map, Eq. 3.15, and the fraction of surviving banks of 100
simulations for fixed values (µL   µA)/( 2A +  2L)1/2 (changing µL for different
simulations) and a0   b0 (changing a0 for different fixed points). The simulation
assumes Normal distributions for the balance sheet values, and for the structure
of the exposure network, Erdo˝s-Re´ny networks with connection probability ↵ and
fraction of interbank loans to total assets ✓ = 0.3 are used. To test the influence of
the number of links from one bank to others, ↵ is varied in (0, 0.1].
smaller the larger the average degree z¯ in the exposure network. However, for ↵ smaller
than 0.03, a large error is also observed. This is because in that region the jump is only
marginal or does not occur in the simulation, implying that due to the smaller number
of links, the insolvency distribution and subsequent cumulative counterparty losses via
the network are not realized.
We note that large errors happen in a range close to the jump for connection proba-
bilities ↵ smaller than 8 ·10 3. In that region, the average degree z¯ of a bank is between
0 and 4 forN = 500. For ↵ < 10 3, the jump is not observed or it is not very dominant
in the simulation testing. The amount loaned from one bank to others is still ✓Ai(0).
However, it was shown in Chessa et al. (1998) and Barrat et al. (2008) using simula-
tion means that the upper critical Euclidean dimension for the mean-field assumption
of the Ising model is 4. Thus, it becomes clear that the mean-field approximation does
not capture the behaviour for average degrees smaller than 4 and further investigation
needs to be done into whether an average low number of counterparties in a banking
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Figure 5.8: The figure shows the average fraction of insolvent banks, 1 p, against the average
degree, z¯, of the interbank network for different  . The fraction of insolvent banks
is determined using 100 simulations. Banks’ balance sheets are initialized using
Normal distributions and fixed values of µL = 960 and ✓ = 0.3. The underly-
ing topology of the interbank network is an Erdo˝s-Re´ny network. The connection
probability ↵ is varied in [0, 0.5]. The variance   is changed for each graph from 0
to 30 ( L = 0 and  A =  ). The parameter values used to initialize the banks re-
sult in an unstable solution for the mean-field model. However, it can be observed
that for decreasing  , the fraction of insolvent banks decreases for increasing z¯.
system reduces the risk of a systemic stress event.
5.3.3 The Influence of the Variance,  , on Diversification of Inter-
bank Assets
To test the influence of the variance,  , we plotted the average fraction of insolvent
banks, 1  p, against the average degree, z¯, for different values of   in Figure 5.8. The
graphs in Figure 5.8 are the averages of 100 simulations. The topology of the underly-
ing exposure network resembles an Erdo˝s-Re´ny network and the random distributions
used to initialize the balance sheets are Normal distributions. The simulations are ini-
tialized with fixed µL = 960 and ✓ = 0.3. The connection probability, ↵, is varied in
[0, 0.5]. The variance,  , is changed from 0 to 30 for each graph as indicated in the
legend. To be more specific,  L, is set to zero, and  A equals  .
We use 1  p in this figure to have the same representation as in Gai and Kapadia
(2010). In Gai and Kapadia (2010), they test the same contagion algorithm as presented
in this thesis. However, in their initialization process, all banks have the same value of
total assets, liabilities and capital. They also use Erdo˝s-Re´ny networks to initialize
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Figure 5.9: The figure is similar to Figure 4.5 showing the fraction of surviving banks, p, for
different values of a and b given p0 = 1. In addition, we also plotted the the
equilibrium solution of the fraction of surviving banks corresponding to the values
archived in Figure 5.8 for different values of   = [20, 18, 15, 13, 10, 5]. It becomes
clear that for   larger than 15, p is in the stable region, whereas for   larger smaller
than 15, p is in the unstable region.
their exposure networks. The interbank assets in Gai and Kapadia (2010) are, as in this
study, a fraction of total assets, and a single weight from a bank i to another bank has the
value: ✓Aizi . To summarize, in Gai and Kapadia (2010),   is zero and the balance sheets
of banks are identical except the exposure from one bank to another, which depends on
the out-degree of each individual bank.
The increased fragility of the banking system for increasing   can be explained
using Figure 5.9. Figure 5.9 shows a plot similar to Figure 4.5. It depicts the fraction
of surviving banks for given a and b. Additionally, we plotted p for a and b using the
same parameters as used to created the graphs in Figure 5.8 as indicated by the legend.
For   larger than 15 the equilibrium fraction of surviving banks is above a2. However,
for   below 18, the equilibrium fraction of surviving banks is below a2 in the stable
region.
For z¯ increasing and small  , the fraction of insolvent banks decreases as well.
Reducing   causes the balance sheets of banks to be more alike. If   = 0, each bank
has the same amount of capital initially. The randomness in the system is caused by the
distribution of the degree of the underlying exposure network. In the simulation model
for   = 0, the exposure leaving bank i to any loaner bank j is given as ✓Ai(0)/zi. Thus,
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for bank i to be vulnerable in round r (assuming that bank i withstands insolvency until
round r) at least one counterparty of bank i needs to be insolvent. Additionally, given
that bank i is only connected to one insolvent bank, the capital of bank i in round r,
Ei(r) = Ai(r)  Li, needs to be less than ✓Ai(0)/zi for bank i to become insolvent.
Let us consider the parameter values used to initialize the simulation in Figure 5.8
and set   = 0. That implies that all banks have the same amount of total assets, initially,
namely Ai(0) = 1000. The capital in round r = 0 of a solvent bank i is 40 and the
single weight of exposure from bank i to bank j is: 300/zi. Thus, for zi = 7, an
insolvent counterparty bank j will cause insolvency to bank i since the exposure of
bank i to bank j is 42.9, greater than bank i’s capital. However, for zi = 8, bank i
needs to be connected to more than one insolvent bank to become insolvent itself.
Hence, assuming all banks i have the same amount of balance sheet quantities,
this implies that the larger the degree of a bank i, the more secure bank i is from
counterparty failure. Furthermore, any cascades will eventually stop, since only banks
with small out-degrees are affected by counterparty default and the network effects can
be disregarded. This is in accordance with the results in Gai and Kapadia (2010).
If the balance sheet parameters are also random variables, than the amount of
capital distributed among banks also differs. This causes the variance of loss-absorbing
capital for banks to be greater with some being more prone to failure than others. There-
fore, the cumulative losses increase as the likelihood of banks being connected to an
insolvent bank increases (and even more so the larger the number of counterparties).
This result is in accordance with Battiston et al. (2012a) and Battiston et al. (2012b),
where they tested the banking cascade model in Gai and Kapadia (2010) using random
variables for the balance sheet parameters. They also observe that for an increase in  ,
counterparty insolvency continues to propagate through the network with large average
degree.
Thus, it can be argued that for a highly homogeneous banking system counter-
party risk can be lowered by diversifying interbank exposure. Whereas, for a more
heterogeneous system, where banks have different levels of loss absorbing capital, di-
versification does not necessary make the system more stable.
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Figure 5.10: The figure shows the average fraction of surviving banks, p, computed using 100
simulations plotted against (µL   µA)/( 2A +  2L)1/2. The balance sheet values
are normally distributed. The underlying structure of the exposure networks are
Small-World with neighbouring nodes c = 12 and a re-wiring probability   set
to 0.1 (A) and core-periphery networks with a strongly connected core created
using Erdo˝s-Re´ny networks with connection probability ↵ = 0.75 and 50 banks,
and 450 periphery banks that are added one by one and joined to the 50 already
existing banks using the preferential attachment algorithm. As in Figure 5.1, for
a fraction of interbank assets to total assets, ✓ = 0.3, p is plotted using green
symbols; for ✓ = 0.1, we used red symbols; and for 0.0, blue symbols were used.
The error bar is the standard deviation of the results of 100 trials. The black line
represents the fixed points of the iteration map, Eq. 3.15, plotted against a0   b0
for changing ✓ as used in the simulation. The values of p for the simulation and
the iteration map, Eq. 3.15, are for both network structures close and the steep
decrease in the proximity of the jump are for both network structures observable.
5.3.4 Network Topology
Interbank networks of various countries (Austria (Boss et al., 2004), Brazil (Cont et al.,
2010), UK (Langfield et al., 2014), Italy (Iori et al., 2008), etc.) have been studied
with the outcome that the networks do not resemble Erdo˝s-Re´ny networks. Instead,
they consist of “low clustering coefficients with short average path length” (Boss et al.,
2004) and the links in the interbank networks resembling the exposure from one bank
to others are distributed with tails exhibiting “a linear decay in log-scale, suggesting a
heavy Pareto tail” (Cont et al., 2010) indicating a core-periphery structure with banks in
the centre being highly connected and periphery banks being connected to core banks
(Viegas et al., 2013).
In Figure 5.10, we test the influence of other exposure network structures than
the Erdo˝s-Re´ny network. The distributions used to initialize the balance sheets for
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both subplots are Normal distributions. The structure of the outline of Figure 5.10 is
similar to the one in Figure 5.1. Again, we plotted the average fraction of 100 trials
of surviving banks for a ✓ of 0.3 (green line), 0.1 (red line) and 0.0 (blue line) against
(µL µa)/( 2A+ 2L)1/2 varying µL. The black lines are the solution of the fixed points
of Eq. 3.15 for changing b0 to match the equivalent value of ✓. Plot A shows the results
given that the underlying exposure network has a Small-World structure and in plot B,
the underlying exposure network structure uses the preferential attachment algorithm
to create a core-periphery structure. To tightly connected core banks, we used Erdo˝s-
Re´ny core networks made out of 50 banks with a connection probability ↵ of 0.75. The
remaining 450 periphery banks are added one-by-one connecting to 15 banks using the
preferential attachment algorithm.
As shown in Figure 5.10, the simulation results using both network structures are
close to the fixed point solutions of the iteration map, Eq. 3.15, with a steep decline in
surviving banks for ✓ = 0.3. The steep decline of p, when the Small-World network
is used, starts a bit earlier than the predicted jump in the mean-field model. Before
the rewiring process, the Small-World network is an ordered lattice. The Ising model
on an ordered lattice can be approximated using the mean-field solution as long as the
number of close neighbours is larger than 4. The re-wiring creates long-distance links
between banks, distributes the shock quicker through the network.
Thus, it can be said that the network influence is marginal given that the number
of lending banks is large enough. This can be explained using the results in Section 4.2.
There, we showed that when pr = x1 (and assuming a small change from pr to pr 1)
and a = a2, the average number of banks failing as a result of one insolvent bank is
one again. Therefore, this implies that when capital is low the insolvency of one bank
causes a chain of insolvencies in connected banks resulting in distress throughout the
entire system. This implies that the network structure is secondary in the distribution of
insolvencies. However, it has been reported that in the real world networks, periphery
banks are of smaller size than core banks, which we did not account for and might lead
to a different result.
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Figure 5.11: The figure shows the average fraction of surviving banks p computed using 100
simulations plotted against (µL   µA)/( 2A +  2L)1/2. The balance sheet values
are normally distributed. The underlying structure of the exposure network is
an Erdo˝s-Re´ny network. A collateral term, a recovery rate q, was added when
the total assets where computed during simulation modelling. The collateral on
loans becomes active after the counterparty becomes insolvent. The black line
represents the fixed points of the iteration map, Eq. 3.15. The fixed points are
plotted against a0 b0 (✓ = 0.3was used in the simulation). The different coloured
lines represent varying fractions q 2 [0, 1]. The value of the collateral for any loan
from bank i to bank j is q✓Aigij . For increasing q, the interbank interaction is
reduced such that for q = 1 the interbank loans can be disregarded.
5.4 Recovery Rate
Figure 5.11 is a plot of the fraction of surviving banks, p, using simulation testing
including the recovery rate and the fixed point solution of the iteration map, Eq. 3.15.
The average fraction of surviving banks was plotted for 100 trials along with the error
bars (coloured lines) for fixed ✓ = 0.3. As in the plots before, µL is varied in the
simulation and a0 is changed accordingly in the mean-field model. The black lines are
the fixed point solutions of the iteration map, Eq. 3.15. The different colours represent
varying fractions of q 2 [0, 1]. For increasing q, the interaction in form of interbank
loans between banks can be disregarded. However, for lower values of q, the jump
can still be observed. This can be explained using the critical value of the ratio of
interbank assets to total assets, ✓c, which increases for increasing q. In fact, if q tends
to one, banks do not have any losses to compensate when counterparties fail. Thus,
unsurprisingly, a large q diminishes the importance of counterparty risk.
In the literature on recovery rates (Bruche and Gonza´lez-Aguado, 2010), it has
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been observed that the value of recovery rates fluctuates with economic cycles. During
a downturn the recovery rates are usually lower than when the economic cycle is in
an upturn. According to Bruche and Gonza´lez-Aguado (2010), the recovery rates for
bonds of US companies range between 0.15 to 0.80.3 In Fleming and Sarkar (2014), it is
stated that the recovery rate of Lehman Brothers was estimated to be 0.28. They further
say: “The settlement of OTC [Annot.: over the counter] derivatives was a long and
complex process...” and that “the Lehman estate was able to make the first distribution
to creditors [Annot.: OTC derivatives contracts with big bank counterparties] on April
17, 2012.” Thus, it is fair to assume that the instantaneous recovery rate is much lower.
Hence, a jump in a real economic setting with positive recover rates is still feasible.
However, the economic conditions need to be dire, allowing for low recovery rates, and
a considerable loss in the value of assets or increase in the cost of funding.
5.5 Changes in Liabilities and Assets During the Insol-
vency Propagation
To investigate the impact of changes in liabilities and assets during the insolvency
propagation, we apply Eqs. 3.23 (Aˆi(r + 1) = exp( (1   pr))Aˆi(r)) and 3.24
(Li(r + 1) = (1   )Li(r)) to the simulation model. We use Normal distributions
to initialize the balance sheet quantities and say the underlying network structure re-
sembles an Erdo˝s-Re´ny network with ✓ = 0.3.
To investigate the effects of reducing the value on non-interbank assets propor-
tional to the fraction of insolvent banks, 1  pr, in round r, we adopted the insolvency
algorithm from Chapter 3 slightly. In particular, Eq. 3.23 is applied after the third step
in the insolvency algorithm. That is, in round r we have:
• The current value of interbank assets, Ai(r), is calculated for each bank i using
Eq. 3.22.
• For all banks i with Ai(r)  Li < 0, the state, Si(r), of bank i set to zero.
• The number of solvent banks is counted and divided by N to obtain the fraction
of solvent banks, pr, in round r.
3They used the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Corporate Bond Default Master Database to extract
the recovery rates.
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Figure 5.12: The figure shows the fraction of solvent banks, pr, against r for one simulation
run given that in each round r, the non-interbank assets, Ai(r), are reduced by
exp( (1  pr)) as outlined in Eq. 3.23. The parameters to initialize the balance
sheets are chosen such that only a small number of banks become insolvent ini-
tially but the overall system stays stable (µL = 860). For each graph the constant,
, is changed from zero (magenta x), to 0.05 (blue cross), to 0.10 (green star). For
 = 0.00, as expected, the equilibrium solution of surviving banks is p = 0.99.
However, for  = 0.05 and  = 0.10, the system defaults with p = 0.
• The value of non-interbank assets, Aˆi(r), is calculated for each bank i according
to Eq. 3.23.
• The iteration is repeated until no further bank becomes insolvent.
Figure 5.12 shows the fraction of solvent banks, pr, in round r plotted against
round r. To create the plot, the location parameter of the liabilities is chosen such that
the banking system is stable when disregarding a reduction in the value of assets, i.e.
µL = 860. To be more precise, only a few banks become insolvent and the majority
of banks stay stable. The ratio of interbank assets to total assets is set to ✓ = 0.3.
Figure 5.12 consist of three graphs representing the fraction of solvent banks, pr, in
round r computed using one simulation run. For each graph the constant, , is changed
from zero (magenta x), to 0.05 (blue cross), to 0.10 (green star). For  = 0, non-
interbank assets do not lose in value and most banks in the banking system survive
with the equilibrium fraction of surviving banks being p( = 0) = 0.99 in round
r = 1. Increasing  to 0.05 and 0.10 results in a reduction of the value of interbank
assets. This causes the banking system to become unstable with the equilibrium fraction
of surviving banks for  = 0.05 and  = 0.10 being p( = 0.05, = 0.01) = 0.00.
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The reduction in non-interbank assets results in a greater loss in capital and moves the
system into the unstable region eventually.
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Figure 5.13: The figure shows multiple plots of x   F (x) against x. The values for a00(r)
and b0 are calculated using Eqs. 3.21 and 5.1. Because of the reduction term,
exp( (1   pr))
PN
i=1 Aˆi(r)
N , in Eq. 5.1 the value for a
00
(r) changes for each in-
solvency round, r. This causes x   F (x) to shift upwards for each r. For r = 0,
x   F (x|a00(0)) has three roots, w1, w2 and w3, which are the fixed points of
pr+1 = F (pr|a000). For r  1, pr+1 = F (pr|a00r  1) has only one fixed point
close to zero. Hence, a reduction in non-interbank assets resulted in an unstable
banking system.
We visualized in Figure 5.13 the change of the system from a stable to an unstable
system conditional on the reduction. Figure 5.13 shows multiple plots of x   F (x)
against x. To calculate b0 , we used Eq 3.21. However, because of the asset reduction
function, Eq. 3.23, we adopted the formula for a0 , Eq. 3.20, to (assuming q = 0):
a
00
(r) =
  exp( (1  pr))
PN
i=1 Aˆi(r)
N + µLp
 2A +  
2
L
, (5.1)
i.e. we changed the term (1  ✓)µA to exp( (1  pr))
PN
i=1 Aˆi(r)
N . Note that
PN
i=1 Aˆi(r)
N
is the arithmetic mean of the non-interbank assets, Aˆi(r), for all banks i in round r.
Thus, we say a00(r) changes in time. It should be noted that the value for the non-
interbank assets, Aˆi(0), for a bank i is specific for each simulation and changes for
each simulation run. To produce the graphs in Figure 5.13, we used the same values
for Aˆi(0) as were used in the banking system to produce the fractions of solvent banks,
pr, in Figure 5.12 for  = 0.05. Hence, a
00
(r) differs for each graph in Figure 5.13
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resulting in an upwards shift of the graphs of x F (x|a00(r)). The legend indicates the
round of insolvency for each graph.
For r = 0 (dark blue line), x   F (x|a00(r)) has three roots. Hence, the iteration
map, pr = F (pr 1|a00(0)) has three fixed points, w1, w2 and w3. For reasons outlined in
Chapter 4, w1 and w3 are stable fixed points and w2 is an unstable fixed point forming
a barrier between the two stable fixed points. Note also that w1 is slightly smaller than
one. Thus, for all banks solvent initially (p0 = 1), some banks become insolvent in the
initial round (r = 0). This has the effect that the non-interbank assets are reduced and
a
00
(1) increases. The increase in a00(1) causes x F (x|a00(1)) to shift upwards. Because
of the shift, x F (x|a00(1)) only has one root, namelyw1, which is the stable fixed point
of pr = F (pr 1|a00(1)). In fact, for any a00(r) for r  1, pr = F (pr 1|a00(r)) has only
one fixed point. The fixed pointw1 is zero for all a
00
(r)with r  1. This implies that for
any r  1, the reduction in non-interbank assets results in system failure for  = 0.05.
In Figure 5.14, we test for the influence of a capital injection into an unstable sys-
tem. Because of that, the parameters are chosen such that the banking system collapses
given  = 0, i.e. µL = 890 and ✓ = 0.3. To be more precise, we adopt the insol-
vency algorithm stated in Chapter 3 and reduce the liabilities in a particular round r by
applying Eq. 3.24 to the liability side of banks’ balance sheet. That is, for each bank
i, Li(r + 1) is a fraction (1   ) of Li(r). Figure 5.14 shows the fraction of solvent
banks, pr, against round r. For each graph, we reduced the value of liabilities in round
r as specified in the accompanying legend. For example, for the graph represented by
the magenta triangles, the liabilities were reduced in round r = 7. Additionally, we
marked the fraction of solvent banks at the point right before the liabilities are reduced.
To be more precise, for a reduction in liabilities at r = 7, the fraction of solvent bank
before the reduction is pr=7 = 0.05.
The graphs show that if a reduction of 5% in the value of liabilities takes place
before the 6th iteration step, the banking system returns to almost all banks solvent
again. However, if the reduction in liabilities takes place after the 6th iteration step,
all banks become insolvent. Note that we did not plot average solutions but only the
solution of a single simulation. Hence, depending on the initial distribution of balance
sheet quantities and the underlying network structure, a system might be rescuable
after the 6th iteration or doomed to default before the 6th iteration step. Nonetheless,
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Figure 5.14: The figure shows the fraction of solvent banks, pr, against round r. To produce
the graphs, the liabilities, Li(r), of each bank i are reduced by a fraction 1   
in round r. The legend indicates the specific round, r, in which liabilities are
reduced. Additionally, we marked pr for each simulation before reduction in
liabilities takes place. For liability reductions in round r = 1, ..., 5, the banks in
the banking system return to normally operating. For r = 7, 9, all banks become
insolvent.
it can be deduced from Figure 5.14 that there exists a point in the iterative process, at
which a capital injection does not save the banking system even though the same capital
injection could have rescued the banking system in earlier iteration steps.
This can be explained using Figure 5.15. In Figure 5.15, the function x  F (x|a0)
is plotted twice against x. The difference in the two graphs is the parameter a0 . For both
graphs, the parameter b0 is calculated using the values used to initialize the simulation
model. However, for the solid line, we used the initial value of µL to calculate a
0
1 =
3.60. For the dotted graph, (1  )µL was used to calculate a02 = 2.82. The parameter
b
0
= 5.1 is the same for both graphs. The vertical lines indicate x corresponding to the
values of pr before the reduction in liabilities. For example, the vertical magenta line
(x = 0.05) corresponds to the fraction of solvent banks in round r = 7 for the magenta
coloured triangle graph in Figure 5.14, i.e. p7 = 0.05. The vertical black lines mark the
position of the fixed points, w1, w2 and w3, of the iteration map pr = F (pr1 |a02), which
are the roots of x  F (x|a02).
As can be deduced from the graphs in Figure 5.15, the reduction in capital causes
the iteration map, pr = F (pr1 |a0), to change from one fixed point solution (for a0 = a01)
to three fixed point solutions (a0 = a02). The fixed point, w1, for a
0
1 = 3.60 is close
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Figure 5.15: The figure shows two plots of x   F (x|a0) against x. The parameter b0 equals
5.1. The parameter a0 varies for the two graphs. For the solid black line we used
a
0
1 = 3.60. Whereas for the dotted black line a
0
2 equals 2.82. The parameters
a
0
1 and b
0 are calculated using the values q, µA, µL,  A,  L and ✓ to initialize the
simulation model before the reduction in liabilities takes place. For the dotted
black graph, b0 stays the same. However, a02 varies because we used (1   )µL
for the average liabilities to represent the reduction in liabilities instead of µL.
The black vertical lines represent the roots of x   F (x|a2), w1, w2 and w3. The
coloured vertical lines are specific x values corresponding to pr in Figure 5.14
before the liabilities are reduced.
to zero. The stable fixed points, w1, w3, for a
0
2 = 2.82 are close to zero and one. The
unstable fixed point, w2, forms a barrier between the two stable fixed points around 0.6.
Therefore, without the reduction in liabilities, all banks in the banking system will
become insolvent. However, if the liabilities are reduced in round r, instead of one
orbit, the new iteration process has two orbits. For any starting value pr in [w1, w2], the
fixed point reached is going to be w1; and for any pr in [w2, w3], the fixed point reached
is going to be w3. For example, for pr=7 = 0.05 the iteration process will stop at zero.
Whereas, for pr=6 = 0.65, the system returns to normally operating again.
5.6 Conclusion
We conclude that the results of the mean-field model can be replicated using a
simulation-based model for a variety of random distributions and banking system pa-
rameters. We determine that interbank networks are crucial to the distribution of coun-
terparty failure, but the network structure is secondary for the onset of the insolvency
propagation. We also show that diversification of interbank assets does not necessarily
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reduce the risk of failure. Hence, monitoring precise exposure from one bank to another
is not necessary. Instead, ratios of interbank assets to total assets should be monitored
to guarantee financial stability. This is of interest as interbank exposure from one bank
to another is not published by regulators. This is because the information contained in
reports on interbank exposures collected by regulators is considered market changing.
The conclusions of this chapter suggest that publishing information on the ratio of in-
terbank assets to total assets is sufficient to monitor financial stability. It would allow
other participants to obtain a better picture about banks’ solvency. That said, we did
not incorporate the importance of recovery rates other than using the same value for all
banks or how maturity times for different financial products influence the solvency of
banks. These should be checked before solely relying on the ratio of interbank assets
to total assets as a measure of how counterparty failure influences financial stability.
Finally, we incorporate functions changing the time value of assets and liabilities
in the simulation model and explain the observations in the setting of the mean-field
model. The functions used are not realistic to model actual processes during a real
financial crisis. The intention of using these functions was to show that value changes
of assets and liabilities can be incorporated into the mean-field setting.4 Depending
on the balance sheet values, the equilibrium solution of the counterparty risk model
shifts. This potentially causes a seemingly stable system to move into an unstable
region given reductions in banks’ capital during the insolvency iteration. Furthermore,
we find that because the equilibrium solution is history dependent, capital injections
during the insolvency propagation might not have the desired effect of rescuing the
banking system, even so the same amount of external capital would have caused the
system to return to stability again at earlier iteration rounds.
4One assumption to derive the mean-field model is to keep the value of non-interbank assets and
liabilities constant after the initial round of insolvency.
Chapter 6
Empirical Analysis of Counterparty
Failure in the UK Banking System
Summary of the chapter: In this chapter, we investigate the simulation-based model
and the mean-field model using banking systems initialized with UK regulatory data. In
the first part of this chapter, we conduct an analysis of bilateral exposure and balance
sheet data of the UK banking system. We construct interbank exposure networks from
the bilateral exposure data and apply network measures to obtain a better understand-
ing of the topology of the banking networks. We observe that the UK banking system
consists of banks varying greatly in the size of their balance sheets. Furthermore, large
UK banks that operate globally can be found in the core of the interbank network with
smaller regional operating banks in the periphery. In the second part of this chapter,
the solutions of both the mean-field and simulation models are compared. We conclude
that the simulation-based model of a highly heterogeneous banking system and the
mean-field model, where we assume a homogeneous banking system, behave similar.
To be more specific, we observe the occurrence of the fragile state in both models for
similar sized shocks. We conclude the chapter by calculating the leverage requirements
using the regulatory data.
6.1 Data Analysis
6.1.1 Description of Regulatory Datasets
The dataset presented in this thesis consist of regulatory reports of UK banks to the
BoE. In particular, we use regulatory reports on bilateral exposure data and balance
sheet information to calibrate a simulation-based and mean-field model. The data was
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collected at the end of 2011 (2011 H2), the end of 2012 (2012 H2) and the first half
of 2013 (2013 H1). The exposure data are supplemented by balance sheet information
obtained from the BoE for UK regulated banks. The balance sheet quantities relevant
for calibrating the counterparty risk models are “total assets” and “Tier 1 capital”.
The datasets are classified due to their market changing nature. The results of
the network and balance sheet analysis in Section 6.1.3 and 6.1.2, and simulations
results presented in Section 6.3 were initialized and run by our collaborator at the BoE.
We need permission from the BoE for publishing any information related to the two
datasets. For this reason, we limit the data analysis to measures relevant to calibrate the
counterparty risk models and to understand the cascade process.
The BoE supervises 176 UK consolidated banking groups. Each bank reports ex-
posures by instrument to their top 20 bank and broker-dealer counterparties. If the
top 20 do not have at least six UK-based counterparties, firms are asked to report ex-
posures to up to six UK-based counterparties in addition to the top 20. Branches of
foreign banking groups in the UK are not included in the data collection as their super-
visory authority is not situated in the UK.1 UK banks disclose their exposures to other
banks and broker dealers by financial instruments. The financial instruments2 reported
include:
• Lending, unsecured, secured3 and undrawn;
• Holdings of equity and fixed-income securities issued by banks;
• Credit default swap, bought and sold;
• Securities lending and borrowing (net of collateral);
1Because the 176 UK banks report their exposures to other global consolidated banking groups,
there are 314 non-UK banks recorded in the dataset. These 314 non-UK banks do not submit their own
exposures to the BoE and are only listed as counterparties of the UK banks. In this study, we consider
the 176 UK regulated banks only and disregard the 314 non-UK banks when constructing the network
since we do not have enough information on the exposure of non-regulated banks to UK regulated banks.
2Moreover, banks state exposures with breakdown by the maturity of the instrument. Categories of
maturities are: open; less than three months; between three months and one year; between one year and
five years; and more than five years. Derivatives are not reported with a maturity breakdown. Banks’
internal risk management limits, with respect to counterparties and instruments, are also supplied. How-
ever, for this study, we disregard any differences in maturity time and debt structure.
3Secured loans do not include reverse repurchase agreements, which have a different contractual
nature. Secured loans are collateralised by various assets such as buildings, lands and other physical
assets.
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Table 6.1: The table reports the number of banks in the system. The first line indicates the
total number of banks regulated by the BoE, which is the same for all years. Only
banks are used for calibrating the counterparty risk models that belong to the largest
connected component of the interbank network, have total assets larger than total li-
abilities, and banks where interbank assets and liabilities are larger than the recorded
total assets and liabilities.
Year Total No. LB BS IB OB CB
All banks recorded 176 8 47 14 67 40
2011 H2 158 8 45 14 54 37
2012 H2 154 8 44 14 50 38
2013 H1 147 8 46 14 44 35
• Repurchase agreements and reverse repurchase agreements (net of collateral);
and
• Derivatives exposures: The breakdown covers interest rate derivatives; credit
derivatives; equity derivatives; foreign-currency derivatives; commodities deriva-
tives; and other derivatives.
Finally, we use the BoE’s classification of banks into “Large Banks” (LB), “Build-
ing Societies” (BS), “Investment Banks” (IB), “Oversea Banks” (OB) and “Other Com-
mercial Banks” (CB). The BoE’s classification groups banks into particular bank types
with similar sized banks, or banks with similar business models belonging to the same
bank type. The number of banks for each bank type are reported in Table 6.1, first row.
For the counterparty risk model, we only use banks that belong to the largest con-
nected component of the network (see Section 6.1.3). Further, we restrict our investiga-
tion to banks, where the difference between assets and liabilities is positive. A negative
difference can be a result of restructuring, insolvencies and other organisational events.
Finally, we include only banks, where the value of interbank assets and interbank liabil-
ities is smaller than the banks value for total assets and total liabilities. The reason for
the discrepancy between interbank assets and liabilities, and total assets and liabilities
is a result of combining the two datasets. When constructing the interbank network,
we assume that any exposure to an international banking group is the exposure to the
UK subsidiary. For example, any exposure to Santander Group is assumed to belong
to Santander UK when the interbank network is constructed. In some cases the expo-
sure reported to the international banking group exceeds the value of the total assets
or liabilities reported by the UK subsidiary to the BoE. Hence, for some banks, OB in
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particular, the interbank exposure exceeds the balance sheet values, and consequently,
we exclude these banks from the model calibration. The total number of banks in the
dataset and the number of banks used for model calibration, can be found in Table 6.1.
We must stress that combining the data for international banking groups and UK
subsidiaries together with limiting the number of counterparties during reporting to the
BoE results in a distorted replication of the real UK banking system.
6.1.2 Data Analysis of Balance Sheets
The balance sheet parameters needed to calibrate the counterparty risk model are: total
assets and loss absorbing capital. In this thesis, we assume that Tier 1 capital is equiv-
alent to loss absorbing capital.4 Liabilities of a bank, are computed as the difference
between the value of total assets and Tier 1 capital.
Table 6.2: The table reports the average value of assets of banks of a particular bank type for
the years 2011 H2, 2012 H2 and 2013 H1 in Mil. GBP. The STD is reported below
in brackets. The STD are of the same order or larger than the mean values indicating
that banks grouped in one bank type have balance sheets varying greatly in size.
Year LB BS IB OB CB Total
2011 H2 675855 2707 183337 2695 4901 53305
(576078) (6487) (219105) (6752) (10528) (205547)
2012 H2 642503 2881 189115 2594 5371 53560
(522503) (6949) (213583) (6199) (11667) (195977)
2013 H1 646177 2809 189152 2928 5529 56252
(522810) (6881) (214470) (6766) (11317) (200985)
The majority of banks in the system are BS, OB and CB. LB and IB are the mi-
nority, but as we can see in Table 6.2, they have the largest balance sheets. Table 6.2
reports the mean values of total assets per bank type and standard deviations (STD) of
assets (in Mil. GBP) as used in the model calibration. In terms of balance sheet size,
the UK banking system is very heterogeneous. Balance sheets of LB and IB are about
ten times larger than the average value of all banks. BS, OB and CB are on average
about 10 times smaller than the average. The average size of all banks’ balance sheets
remains similar for the three years. However, the mean value of total assets of LB
decreases. This is because major UK banks conducted some restructuring of balance
sheets to decrease the overall financial risk.
4There is still an on-going discussion as to what counts as loss absorbing capital. For example, the
UK government states that beside equity “potentially loss-absorbing liabilities” (UK parliament, 2013)
should be included.
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Table 6.3: The table reports the mean value of Tier 1 capital of banks of different bank types
in the years 2011 H2, 2012 H2 and 2013 H1 in Mil. Pounds. The values in brackets
are the STD. Analogous to the STD of the assets values reported in Table 6.2, the
STD for Tier 1 capital is also of the same order or larger than the mean values. Tier
1 capital can be considered to be the loss absorbing capital buffer. From 2011 H2
to 2013 H1, an increase of the average Tier 1 capital in banks of all bank types
can be observed. In recent years, banks increased their capital to meet the capital
requirements as outlined in Basel III.
Year LB BS IB OB CB Total
2011 H2 29619 124 4630 265 358 2120
(24088) (266) (5426) (502) (574) (8405)
2012 H2 32835 155 7966 315 380 2670
(25583) (331) (8574) (564) (750) (9568)
2013 H1 33113 151 7990 336 416 2810
(25453) (328) (8565) (611) (766) (9809)
The mean Tier 1 capital of all banks and banks aggregated to their bank type is
reported in Table 6.3 together with the STD. We observe that the total average Tier
1 capital increases over the years. This is due to regulatory requirements in the UK
for banks to increase their capital reserves following the guidelines in Basel III (BIS,
2011).
Table 6.4: The table reports the leverage ratios (ratio of the average Tier 1 capital to the average
total assets) for the years 2011 H2, 2012 H2 and 2013 H1 for the different bank
types. The leverage ratio increases for LB, BS, IB and OB. The ratio for CB stays
almost constant. Further, the leverage ratio for OB and CB is considerably higher
than the leverage ratio of LB, IB and OB.
Year LB BS IB OB CB Total
2011 H2 0.044 0.046 0.025 0.098 0.073 0.040
2012 H2 0.051 0.054 0.042 0.121 0.071 0.050
2013 H1 0.051 0.054 0.042 0.115 0.075 0.050
Table 6.4 denotes the leverage ratio, which in this case is the ratio of Tier 1 capital
to total assets. We note that the leverage ratio increases over time from 0.04 (2011 H2)
to 0.05 (2012 H2 and 2013 H1). This implies that the rate of accumulation of Tier 1
capital is greater than the rate of growth of the value of banks’ balance sheets showing
the regulatory efforts to increase overall capital reserves. The lowest leverage ratio is
achieved by IB in 2011 H2 with 0.025. OB have the largest leverage ratio (0.1213) in
2012 H2. The leverage ratios of LB and BS are similar in all years increasing slightly
from around 0.04 to 0.05. CB have leverage ratios around 0.07 for all years. The reason
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Figure 6.1: The figure shows the exposure network 2013 H1 as used in model calibration. The
nodes of the exposure network are the banks, with the links depicting the exposure
from one bank to another creating a directed network. The size of the nodes varies
relatively to the size of banks balance sheets. The nodes are also coloured according
to bank type with blue for LB, red for BS, green for IB, black for OB and magenta
for CB.
for the larger leverage ratios of OB and CB as well as some BS is that small banks
typically do not have the skills and resources to apply advanced approaches to calculate
Risk Weighted Assets (RWA). So small banks tend to use the standardised approach,
which leads to higher RWA, and hence, higher risk-based capital requirements.
6.1.3 Topology of the UK Interbank Network
The interbank exposure network from the 2013 H1 data as used in model calibration is
shown in the Figure 6.1. A node in the interbank network represents a bank i 2 [1, N ]
in the banking system. The size of the nodes in Figure 6.1 are proportionate to the size
of banks’ balance sheets. Furthermore, the nodes are coloured according to their bank
type with blue for LB, red for BS, green for IB, black for OB and magenta for CB.
6.1. Data Analysis 105
The interbank network is a directed graph, i.e. the links in the network have a direction
associated with them. In particular, a link from a bank i to another bank j indicates
the exposure gij from bank i to bank j. While creating the interbank network from
the exposure data, we do not differentiate between different financial instruments and
disregard variations in maturity time.
The network measures used in this study to calibrate the models and to understand
the insolvency process are a connected component analysis, out-degree, in-degree,
weights and assortativity coefficient (Newman, 2010). We measure the averages of
these quantities over the whole network and the averages aggregated by bank type.
6.1.3.1 Connected Component Analysis
The component analysis reveals that most of the banks belong to the largest connected
component; meaning that, disregarding the directedness of a link, there exist at least
one path between any two nodes. The banks that do not belong to the largest connected
component are isolated.5 Compositions of the largest connected components per bank
type are reported in Table 6.1 (second to fourth row). For the stability analysis of
the UK banking system, we only use banks in the largest connected component. The
insolvency of banks that are not members of the largest component is not influenced by
counterparties. This is because banks not included in the largest connected component
do not have any counterparties and form a component on their own. If there exists
more than one network component of connected banks then all components need to be
considered for calibration that contain more than one bank.
6.1.3.2 Degree Analysis
The average in- and out-degree states the average number of links leaving or direct
to a bank in the interbank network. To compute the average in- and out-degree of a
bank of a specific bank type to other bank types, we only use banks belonging to the
specific bank type. To be more specific, the in- and out-degree of a bank i of type
⌧ 2 {LB,BS, IB,OB,CB} are given as:
z ini ⌧ =
P
j2V⌧⇤{1}(gji>1), zouti ⌧ =
P
j2V⌧⇤{1}(gij>1), (6.1)
5In 2011 H2 and 2012 H2, four banks are not part of the largest connected component (2011 H2: 2
BS, 1 OB, 1CB, and 2012 H2: 1 OB, 3 BS). In 2013 H1, 8 banks do not belong to the main component
with 1 being a CB and 7 being OB.
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(a) In-degree (b) In-weight
(c) Out-degree (d) Out-weight
Figure 6.2: The networks represent the average in- and out-degree (subplots (a) and (b), respec-
tivly), and the average in- and out-weight (subplots (c) and (d)) to and from a bank
of a partciular bank type to banks of other bank types of the exposure network 2013
H1. The graphs are visualizations of the information contained in Tables B.3, B.4,
B.1 and B.2. It becomes clear that LB and IB form a central role in the exposure
network with the majority of BS, OB and CB situtated in the periphery.
where V⌧⇤ is the sets of banks belonging to bank type ⌧⇤ 2 {LB,BS, IB,OB,CB}.
The average in- and out-degree of a bank of type ⌧ to banks in the set V⌧⇤ are:
z¯ in⌧⇤ =
1
N⌧
P
i2V⌧⇤ z
in
i ⌧ , z¯
out
⌧ =
1
N⌧
P
i2V⌧⇤ z
out
i ⌧⇤. (6.2)
Tables B.3 and B.46 report the average and STD of in- and out-degree from one bank
type (columns) to another (rows), or vice versa. The information from the tables is
visualized in Figues 6.2a7 and 6.2c. Figues 6.2a and 6.2c show the average in-degree
from bank types to a particular bank type and the out-degree from a bank type to other
bank types for the exposure network in 2013 H1.
The degree analysis is to a certain extent limited by the number of links banks
have to report to the BoE. This is also reflected in the small STD of average number of
6Because of the size of the tables they are placed in the Appendix, Chapter B.
7The transpose of Table B.3 for 2013 H1 is used to produced the directed links in the graph in
Figure 6.2a.
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out-degrees. Thus, it should be kept in mind that without the threshold, the potential
number of counterparties from one bank type to others might differ greatly.
We can note that the average in-degrees have high STD, which is mostly due to the
high number of in-coming links LB and IB receive and low number of links directed to
BS, CB and OB. The largest number of links to LB are directed from BS, OB and CB.
However, the number of banks belonging to BS, OB and CB is larger than the number
of banks belonging to LB and IB. Thus, in relative terms LB and IB are also almost
entirely exposed to other LB. Similarly, most of the links directed to IB are coming
from LB, IB and OB. BS, CB and OB have on average very low incoming links. The
STD for both OB and CB are also close to the average values. Thus, the majority of
OB and CB only receive little exposure from other bank types.
The degree analysis indicates that LB in all three years as well as IB in 2012 H2
and 2013 H1 form the centre of the interbank network with BS, OB and CB mostly
interacting with LB or IB. Hence, BS, OB and CB are forming the periphery with LB
and IB being in the centre of the interbank network.
6.1.3.3 Weight Analysis
To evaluate the importance of the different bank types towards counterparty risk, the
weights of the links are also of importance. The in- and out-weight of states the size of
the exposure of a bank of a particular bank type to and from banks of other bank types.
That is
wini ⌧ =
P
j2V⌧⇤ gji, w
out
i ⌧ =
P
j2V⌧⇤ gij. (6.3)
The average in- and out-weights of a bank of type ⌧ to banks in the set V⌧⇤ are:
w¯in⌧ =
1
N⌧
P
i2V⌧⇤ w
in
i ⌧⇤, w¯
out
⌧⇤ =
1
N⌧
P
i2V⌧⇤ w
out
i ⌧ . (6.4)
Tables B.1 and B.28 report the average total in- and out-weights in GBP Mil. lead-
ing to or direct from a specific bank type (rows) from or to banks of another bank
type (columns), as well as the total averages for the entire network. The average total
weights are the sum of the single weights directed to or leaving a bank. To obtain the
8Because of the size of the tables, they are placed in the Appendix, Chapter B.
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single average weight directed to or leaving a bank of a specific bank type, the total
average weight needs to be divided by the average link as stated in Tables B.3 and B.4.
In Figures 6.2b9 and 6.2d, the in- and out-weights for 2013 H1 to and from a bank of a
particular bank type from or to other bank types are plotted visualizing the data stated
in Tables B.1 and B.2.
The break down into different bank types reveals that total exposure varies by
orders of magnitude for different bank types with the mean in- and out-weight of LB
being around GBP Mil. 10,000, IB weights being about a tenth smaller than LB, and
BS, OB and CB again being a tenth smaller than IB. This is not too surprising as
the sizes of the balance sheets also vary by orders of magnitude (see Table 6.2). The
average in- or out-weight for BS, OB and CB does not vary much over time. However,
the exposure of LB and IB to IB increases considerably from 2011 H2 to 2012 H2 and
2013 H2. The average out-weight of LB to LB decreases from 2011 H2 to 2012 H2.
Table 6.5: The table reports the ratio of the average values of interbank assets to total assets,
✓out, aggregated to different bank type levels and the entire banking system. The
values ✓, used in the mean-field model, are the total over all banks types.
Year LB BS IB OB CB Total ✓
2011 H2 0.0162 0.0351 0.0097 0.0634 0.038 0.0158
2012 H2 0.0162 0.0217 0.0126 0.0538 0.0231 0.0159
2013 H1 0.0156 0.0329 0.0126 0.0312 0.0328 0.0159
The relative out-weight, ✓out, is calculated using the average out-weights as given
in Table B.2 and the mean values for total assets as reported in Table 6.2 and Table 6.5.
That is
✓out⌧ =
w¯out⌧
µA⌧
, (6.5)
where µA⌧ states the mean value of assets of banks of type ⌧ . The value of ✓out for
all bank types is used to calibrate the parameter ✓, the ratio of interbank assets to total
assets in the mean-field model (see Chapter 4).
The average value of ✓out for all bank types averaging around 1.6% is relatively
low. In comparison, in Mu¨ller (2006) and Upper (2011), the average interbank lend-
ing in the second half of the 2000s is between 10% to 20%, which indicates that the
9The transpose of Table B.1 for 2013 H1 is used to produced the directed links in the graph in
Figure 6.2b.
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recorded interbank network is incomplete. This is partly due to the data structure used
in other studies, where interbank exposures is measured on a gross-of-collateral ba-
sis. In this thesis, exposure is measured on a net-of-collateral basis. Another reason
why the interbank exposure of banks is lower than observed in other studies is the
limited number of twenty counterparties UK regulated banks have to report as well as
the restriction made to only investigate UK regulated banks, which makes the dataset
incomplete. Because of this, we test the effects of increased exposure in Section 6.3.3.
6.1.3.4 Associativity Coefficients Analysis
Finally, the associativity coefficients of the interbank exposure networks also indicate
a core-periphery structure. The associativity coefficient is the ratio of the covariance
of nodes over edges to the value of perfect mixing and can take values between one
and minus one (Newman, 2010). It states whether nodes with a large (small) number
of links are connected to nodes with a large (small) number of links, in which case the
associativity coefficient is closer to one and the network is associative. If nodes with
a large (small) number of links are connected to nodes with a small (large) number
of links, the associative coefficient is closer to minus one and the network is said to
be disassociative. We used the algorithm from the Brain Connectivity Toolbox (Brain
Connectivity Toolbox, 2010) to compute the associativity coefficient. The algorithm is
described in Rubinov and Sporns (2010). The associativity coefficient of the exposure
networks are: -0.32 (2011 H2), -0.27 (2012 H2) and -0.28 (2013 H1). The negative
associativity coefficients indicate that banks with a small number of degrees are mostly
connected to banks with a large number of degrees.
Overall, the network analysis shows that the topology of the interbank networks in
2011 H2, 2012 H2 and 2013 H1 resembles a core-periphery structure with LB and IB
in the core and BS, OB and CB in the periphery. The core-periphery structure has been
observed in other studies on interbank network topology (Boss et al., 2004; Fricke and
Lux, 2015; van Lelyveld et al., 2012). The core-periphery structure suggests that LB
and IB are financial intermediaries, i.e. these banks provide links between banks with
money surplus to banks with liquidity or hedging needs.
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6.2 Model Calibration
6.2.1 Calibration of Homogeneous Mean-Field Model
The mean-field model requires the calibration of 6 parameters for each historic period:
µA(t0), µL(t0), ✓(t0),  A(t0),  L(t0), and q(t0), where t0 = 2011 H2, 2012 H2 and
2013 H1.
The random distribution to initialize the balance sheets is chosen to be a Normal
distribution. The parameters µA(t0) and µL(t0) can be traced from the balance sheet
data. In particular, µA(t0) is the average of total assets, reported in Table 6.2. For
µL(t0), we use the difference between the mean value of total assets and Tier 1 capital
for the entire banking system as reported in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. In addition, we multiply
µL(t0) by a parameter fL. We introduced fL in Section 4.6. The parameter fL is used
to stress the system by increasing (or decreasing) average liabilities with respect to the
empirically measured ones. Thus, we are testing stability over different average loss
adsorbing capital.
Note that we could have chosen to multiply µA(t0) by a fraction, increasing or
decreasing the mean value of the total assets, creating a positive or negative shock
to the price value of assets. In both cases, the loss absorbing capital is increased or
reduced. The more the loss absorbing capital is reduced initially, the more stressed is
the banking system.
The values for ✓(t0) are reported in Table 6.5. For the purpose of this model, we
set the instantaneous recovery rate q(t0) equal to zero for all t. In the event of a bank
becoming insolvent, any loaner banks cannot expect any repayment. Thus, we consider
the worst case scenario only.
The free-model parameter is  . We set   to be equal to
p
2fAµA(t0), i.e.  A(t0) =
fAµA(t0) =  L(t0); in this way making ✓c independent of µA.
As in Chapter 5, we assume all banks solvent initially. Hence, the initial fraction
of solvent banks, p0, equals one.
6.2.2 Calibration of the Heterogeneous Simulation
The number of banks, N , used in the simulation are reported in Table 6.1. The initial
values for banks’ total assets and total liabilities are drawn from Normal distributions.
The mean value µAi(t0) is taken from the raw data. Hence, µAi(t0) differs for each
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bank i. The STD is assumed to be a fraction of the mean of the total assets, µAi(t)fA.
Thus, the total assets of bank i are initially: Ai(0) ⇠ N (µAi(t0), fAµAi(t0)), where
N (., .) is the normal distribution.
The liabilities of each bank i, are initialized by computing µLi(t0) as the difference
of a bank i’s total assets and Tier 1 capital. In the simulation, values are then drawn
from a Normal distribution with mean fLµLi(t0). The STD is fAµAi(t0), causing  i =q
 2Ai(t0) +  
2
Li(t0)
=
p
2fAµAi(t0), which is consistent with the homogeneous model.
Thus, the liabilities of bank i are: Li(0) ⇠ N (fLµLi(t0), fAµAi(t0)).
For each simulation, the interbank network is the real network for the respective
year. That is gij is the exposure as recorded in the data. The recovery rate of any
exposure is assumed to be zero.
Furthermore, we consider all banks solvent initially, i.e. Si(0) = 1 for all banks i.
Because of the incompleteness of the exposure data, any result calculated with the
mean-field model or achieved with the heterogeneous simulation model should still be
considered with caution as these might differ greatly with the values calculated when
the complete exposure network is used.
6.3 Stress Simulation Results and Comparison with
Homogeneous Solutions
6.3.1 Inducing System Stress by Increasing Average Liabilities
We perform 1,000 simulations by using the simulation-based model calibrated with UK
regulatory data setting fA = 0.001 and varying the factor fL between 0.8 and 1.3. Let
us first observe that when fL  1 and fA = 0.001, the banking system is in a stable
state with all banks operating normally. When the system is stressed by increasing
liabilities and reducing loss adsorbing capital, we observe the occurrence of a jump in
the number of normally operating banks with the system becoming distressed.
Figure 6.3 shows in the upper subplot the fraction of surviving banks, p, against
the fraction of the mean liabilities, fL, for banking systems calibrated with the 2013
H1 data. The same plots for banking systems initialized with 2011 H2 and 2012 H2
data can be found in the Appendix, Figure C.1. There are three graphs in each figure:
1) pS is the mean value of the fraction of surviving banks over 1,000 simulations; 2)
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Figure 6.3: The figure shows in its first row the fraction of surviving banks, p, against the mean
liabilties, fL, for models calibrated with the 2013 H1 data. We set fA = 0.001.
The solid black line shows the average fraction of surviving banks, pS , from 1,000
simulations. The dotted black line shows the average fraction pN of surviving
banks from 1,000 simulations when gij is set to zero for all banks i, j. This solution,
pN , is the null model as it shows the stability of the banking system when direct
contagion is excluded. The blue line shows the solution of Eq. 3.15, pMF , when
p0 = 1. The second row shows the STD of pS . In the upper row, we indicated
the position of fL, at which pMF jumps from almost all banks solvent to almost
all banks insolvent. In the second row, we indicated the value of fL, at which the
STD of pS is maximal. It becomes clear that, for a given fL, the exposure network
causes significantly more losses with respect to the case when the exposure network
is disregarded. Also, close to the value of fL, at which the jump occurs in the
mean-field model, the STD is at maximum, suggesting that in that region, pS also
experiences a jump. The figures calibrated with 2011 H2 and 2012 H2 data can be
found in the Appendix (Figure C.1).
pMF is the fixed point solution of Eq. 3.15 when p0 = 1; 3) pN is the ‘null hypothesis’
mean value of the fraction of surviving banks. In the null hypothesis solution, all links
of the underlying exposure network are set to zero (gij = 0). Thus, bank failure is only
caused by changes to the value of liabilities and non-interbank assets. We note that
pS decreases in value first, followed by a sharp decline in the value of pMF , followed
finally by pN at larger values of fL. The second row of each plot shows the STD of the
simulation solution, pS , plotted against the fraction of the mean liabilities, fL.
There is a considerable difference between pN and pS . The decline of pN is much
smoother because banks become insolvent when their capital becomes negative, which
happens independently for each bank. When the exposure network is incorporated
into the simulation, in the first iteration round, the same number of banks become
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Figure 6.4: The figure shows the mean fraction of surviving banks of 1,000 simulations of
particular bank types plotted against the fraction of mean liabilities, fL, in the
upper subplots for banking systems calibrated with 2013 H1 data. The parameter
fA was fixed at 0.001. The different bank types are indicated using the colours
blue for LB, red for BS, green for IB, black for OB and magenta for CB. In the
lower plot, the STD of the mean fractions of surviving banks of particular banks
is plotted against fL. The figure showing the corresponding graphs for banking
systems calibrated with 2012 H2 and 2012 H2 data can be found in the Appendix
(Figure C.2).
insolvent as in the null model (for fixed fL). In later insolvency rounds, the insolvent
banks reduce the total asset value of healthy banks, potentially flipping these (formerly-
healthy) banks into insolvency. This process continues until a stable fixed point is
reached, at which point all surviving banks have enough capital to withstand the losses
caused by direct exposure.
The homogeneous mean-field model behaves as predicted in Chapter 4 and a
sudden jump happens from almost all banks operating to almost all banks insolvent.
The value of fMFL , at which the mean-field model predicts the jump, is calculated us-
ing Eq. 4.6. We obtain: fMFL = 1.0383 (2011 H2), fMFL = 1.0495 (2012 H2) and
fMFL = 1.0498.
In the second row of each figure, the STD of pS , STD(pS), is plotted against fL.
It becomes clear that around the value of fL, at which the steeper decline in pS starts,
STD(pS) has a sharp peak. This indicates that this is a region, where small fluctua-
tions can bring most of the system down; and for the same set of average parameters,
simulations can produce very different results leading to large values of STD(pS).
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In Figures 6.4 and C.2 (Appendix), we plotted the mean fraction of surviving
banks aggregated to bank type level against fL (upper rows) and the STD for each bank
type (second row). The banking systems in Figure 6.4 are initialized with 2013 H1 data
and the banking system used to produce Figure C.2 are initialized with 2011 H2 (a) and
2012 H2 (b) data. Again, averages are over 1,000 simulations. The average fraction
of LB is the blue line, BS are represented by the red line, the fraction of surviving IB
banks is green, OB are the black line and CB are represented by the magenta line.
Splitting the fraction of surviving banks into the different bank types reveals a
bit more detail about the loss dynamic. For instance, we observe that in 2011 H2
(Figure C.2 (a)), IB default much earlier than the other bank types. Further, the losses
of IB do not cause a system failure. The earlier insolvencies happen because the capital
reserves of IB are much smaller than the capital reserves of the other bank types in
2011 H2 (see Section 6.1.2). In Table B.2 and B.4, we see that in 2011 H2 bank
types were not as much exposed to IB as in 2012 H2 and 2013 H1. The low average
capital explains the earlier insolvencies of IB; and the less-central position of IB in the
interbank network accounts for the smaller influence of IB to the stability of other bank
types.
A steep decline in the fraction of surviving banks for all bank types (except for
IB in 2011 H2) happens around the same value of fL in each single year. The value
of the fraction of surviving banks for specific bank types, at which the steep decline
stops, varies for the individual bank types, such that for LB and BS, the shock causes
the majority of banks to suddenly become insolvent. CB and OB lose during the steep
decline about half to a third of banks. The reason why OB and CB are less effected by
the shock is that most of these banks have only a small number of outgoing links with
the average out-degree being between 3 to 4 (see Table B.4). Furthermore, the capital
reserves of OB and CB are larger (See Section 6.1.2). Thus, the stability of these bank
types are only minimally effected by counterparty risk.
The STD is plotted in the second row. The graphs of the STD also indicate that
the largest bank failure happens for all banks around the same value of fL. Again, we
marked the value of fL, at which the STD is at maximum for all different bank types.
We observe that in 2011 H2, the values of fL vary slightly, but in 2012 H2 and 2013
H1 the largest STD for all bank types happen almost at the same value of fL. From
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this value of fL, the direct exposure of banks has a significant influence, causing the
majority of banks in the banking system to become insolvent independent of the bank
type.
The simulation results reveal that in 2012 H2, LB, OB and IB form a platform after
fL equals 1.0420 with 2 LB surviving. Again a steep decline of banks happens around
fL equal to 1.0670. This suggests that an in-between stable state occurs for values of
fL close to 1.0670, which cannot be explained by the result of the mean-field model.
We hypothesize that the heterogeneity of the simulation-based model causes multiple
fixed points for various values of fL. This, however, still needs to be verified.
Overall, let us observe that the sudden decline happens earlier in 2011 H2 than in
2012 H2 and 2013 H2. In Section 6.1.2, we argued that the leverage ratio increases
for LB, BS, IB and OB. This shows that to a certain extent, larger capital reserves can
make the banking system more stable, making the system capable of absorbing losses
of individual banks. However, if the cumulative losses caused by direct exposure in
an interbank network create a system failure, then banks with larger leverage ratios are
also at risk of insolvency.
6.3.2 Frequency Distribution for Fixed fL
To further show that at specific values of fL(max(STD(pS))), the simulation indeed
experiences a jump, in Figures 6.5 and C.3 (in the Appendix), we plotted the frequency
distribution of pS . Again, banking systems in Figure 6.5 are initialized with the 2013
H1 data, and the banking systems in Figure C.3 are initialized with 2011 H2 (a) and
2012 H2 (b) data. To obtain these frequency distributions, we fixed fL at 1.038 (2011
H2) and 1.042 (2012 H2 and 2013 H1). Again, fA was set to 0.001. We then re-
peated the simulation 10,000 times and recorded the occurrence of each value of pS .
It becomes visible that in all three years multiple peaks occur. In 2011 H2, the most
dominant peaks materialise around 0.4 and 0.65 with an island formed in between these
peaks. The picture in 2012 H2 is similar with the two dominant peaks occurring around
0.5 and 0.85 and smaller islands in between. In 2013 H1, there are three peaks. The
first one occurs around 0.45, a second one occurs around 0.55 and a third one is formed
around 0.8. This means that for most simulations, about 80% or about 40-50% banks
of the banking system survive.
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Figure 6.5: The figure shows the frequency distribution of the fraction of surviving banks, pS .
The simulation was repeated 10,000 times at fixed values of fL at 1.042 for the
2013 H1 data. The parameter fA was set to 0.001. Distinct peaks occur around
0.45, 0.57 and 0.8 in 2013 H1. This indicates that small perturbations in liabilities
and assets cause pS to jump from around 0.8 to 0.57 or 0.45 confirming the exis-
tence of the discontinuity predicted in the mean-field model. The figure showing
the corresponding graphs for banking systems calibrated with 2011 H2 and 2012
H2 data can be found in the Appendix (Figure C.3).
Figure 5.2 in Chapter 5 also shows the frequency distribution of a simulation-
based risk model, where two distinct peaks occur close to either end of the interval
[0, 1]. The simulations of the heterogeneous banking system initialized with UK data
do not lead to such a clean picture as in Figure 5.2. That is, in the simulations in
Chapter 5, the banking system is assumed to consist of banks with similar sized balance
sheets with similar ratios of interbank assets to total assets. Thus, banks behave more
similarly. Nonetheless, a discontinuity in the fraction of surviving banks instead of a
steady decline can be observed in Figures 6.5 and C.3. This suggests that indeed jumps
occur caused by the direct exposure of banks to other banks.
Note that the middle peak in Figure 6.5 can not be explained by the mean-field
model. The mean-field model homogenises the system and we expect that the third
peak is a result of the diverse UK banking system. This needs to be further investigated
by, for example, extending the one-tier mean-field model into a more realistic multi-tier
mean-field model including banks with different sized balance sheets.
We can conclude that the main feature of the mean-field model, namely, the jump
from almost all banks operating to almost all banks insolvent, is also observed in the
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Figure 6.6: As in Figure 6.3, the first row of each subplot shows the fraction of surviving banks,
p, plotted against the fraction of the mean liabilities, fL. The second row shows the
STD of pS plotted against fL. The models are initialized with the 2013 H1 data.
The dotted lines are the average of 1,000 simulations and the solid lines indicate
the solution of Eq. 3.15 given p0 = 1. The green lines use the original interbank
network for each year. Whereas for the red line, the exposure of LB was multiplied
by d = 9. Multiplying the exposure of LB by 9 increased ✓ from 0.0159 to 0.0933
in 2013 H1. The parameter fA for both simulation models as well as the mean-
field model is set to 0.01. This causes ✓ for the original network to be smaller than
✓c, and for the network with increased exposure to be larger then ✓c. As a result,
for the green lines we are not able to observe a jump but a smooth decline in p for
increasing fL, whereas for the red line a jump can be observed. The figure showing
the corresponding graphs for banking systems calibrated with 2012 H2 and 2012
H2 data can be found in the Appendix (Figure C.4).
simulation model of the heterogeneous banking system. In addition, the mean liabili-
ties, fMFL , at which the jump occurs in the mean-field model is relatively close to fL
where the fragile state is induced in the simulation model. This implies that the param-
eter analysis of the highly homogeneous banking system in Chapter 4 can be used for
stability evaluation of a heterogeneous banking system. However, the heterogeneity of
the banking system most likely allows for more than two stable states at the point of the
jump such that intermediate states can reduce the size of the jump for some scenarios.
Further, more than just one jump seems to occur when fL is increased.
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Figure 6.7: The figure shows the frequency distribution of the fraction of surviving banks, p,of
10,000 simulations for banking systems calibrated with 2013 H1 data. The pa-
rameter fA is set to 0.01. For the blue line fL is fixed at 1.037 for 2013 H1 and
the original interbank networks have been used during the simulations. For the
red line, the exposure of LB was multiplied by a factor d = 9, and fL is fixed at
1.025. For d = 1 (blue line), ✓ for the 2013 H1 (and 2011 H2, 2012 H2) network
is below ✓c, and henceforth, no jump is visible. Instead the frequency distribution
is almost bell shaped. For d = 9 (red line), ✓ is larger than ✓c, and peaks become
visible around p approximately 0.5 and 0.95 confirming that the banking system
can be in two states, where either most banks are operative or half of the banks are
insolvent. These peaks cannot be observed for the frequency distribution when the
original interbank network is used. The figure showing the corresponding graphs
for banking systems calibrated with 2012 H2 and 2012 H2 data can be found in the
Appendix (Figure C.4).
6.3.3 Inducing Stress by Increasing Direct Exposure of Large
Banks
In Section 4.6, we discuss that the fragile state can only be observed for fA (  =p
2fAµA) being smaller than or equal to (1 q)✓p2bc . For fA larger than
1 qp
2✓bc
, some banks
have enough capital to withstand the shock and form a barrier preventing the insolvency
to propagate through the entire network. For ✓ as recorded in Table 6.5, this implies
fA needs to be smaller than 0.0044 for the fragile state to become possible. This re-
striction on fA results in a small minimum leverage requirement (see the next section,
Section 6.4). In that section, we calculated the minimum leverage requirements using
Eq. 4.5 for ✓ as recorded in Table 6.5. Because of the small value of fA and ✓, the
minimum leverage value ensuring a stable system is also relatively small with 0.0031
in 2011 H2, and 0.0041 in 2012 H2 and 2013 H1. That is, if ✓ is indeed of similar order
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as recorded in the regulatory data, the UK banking system could be considered stable
if banks set their leverage requirements to 0.3%.
However, as mentioned before, the values of ✓ recorded in Table 6.5, are relatively
small in comparison to other studies, where interbank assets to total assets are esti-
mated to be 10% to 20% (Mu¨ller, 2006; Upper, 2011). Another example illustrating
the inaccuracy of the values in Table 6.5 can be found in banks’ annual reports. The
financial statement in banks’ annual reports lists, among others, “Loans and advances
to banks” in addition to “Total assets”. The ratio of ”Loans and advances to banks”
to ”Total assets” of the Royal Bank of Scotland in their annual report of 2013 is 0.05
(RBS, 2014). Values for other banks are similar. The section ”Loans and advances to
banks” lists reverse repos, and loans and receivables to banks, excluding other obliga-
tions. If repos, derivatives and other assets to banks would be included, then it can be
assumed that the ratio of interbank assets to total assets for the Royal Bank of Scotland
is even higher than 5%.
To test the effects of increased exposure, we increase the exposure of LB by mul-
tiplying a factor d = 9. This increase has the effect to change ✓c to 0.035. We chose
to increase the exposure of LB only as the exposure of some banks of other bank types
exceeded their total assets when their exposure is increased by d = 9. This changes ✓
from 0.0158 to 0.0991 in 2011 H2, from 0.0159 to 0.0966 in 2012 H2 and from 0.0159
to 0.0933 in 2013 H1. Hence, the observed ✓s are now below the critical value ✓c and
the homogeneous model predicts no jumps. However, when for the network with in-
creased exposure, ✓ is above ✓c, a jump becomes possible. We induce the system into
the fragile state by setting fA equal to 0.01.
In the upper row of Figures 6.6 and C.4, the fraction of surviving banks for the
mean-field solution, pMF , for ✓ equal to 0.0158 (blue line) and to 0.0991 (red line)
in 2011 H2 (FigureC.4 (a)); 0.0159 (blue line) and to 0.0996 (red line) in 2012 H2
(Figure C.4 (b)); and 0.0159 (blue line) and to 0.0933 (red line) in 2013 H1 (Figure 6.6)
are plotted against the fraction of the mean liabilities, fL. Additionally, the fraction
of surviving banks evaluated using the simulation, pS , is computed for the original
network (blue dotted line) and when the exposure of LB is multiplied by d equal to
9 (red dotted line). It should be noted that changing d does not change the network
structure nor the average mean value of total assets of a bank i. The second row of each
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subfigure shows the STD of the simulation solution when d = 1 (blue dotted line) and
when d = 9 (red dotted line).
We observe that, when d = 1, the homogeneous mean-field solution does not ex-
perience a jump. Instead, the decline is smooth in all years. The simulation solution
for d = 1 starts a decline at similar fL to the mean-field solution, but eventually di-
verging from the mean-field solution. When d = 9, the mean-field solution jumps from
almost all banks operating to almost all banks defaulted. Furthermore, the value of fL,
at which the jump is predicted, is fairly similar to the value of fL, at which the STD is
the largest. This suggests that a jump occurs.
To verify this, we again plotted the frequency distribution of each simulation for
fixed values of fL in Figures 6.7 and C.4 for 10,000 simulations. Figures 6.7 and
C.4 show the frequency distribution for the years 2011 H2 (Figure C.4 (a)), 2012 H2
(Figure C.4 (b)) and 2013 H1 (Figures 6.7). For d = 1, fL was fixed respectively at
1.032 for 2011 H2, at 1.037 for 2012 H2 and 2013 H1. Whereas, for d = 9, fL was
fixed respectively at 1.013 for 2011 H2, 1.037 for 2012 H2 and 1.025 for 2013 H1. The
blue line indicates the frequency distribution for d = 1 and the red line is used for the
frequency distribution when d = 9.
Peaks are not visible in the frequency distributions for d = 1 for all years. Instead
one bump occurs between p equal to 0.4 and 1.0. The bump is most dominant in 2011
H2. In Figure C.5 (b) and 6.7 the bump has a dent around 0.7 for both years. The dent
indicates the beginning of the peak formation. However, values of p within the dent are
still likely since ✓ for d = 1 is below ✓c. Hence, the decline in p for increasing fL is still
smooth. This clearly shows that no jump occurs in the simulation when d = 1; instead,
small perturbations in the values of assets and liabilities cause a smooth decline. For
d = 9, the shape of the frequency distribution looks quite different. Peaks occur around
0.5 and 0.95 in 2011 H2; 0.55, 0.7 and close to one in 2012 H2 and 0.5 and close to
one in 2013 H1 suggesting that small perturbations in the value of assets and liabilities
cause the system to jump from a fairly stable state, where most banks are operative, to
an unstable state, where half the banks are insolvent. Thus, a jump occurs.
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Figure 6.8: The figure shows the minimal leverage ratio,  min that is needed for a banking
system to be stable plotted against the fraction of interbank asset to total assets, ✓,
for a fixed   =
p
2faµA. The different curves correspond to different values of fA.
In addition, the crosses indicate the minimum leverage ratio for a banking system
for some given ✓ and fA, where the parameter ✓ correspond to the values calculated
from the interbank data from 2013 H1.
6.4 Minimum Leverage Ratio
We have shown that the system failure in a model of a heterogeneous banking sys-
tem happens around similar values as the jump predicted in the mean-field model of
a homogeneous banking system. This implies that we can use Eq. 4.5 to calculate the
minimum leverage requirement for more heterogeneous banking systems.
Eq. 4.5 allows us to calculate the minimal leverage ratio needed to ensure a stable
system when ✓ is greater than ✓c. If d = 1, then ✓ in 2011 H2 is 0.0158; and in 2012 H2
and 2013 H1 ✓ is 0.0159. These values are very close and result in a minimum leverage
ratio of 0.0031 (2011 H2) and 0.0041 (2012 H2 and 2013 H1), if fA equals 0.01. When
increasing ✓ to 0.0991 in 2011 H2, to 0.0996 in 2012 H2 and to 0.0933 in 2013 H2, the
minimum leverage ratio changes to 0.0278 for fA equal to 0.01.
Figure 6.8 shows the minimum leverage ratio,  min, plotted against the fraction
of interbank assets to total assets, ✓, for different values of fA as stated. The crosses
indicate the position of the minimum leverage ratio,  min, for ✓ and fA as indicated.
These ✓ values correspond to ✓ as calculated using the 2013 H1 data. It becomes clear
that the larger fA, the larger  min has to be in order to ensure a stable system.
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In Bank for International Settlement (2014), it is stated that the recommended
non-risk based leverage ratio for banks is 3%. The minimum leverage ratios ensuring
a stable system calculated for d = 1 and d = 9 are below the recommended leverage
ratio. That said, the incompleteness of the bilateral exposure data implies that the
calculated leverage ratios are most likely underestimating the actual leverage ratios.
6.5 Conclusion
The chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, we introduce the dataset used
to calibrate the mean-field and simulation-based models discussed in the second part
of the chapter. The two regulatory datasets are studied recording balance sheet and
exposure information of banks in the UK banking system for three different years. Our
analysis reveals that banks in the UK vary largely in the size of their balance sheets.
Additionally, we showed that banks’ capital reserves increased over the years following
regulatory requirements set by the BoE.
The dataset containing the exposure data is limited by the number of counterparties
banks have to report to the BoE. Because of that, the exposure networks constructed
from the data only provide limited representation of the real UK interbank networks.
Nonetheless, we can deduce from the network analysis that LB and IB form the centre
of the interbank network with BS, OB and CB being positioned in the periphery. This
result is in line with the outcomes of other studies. Obtaining data for this thesis was
one of the biggest obstacles, not only because access to exposure data is limited but
also because regulators (with a few exceptions) started only recently, following the
financial crisis, collecting interbank exposure data. For future studies, the quality of
exposure data needs to improve in order to investigate further how financial stability
is influenced by counterparty exposure. In particular, more data on exposure between
international banks needs to be collected because via international banks a banking
crisis can propagate from one country to another.
In the second part of the chapter, we calibrate the mean-field and simulation mod-
els with the datasets. The banking system in the simulation-based model is highly
heterogeneous with banks varying in size, position in the interbank network, links di-
rected towards them and value of exposure to other banks. Nonetheless, we observed
that the fragile state in the simulations occurs for a similar sized shock to banks’ capital
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as is predicted in the mean-field model. Hence, we mapped the results of the mean-field
model of a simple banking system to a simulation-based model of a more complicated
banking system. This suggests that the minimum capital requirements deduced from
the mean-field model can be applied to real world banking systems to create a more
stable financial system given more accurate data on interbank exposure.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
This study set out to explore the influence of counterparty failure on the financial sta-
bility of a banking system. For this reason, we studied a counterparty cascade model,
where banks’ stability depends on their balance sheet quantities and the solvency of
their counterparties. In our model, the balance sheet parameters are random variables.
The model was solved in two ways: semi-analytically by applying a mean-field as-
sumption homogenizing the banking system, and by constructing a simulation model
to test counterparty failure in more complex banking systems.
The mean-field assumption allowed us to conduct a parameter analysis of the bal-
ance sheet quantities to determine the ratios of assets, liabilities and capital that ensure
a stable banking system. We showed that the results extracted from the mean-field solu-
tion can be mapped to the simulation-based model of a more complex banking system,
where banks vary in size, have different leverage ratios, and exposure to other banks.
Because of that we can conclude that a simple model of counterparty failure of a ho-
mogeneous banking system predicts the propagation of counterparty failure in banking
systems dynamics before, during and after a crisis. Therefore, the results of this thesis
can be used to set restricting guidelines on leverage ratios and interbank exposure that
also ensures financial stability for more complex real-world financial systems.
By applying the mean-field assumption in Chapter 4, we were able to reduce a
multi-parameter counterparty risk model into a two-parameter iteration map. The itera-
tion map states the average fraction of surviving banks in an iteration round r. The two
parameters, a and b, represent the influence on the stability of banks of external fac-
tors changing balance sheet parameters (a), and the average exposure between banks
(b). A fixed point analysis of the iteration map revealed that for fixed b above a critical
125
value and changing a, the solution of the iteration map has a hysteresis cycle. This
is because the iteration map has at least one and at most three fixed points depending
on the values of the parameters a and b. This implies that the solution of the iteration
map is history dependent. That is, depending on the initial value of solvent banks, the
solution of the iteration map for the same parameters can differ. This result allowed us
to draw conclusions about the cost of rescuing a defaulted banking system. Further-
more, the hysteresis cycle explains a discontinuity in the fraction of surviving banks
also observed in other studies (Gai and Kapadia, 2010; Amini et al., 2012; Hurd and
Gleeson, 2011). In this thesis, we calculated the values of a, namely a1 and a2, where
the fraction of surviving banks changes for slight perturbations from almost all banks
solvent to almost all banks insolvent and vice versa. We determined a1 and a2 for dif-
ferent location-scale distributions, which allowed us to draw conclusions on restricting
leverage ratios to ensure a stable banking system. Additionally, we showed that in the
proximity of the jump, the failure of one bank is sufficient to induce system failure.
Finding exposure data for calibrating the counterparty risk model was one of the
major challenges of this thesis. Balance sheet data is published each year by banks
in their annual report and are publicly accessible. However, exposure data between
banks is, in most cases, only collected by regulators. For this reason, we calibrated
the mean-field model in Section 6.1 with balance sheet data only. We used balance
sheet data of UK and US banks from the years 2007 and 2012 to demonstrate the
stability of the banking systems in the individual years. We showed that interbank
lending made both the US and UK systems more prone to failure in 2007 such that
small fluctuations in assets and liabilities could have caused catastrophic events. In
2012, for the same fluctuations, both banking systems are more stable with much larger
fluctuations needed to create a system-wide bank failure.
In Chapter 5, we tested the robustness of the mean-field model comparing the
solution of the mean-field model to the solution of a more complex simulation-based
model. The assumptions used to find the solution of the mean-field model create an
overly simplistic banking system of banks of similar size and with the same value of
interbank exposure to other banks. We showed using the simulation model that the pre-
dicted fragile state in the mean-field model occurs for different distributions and various
network structures used to initialize the simulation model. In particular, we were able
126
to show that the discontinuity occurs when banks initial capital is shocked for location-
scale and non-location scale distributions. We further explained how the mean and full
width at half maximum (FWHM) of random distributions used to initialize the balance
sheets affected the size of the jump, and the size of the shock to banks’ initial capital
needed to induced the fragile state. When banking systems are initialized with different
random distributions with the same mean but different FWHM, banks in the banking
systems with small FWHM have more similar levels of initial loss-absorbing capital
than banks in banking systems with larger FWHM. In systems with similar levels of
initial capital, the size of the jump is more severe. Whereas, in banking systems with
differing levels of capital, the size of the jump is smaller but the fragile state occurs
at larger mean values of initial capital. This is because some banks have less capital
than others. These banks induce the fragile state at higher levels of average capital in
comparison to a more homogeneous system. However, some banks in a system with
diverse capital levels also have more initial loss absorbing capital and therefore are able
to withstand the shock. Eventually, these banks form a barrier in the distribution of in-
solvency on the interbank network, and they stop the insolvency induced by a small
number of initially failing banks. This suggest that for a homogeneous banking sys-
tem, a two-tier leverage system as suggested in in the Basel III (Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, 2010)), where systemically important banks have larger capital
requirements, could have a positive effect on financial stability. However, more re-
search needs to be conducted to provide a definitive answer. An analysis of a multi-tier
model with banks of different size and exposure towards other banks using the mean-
field method presented in Chapter 4 could potentially answer some of these questions
in more detail.
Standard network topologies were used in the simulation model to compare the
simulation solution with the solution of the mean-field model in Chapter 5. The results
indicate that network topology and the size of the banking system do not influence the
solvency propagation through interbank networks in a homogeneous banking system.
Furthermore, diversification only reduces the risk of spreading insolvency if banks in
the banking system have very similar balance sheets. If the distribution of initial capital
varies a lot in the banking system, then diversification does not necessary reduce the
risk of insolvencies caused by counterparties. This is because the probability of being
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connected to an insolvent bank also increases when a bank increases the number of
counterparties. Previous studies (Allen and Gale, 2000; Freixas et al., 2000; Gai and
Kapadia, 2010) suggested that diversification lowers the risk of failure of a banking
system. We repeated in our model-setting the results in Gai and Kapadia (2010) and
explained that stochastic effects causing slight changes in banks’ initial capital result in
banks to become insolvent regardless of the number of counterparties.
We conclude Chapter 5 by relaxing the assumption that banks’ balance sheet quan-
tities do not change in time during the insolvency propagation. It is much more reason-
able to assume that due to the announcement of a bank failure asset prices change, than
to consider that no correlation between changes in asset values and bank failure exist.
Similarly, QE programs and government bail-outs can prevent the failure of a banking
system by providing external capital, and reducing the debt of banks. To address this
short-coming of the mean-field model, we changed the values of non-interbank assets
and liabilities in the simulation model using functions that change the value of assets
proportional to the fraction of insolvent banks and induce capital into the banking sys-
tem at a particular round in the insolvency process. We explained how the changes in
the balance sheet values influenced the equilibrium solution of the mean-field model
and how the mean-field model can still be used to calculate the fraction of surviving
banks. By doing so, we showed that asset price devaluation can move the banking
system into an unstable (from a formerly healthy) region and can induce the fragile
state. Furthermore, we showed that capital injections into a failing system do not nec-
essary cause the system to return to a stable state. Our model suggests that if external
capital is provided too late, the system still fails, even though earlier rescue attempts
would have saved the banking system for the same cost of external capital. We wish to
stress that the functions used to stress balance sheet quantities were chosen arbitrarily.
This was done mainly to affirm that time changing variables can also be incorporated
into our model set-up. Nonetheless, it would be of interest to incorporate more realis-
tic functions that imitate the process of price changes or cost of borrowing in a better
way. In addition, functions modelling more complex interactions between banks such
as derivatives that depend on the solvency of multiple parties or repayment agreements
can be added in future research.
The analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 was done on highly stylized banking system.
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Banks’ balance sheet parameters and weights of the interbank network are, by con-
struction of the banking system, fairly similar. The real world banking system consists
of banks of various sizes. This issue is addressed in Chapter 6, where we used real-
world exposure and balance sheet data obtained from the BoE for three different years
to calibrate the mean-field and a simulation-based model. We constructed the banking
system in the simulation-based model such that, for each bank, the recorded values of
banks’ balance sheets in the respective years form the means of the random distribu-
tions used to initialize the assets and liabilities. Furthermore, we use real-world expo-
sure data to construct the exposure networks. From the data analysis in Section 6.1, we
can conclude that the UK banking system is highly heterogeneous with banks vary in
size of their balance sheets by orders of magnitude. The banking system constructed
using the balance sheet data is therefore heteregeous as well.
In that section, we group banks into different banktypes: LB, BS, IB, OB and
CB1. We find that LB are the largest, and BS and OB are the smallest banks on average.
Nonetheless, the leverage ratios between the bank types vary only marginally, with OB
having the largest leverage ratio and IB the smallest. We were also able to observe that
leverage ratios increased between 2011 to 2013 for most bank types due to regulatory
requirements set by the BoE. Hence, we can conclude that even though the sizes of UK
banks’ balance sheets vary by orders of magnitude, the ratio of capital to total assets (i.e.
the leverage ratio) is of similar value across most bank types. The explanation for this
can be found in the regulatory framework. The required leverage ratio in the UK was
set according to Basel II guidelines using the same leverage value for all banks. Note
that with the introduction of Basel III, this changes because systemically important
banks have to satisfy higher leverage requirements.
The degree, weight, component and assortative analysis of the interbank networks
show that LB and IB are in the center of the exposure network with most links directed
towards these bank types. Hence, we can state that the structure of the interbank net-
work resembles a core-periphery network with LB and IB in the centre of the network
and BS, OB and CB in the periphery. The core-periphery structure has been observed
in other studies and confirms that LB and IB form intermediaries that provide financial
1LB = large bank, BS = building society, IB = investment bank, OB = oversea bank, and CB = other
commercial bank.
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services and access to international markets for regionally operating banks. The rela-
tive out-weight, namely the average interbank assets to total assets, for LB, BS, IB and
CB are fairly similar. However, we argued that the values observed in Section 6.1.3
are lower than the values observed in other studies since the exposure is measured net
of collateral and the number of counterparties that banks have to report to the BoE is
restricted.
In Section 6.3, we found that the model of the more realistic heterogeneous bank-
ing system reproduces the main feature of the mean-field model: We observe the oc-
currence of a fragile state in both models, where a large portion of banks in the banking
system can become suddenly insolvent as a consequence of an external shock to the
banks’ non-interbank asset or liabilities, and the interconnectedness of banks via direct
exposure.
We showed that the capital in both the homogeneous and heterogeneous model
has to be reduced to similar levels for a sudden system failure to occur. This effect
is surprising and can be explained by the cumulative losses that the majority of banks
experience in later rounds of insolvency. We showed that the loss in the fraction of sur-
viving banks in the simulation-based heterogeneous system was not as severe as for the
mean-field model. For the heterogeneous system, about 50% of banks become insol-
vent, whereas for the mean-field model almost the entire banking system defaults. The
banks surviving the shock are mostly OB and CB in the periphery with little exposure
to the rest of the banking system.
Nonetheless, in the heterogeneous banking model, the sudden insolvency occurs
for most failing banks of all bank types at the same fraction of mean liabilities, indepen-
dent of balance sheet size. Variations in the capital reserves of banks in the simulation-
based model lead to smaller jumps occurring for the rest of the banks that survived
the first jump at lower capital values. These are heterogeneous effects that cannot be
explained by the mean-field model. These are probably the consequence of the onset
of multiple fixed points caused by the heterogeneity and can be explained by extending
the one-tier mean field model into a multi-tier model.
Finally, we addressed the low values of out-weight, ✓, in the dataset by artificially
increasing the exposure of LB such that the average ratio of interbank assets to total
assets are closer to 10%. We find that for larger exposure the minimum leverage re-
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quirements increase. This is because it is more likely that large shocks to banks’ capital
can propagate through the interbank network for larger values of average exposure.
We should note that we disregarded any additional information about the interbank
exposure such as maturity time, risk weights and variations in financial products. We
did so because of the low number of data points. Similarly, we only briefly discussed
the effects of collateral and recovery rates due to a lack of data. However, variations
in exposure clearly do have an effect on counterparty risk and should be part of future
research projects. In general, the quality of the data needs to improve. Without actual
data on interbank exposure, the precise risk imposed via counterparty failure can not
be quantified.
In conclusion, we used a simple cascade counterparty risk model to explain the
propagation of distress in a connected banking system and explained the mechanism
and conditions under which a system failure occurs. The simple model of banking
failure demonstrates the risk that counterparty failure imposes in a highly connected
banking system and can be used to create a more stable banking system.
Appendix A
Propositions and Lemmas Needed for
Fixed Point Analysis
The section states the propositions and lemmas used in the fixed point analysis here.
Propositions, lemmas and proofs from textbooks are in italics. We adapted the notation
of the propositions, lemmas and proofs to fit the notation of this thesis.
In general, a fixed point of an iteration map, fn(x) (where n indicates the nth
iteration step), is defined as the point where p = f(p) (Devaney et al., 2003). Fixed
points can be repellent or attracting. The two following propositions can be found in
Devaney et al. (2003) (Propositions 4.4 and 4.6) and help to determine whether a fixed
point is repellent or attracting:
Proposition A.4.1 [Proposition 4.4 in Devaney et al. (2003)] Let fn(x) be an iteration
map at the nth iteration step and f 0(.) be continuous. Let p be a fixed point of fn(x)
with |f 0(p)| < 1. Then there exists an open interval U about p such that if x 2 U , then
lim
n!1
fn(x) = p. (A.1)
Proof Since f 0(x) is continuous, there exists ✏ > 0 such that |f 0(x) < A < 1| for
x 2 [p  ✏, p+ ✏]. By the Mean Value Theorem
|f(x)  p| = |f(x)  f(p)|  A|x  p| < |x  p|  ✏. (A.2)
Hence f(x) is contained in [p   ✏, p + ✏] and, in fact, is closer to p than x is. Via
the same argument
|fn(x)  p|  An|x  p| (A.3)
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so that fn(x)! p as n!1.
Proposition A.4.2 [Propositions 4.6 in Devaney et al. (2003)] Let fn(x) be an iter-
ation map at the nth iteration step and f 0(.) be continuous. Let p be a fixed point of
fn(x) with |f 0(p)| > 1. Then there is an open interval U of p such that, if x 2 U , x 6= p,
then there exists n > 0 such that fn(x) /2 U .
Proof Since f 0(.) is continuous, there exists ✏ > 0 such that |f 0(x)| > A > 1 for
x 2 (p  ✏, p+ ✏). Using the Mean Value Theorem, we have
✏ < |p  x| < A|p  x| = |f(p)  f(x)| = |p  f(x)|. (A.4)
Hence, the distance to ✏ increases if f is applied to x. Thus,
|p  fk(x)| > ✏, (A.5)
for any k.
Thus, for |f 0(p)| < 1, p is a stable fixed point and |f 0(p)| > 1, p is an unstable
fixed point.
Furthermore, note that the iteration map in Eq. ?? is a monotone decreasing one-
dimensional map on a compact set. In Smith (2008), Lemma 1.2 (and proof) can be
found. It states:
Lemma A.4.1 [Lemma 1.2 in Smith (2008)] A monotone sequence contained in a
compact subset of X converges in X.
Proof Suppose xn is a sequence satisfying xn  xn+1 and xn 2 A for n   1 where A
is a compact subset ofX; the case for a decreasing subsequence is treated similarly. It
follows that the sequence xn has convergent subsequences. The Lemma will be proved
by showing that there exists a unique p 2 X which is the limit of every convergent
subsequence. If xnk and xmk are two subsequences of xn and if xnk ! p and xmk ! q
as k ! 1 then, by monotonicity of xn, for each k there exists l(k) such that xnk 
xml(k) . Passing to the limit as k ! 1, p  q. A similar argument shows that q  p.
[Thus,] ... q = p. Hence, Lemma 4.1 ensures that the iteration map in Eq. ?? has at
least one stable fixed point.
The following lemma states the extrema of x F (x). The function x F (x) is important
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Figure A.1: The figure shows the function x   F (x) plotted against x for fixed a = 2 and
various values of b as indicated in the legend. For b = 0, 1, 2, x F (x) is monotone
increasing. Whereas, for b = 3, 4, 5, x  F (x) has a maximum and a minimum.
as its roots are equal to the fixed points of the iteration map pr = F (pr 1).
Lemma A.4.2Assume P (.) in Eq. ?? is a standard normal CDF. Given b > bc =
p
2⇡,
x  F (x) has extrema x1,2 = b 1(a⌥
q
2 ln bp
bc
), where x1 is a maximum and x2 is a
minimum.
Proof The derivatives of x  F (x) relevant for the extrema analysis are
d(x  F (x))
dx
= 1 +
b
bc
exp
✓
  (a  bx)
2
2
◆
, (A.6)
and
d2(x  F (x))
dxdx
=
b2
2bc
(a  bx) exp
✓
  (a  bx)
2
2
◆
. (A.7)
For f d(x F (x))dx ) = 0, two solution exist if b   bc, namely, x1,2 as defined above. Fur-
thermore, d
2(x F (x))
dxdx (x1) =  2
q
ln( bbc )  0 and
d2(x F (x))
dxdx (x2) = 2
q
ln( bbc )   0.
Hence, x1 is a maximum and x2 is a minimum of x  F (x).
Figure A.1 illustrates the behaviour of x   F (x) for changing b. The function
x   F (x) is plotted against x for fixed a = 2. To plot the graphs, we used a standard
Normal CDF for P (.) in F (.). The parameter b is changed for each plot as indicated in
the legend. For b = 0, 1, 2 < bc, x   F (x) is monotonically increasing. Whereas, for
b = 3, 4, 5 > bc, x  F (x) has a maximum (x1) and a minimum (x2).
Appendix B
Emperical Information on Interbank
Network
The exposures among banks of different kinds are reported in Table B.1. In Table B.2,
we report the empirical values for interbank exposures. The interbank network average
out-degree and in-degree are reported in Tables B.3 and B.4.
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Table B.1: The table shows the average value of exposure in Mil. GBP to a bank of a particular bank
type (row) from banks of another bank type (column) (the total in-weight) for 2011 H2,
2012 H2 and 2013 H1. The brackets below each mean value indicates the STD. The STD of
the mean values are of the same order or larger than mean values indicating that the size of
funding a bank of a particular bank type differs largely form the size of funding other banks
of the same bank type receive.
2011 H2 LB BS IB OB CB Total
LB 6645.09 378.66 1263.91 658.52 726.48 9672.66
(5259.03) (297.83) (1070.73) (514.38) (680.33) (7204.10)
BS 0.87 14.58 0.33 0.11 3.09 18.98
(4.32) (28.49) (2.02) (0.75) (13.74) (41.43)
IB 2335.04 4.45 804.70 198.22 23.76 3366.18
(2579.48) (8.49) (817.13) (166.78) (32.24) (3421.39)
OB 12.61 1.39 51.19 14.27 2.32 81.77
(56.30) (10.22) (276.59) (33.51) (11.28) (290.05)
CB 30.90 12.39 22.45 10.89 14.61 91.25
(150.68) (38.23) (66.46) (44.50) (52.27) (297.74)
Total 555.16 27.10 158.15 58.36 43.98 842.75
(2053.47) (105.95) (498.23) (192.88) (215.63) (2898.26)
2012 H2 LB BS IB OB CB Total
LB 4153.29 251.51 1567.65 441.00 474.43 6887.88
(3418.68) (207.29) (1355.99) (350.40) (504.83) (5010.34)
BS 3.21 12.55 0.00 0.36 5.12 21.25
(14.80) (19.75) (0.00) (2.41) (21.94) (44.72)
IB 3452.42 6.47 1279.51 186.45 21.53 4946.38
(3590.70) (18.82) (1221.12) (178.93) (21.29) (4778.66)
OB 27.17 0.00 53.09 14.29 0.45 95.00
(192.12) (0.00) (324.64) (29.84) (2.47) (533.05)
CB 5.04 2.68 4.54 2.97 10.01 25.25
(30.85) (13.13) (19.43) (15.29) (40.31) (116.32)
Total 540.59 17.90 216.11 45.34 30.68 850.63
(1827.85) (72.00) (690.57) (141.53) (152.07) (2679.19)
2013 H1 LB BS IB OB CB Total
LB 4158.68 420.08 1678.31 266.77 486.48 7010.32
(3556.12) (332.13) (1474.11) (311.03) (456.85) (5528.95)
BS 1.24 11.73 0.35 0.22 6.24 19.78
(8.40) (23.30) (2.36) (1.47) (29.43) (53.18)
IB 3221.71 12.35 1220.62 111.55 27.01 4593.24
(3225.70) (20.68) (1336.57) (160.77) (27.67) (4602.72)
OB 43.30 0.54 61.20 5.33 4.22 114.60
(254.48) (2.56) (353.01) (10.11) (18.51) (607.31)
CB 1.71 4.48 3.82 2.16 45.56 57.72
(7.92) (21.41) (18.78) (9.11) (253.94) (309.97)
Total 546.91 28.94 226.92 27.32 43.11 873.20
(1787.25) (120.38) (739.28) (106.49) (192.72) (2727.08)
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Table B.2: The table reports the total average amount in Mil. GBP of interbank exposure of banks
belonging to a particular bank type (row) to banks of other bank types (columns), i.e. the
total out-weight. The amount in the brackets is the STD. The values can be thought of as the
total in-weight of banks in the interbank system. The STD are of the same order or larger
than the mean values suggesting that even banks in the same bank type have highly varying
exposure to other banks.
2011 H2 LB BS IB OB CB Total
LB 6645.09 4.90 4086.32 85.09 142.92 10964.32
(5953.31) (9.39) (4483.17) (88.69) (223.11) (8245.12)
BS 67.32 14.58 1.39 1.67 10.19 95.14
(114.01) (28.74) (4.36) (6.92) (33.23) (161.91)
IB 722.23 1.06 804.70 197.46 59.34 1784.80
(869.15) (3.60) (807.09) (340.39) (134.02) (1675.86)
OB 97.56 0.09 51.39 14.27 7.46 170.77
(175.18) (0.68) (133.84) (29.76) (22.94) (315.73)
CB 157.08 3.76 8.99 3.38 14.61 187.82
(204.28) (12.01) (15.54) (7.49) (25.57) (217.02)
Total 489.75 5.41 298.27 27.95 21.37 842.75
(1931.81) (17.49) (1332.73) (115.77) (73.06) (3005.22)
2012 H2 LB BS IB OB CB Total
LB 4153.29 17.65 6041.74 169.81 23.94 10406.43
(3782.40) (32.48) (7329.54) (435.75) (44.85) (10989.00)
BS 45.73 12.55 2.06 0.00 2.31 62.65
(61.45) (16.89) (11.00) (0.00) (5.92) (79.21)
IB 895.80 0.00 1279.51 189.61 12.33 2377.30
(892.90) (0.00) (1458.27) (349.11) (29.48) (2489.23)
OB 70.56 0.32 52.20 14.29 2.26 139.63
(108.63) (1.63) (133.55) (23.35) (5.78) (241.96)
CB 99.88 5.93 7.93 0.59 10.01 124.34
(176.06) (17.76) (17.96) (2.82) (20.67) (191.97)
Total 357.81 6.07 449.67 30.84 6.23 850.63
(1259.30) (15.46) (2121.37) (152.07) (17.96) (3397.48)
2013 H1 LB BS IB OB CB Total
LB 4158.68 7.12 5637.99 238.16 7.47 10049.41
(3956.45) (20.14) (6574.11) (445.99) (15.98) (10261.69)
BS 73.06 11.73 3.76 0.52 3.41 92.47
(86.26) (15.54) (12.17) (1.71) (7.65) (108.98)
IB 959.04 1.14 1220.62 192.34 9.54 2382.69
(1049.12) (4.28) (1281.65) (252.25) (29.38) (2466.63)
OB 48.50 0.23 35.49 5.33 1.72 91.28
(112.96) (1.51) (126.04) (10.81) (4.68) (219.47)
CB 111.20 8.21 10.80 5.31 45.56 181.07
(189.47) (17.22) (23.89) (12.11) (210.14) (305.91)
Total 381.51 6.19 437.45 34.30 13.74 873.20
(1325.74) (13.75) (1978.79) (144.08) (103.54) (3309.62)
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Table B.3: The table shows the average number of links to a bank of a particular bank type (rows) from
banks of another bank type (columns), i.e. the average in-degree, for 2011 H1, 2012 H2
and 2013 H3. The number in the brackets is the STD of each value. It becomes clear that
LB and IB receive the largest number of in-coming links from other banks. OB, CB and BS
hardly receive any, indicating that LB and IB form the core, and and BS, OB and CB the
periphery of the interbank network.
2011 H2 LB BS IB OB CB Total
LB 4.63 17.88 7.80 18.64 18.21 67.14
(1.92) (8.32) (4.19) (11.27) (8.85) (28.82)
BS 0.07 2.51 0.04 0.02 0.32 2.97
(0.33) (3.63) (0.21) (0.15) (0.74) (4.31)
IB 2.36 0.64 4.32 5.67 2.16 15.15
(2.34) (0.84) (2.96) (4.38) (1.98) (10.82)
OB 0.13 0.06 0.23 1.03 0.22 1.66
(0.44) (0.41) (0.67) (1.52) (0.84) (2.55)
CB 0.19 0.65 0.16 0.58 0.66 2.24
(0.52) (1.89) (0.37) (1.50) (2.33) (6.00)
Total 0.55 1.85 0.91 1.94 1.43 6.68
(1.44) (4.74) (2.38) (5.08) (4.57) (16.50)
2012 H2 LB BS IB OB CB Total
LB 5.25 17.26 8.47 16.37 16.77 64.12
(2.25) (9.35) (5.09) (9.93) (8.73) (29.04)
BS 0.07 4.57 0.00 0.05 0.31 5.00
(0.25) (4.69) (0.00) (0.30) (0.96) (5.21)
IB 3.36 0.41 5.00 6.28 1.58 16.63
(3.15) (0.75) (3.68) (4.54) (1.32) (11.17)
OB 0.06 0.00 0.18 1.11 0.07 1.41
(0.42) (0.00) (0.66) (1.61) (0.26) (2.46)
CB 0.08 0.36 0.13 0.28 0.46 1.31
(0.36) (1.61) (0.40) (1.04) (1.96) (5.12)
Total 0.64 2.33 0.98 1.86 1.24 7.05
(1.80) (5.20) (2.76) (4.68) (4.28) (16.24)
2013 H1 LB BS IB OB CB Total
LB 5.63 23.63 8.08 8.94 17.06 63.33
(2.07) (12.46) (4.38) (6.98) (9.46) (32.48)
BS 0.021 4.34 0.02 0.02 0.46 4.86
(0.15) (4.93) (0.15) (0.15) (1.34) (5.68)
IB 3.64 1.29 4.50 3.27 2.01 14.71
(3.30) (1.66) (3.68) (2.24) (1.54) (10.56)
OB 0.14 0.14 0.27 0.62 0.23 1.40
(0.63) (0.55) (1.09) (0.98) (0.75) (2.48)
CB 0.06 0.64 0.09 0.23 0.77 1.78
(0.24) (2.46) (0.28) (0.77) (2.72) (6.06)
Total 0.71 2.96 0.98 1.05 1.51 7.21
(1.95) (6.68) (2.66) (2.76) (4.60) (16.67)
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Table B.4: The table shows the average number of links from one a bank of a particular bank type
(rows) to banks of another bank type (columns), i.e. the average out-degree, for 2011 H1,
2012 H2 and 2013 H3. The number in the brackets is the STD of each value. It becomes
clear that LB and IB have the largest number of links to other banks. OB, CB and BS are
mostly exposed to LB and IB. This is another indication for the core-periphery structure.
2011 H2 LB BS IB OB CB Total
LB 4.63 0.38 4.13 0.88 0.88 10.88
(0.92) (0.74) (2.03) (0.64) (1.13) (2.36)
BS 3.18 2.51 0.20 0.07 0.53 6.49
(2.45) (3.67) (0.46) (0.25) (0.99) (5.84)
IB 4.46 0.14 4.42 0.89 0.43 10.24
(1.85) (0.36) (2.72) (1.21) (0.65) (3.82)
OB 2.76 0.02 1.47 1.03 0.40 5.68
(1.73) (0.14) (1.60) (1.12) (0.73) (3.36)
CB 3.93 0.39 0.82 0.32 0.66 6.13
(1.77) (1.02) (0.88) (0.53) (0.88) (3.20)
Total 3.40 0.85 1.34 0.57 0.52 6.68
(2.04) (2.28) (1.88) (0.90) (0.86) (4.43)
2012 H2 LB BS IB OB CB Total
LB 5.25 0.38 5.88 0.38 0.37 12.25
(0.71) (0.52) (1.96) (0.52) (0.52) (2.25)
BS 3.14 4.57 0.13 0.00 0.31 8.15
(2.13) (5.06) (0.46) (0.00) (0.59) (6.88)
IB 4.84 0.00 5.00 0.64 0.36 10.83
(1.35) (0.00) (3.21) (0.84) (0.71) (3.78)
OB 2.61 0.04 1.76 1.10 0.21 5.74
(1.68) (0.20) (2.00) (1.27) (0.45) (3.57)
CB 3.53 0.36 0.58 0.09 0.46 5.03
(2.04) (0.80) (0.87) (0.27) (0.63) (3.27)
Total 3.33 1.43 1.51 0.46 0.32 7.05
(1.99) (3.37) (2.34) (0.92) (0.57) (5.11)
2013 H1 LB BS IB OB CB Total
LB 5.63 0.13 6.38 0.75 0.25 13.13
(0.74) (0.35) (1.41) (0.46) (0.46) (1.73)
BS 4.11 4.34 0.39 0.13 0.49 9.46
(1.54) (4.62) (1.29) (0.34) (0.86) (5.69)
IB 4.62 0.07 4.50 0.86 0.21 10.26
(1.60) (0.27) (2.93) (1.10) (0.43) (3.96)
OB 1.63 0.02 1.04 0.62 0.18 3.49
(1.83) (0.14) (1.77) (1.13) (0.37) (3.59)
CB 3.90 0.60 0.80 0.29 0.76 6.36
(1.87) (1.86) (1.55) (0.77) (0.76) (3.15)
Total 3.45 1.52 1.40 0.42 0.42 7.21
(2.09) (3.18) (2.27) (0.80) (0.65) (5.13)
Appendix C
Additional Figures of Empirical
Counterparty Risk Analysis of the UK
Banking System
For readability, we placed the figures of the results for the simulation and the mean-field
models calibrated with 2011 H1 and 2012 H2 data in this chapter.
In particular, the figure corresponding to Figure 6.3 is Figure C.1, to Figure 6.5 is
Figure C.3, to Figure 6.6 is Figure C.4, and to Figure 6.7 is Figure C.5. The datasets
used to produce subplot (a) of each figure are 2011 H2. For the initialization of subplot
(b) of each figure, we used the 2012 H2 datasets.
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Figure C.1: To produce the plots in this figure, we use the same simulation set-up as was used
to produce Figure 6.3. However, for the initialization of the models, we apply the
2011 H2 (a) and 2012 H2 (b) datasets for UK banks’ balance sheets and interbank
exposure data. The plot in the upper row shows the fraction of surviving banks,
p, against the mean liabilities, fL, evaluated using the average of 1’000 simulation
(black solid line, pS); the mean-field model (blue solid line, pMF ); and the solution
of a null-model (black dotted line, pN ), where all links in the interbank network
are set to zero. The second row is a plot of the STD of the simulation solution, pS ,
against the mean liabilities, fL. Additionally, we marked the position at which the
jump occurs in the mean-field model, fMFL , and the maximum STD of pS .
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Figure C.2: To produce the plots in this figure, we use the same simulation set-up as was used
to produce Figure 6.4. However, for the initialization of the models, we apply the
2011 H2 (a) and 2012 H2 (b) datasets for UK banks’ balance sheets and interbank
exposure data. In the first tow of the figures, the mean fraction of surviving banks
of 1’000 simulations of a particular bank type is plotted against the mean liabilities,
fL. In the second row, the STD of each fraction of surviving banks for the different
bank types is plotted against the mean liabilities, fL. The graphs are coloured blue
for LB, red for BS, green for IB, black for OB and magenta for CB. Additionally,
we marked the maximum STD of pS for each bank type.
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Figure C.3: To produce the plots in this figure, we use the same simulation set-up as was used
to produce Figure 6.5. However, for the initialization of the models, we apply the
2011 H2 (a) and 2012 H2 (b) datasets for UK banks’ balance sheets and interbank
exposure data. The figures show the frequency distributions of 10’000 simulations
for fixed values of fL at 1.038 (2011 H2) and 1.042 (2012 H2). The parameter fA
was set to 0.001. Distinct peaks occur around 0.4 and 0.65 in 2011 H2, 0.5 and 0.8
in 2012 H2, and 0.45 confirming that the fragile state occurs for the fixed values
of fL.
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Figure C.4: To produce the plots in this figure, we use the same simulation set-up as was used
to produce Figure 6.6. However, for the initialization of the models, we apply the
2011 H2 (a) and 2012 H2 (b) datasets for UK banks’ balance sheets and interbank
exposure data. As in Figure 6.3, the first row of each subplot shows the fraction
of surviving banks, p, plotted against the fraction of the mean liabilities, fL. The
second row shows the STD of pS plotted against fL. The dotted lines are the av-
erage of 1’000 simulations and the solid lines indicate the solution of the Iteration
Map ?? given p0 = 1. The green lines use the original interbank network for each
year. Whereas for the red line, the exposure of LB was multiplied by d = 9. Mul-
tiplying the exposure of LB by 9 increased ✓ from 0.0158 to 0.0991 in 2011 H2,
from 0.0159 to 0.0966 in 2012 H2 and from 0.0159 to 0.0933 in 2013 H1. The
parameter fA for both simulation models as well as the mean-field model is set to
0.01. This causes ✓ for the orginal network to be smaller than ✓c and for the ex-
posure network where LB exposure is multiplied by d equal to 9 to be larger then
✓c. As a result, for the green lines, we are not able to observe a jump but a smooth
decline in p for increasing fL, whereas for the red line, a jump can be observed.
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Figure C.5: To produce the plots in this figure, we use the same simulation set-up as was used
to produce Figure 6.7. However, for the initialization of the models, we apply the
2011 H2 (a) and 2012 H2 (b) datasets for UK banks’ balance sheets and interbank
exposure data. The figures show the frequency distribution of the fraction of sur-
viving banks, p,of 10’000 simulations. The parameter fA is set to 0.01. For the
blue line fL was fixed at 1.032 for 2011 H2 (a), and at 1.037 for 2012 H2 (b) and
the original interbank networks have been used during the simulations. For the
red line, the exposure of LB was multiplied by a factor d = 9, and fL was fixed
at 1.013 for 2011 H2 (a), and 1.037 for 2012 H2 (b). For d = 1 (blue line), ✓
for all networks is below ✓c, and henceforth, no jump is visible. Instead the fre-
quency distribution is almost bell shaped. For d = 9 (red line), ✓ is larger than
✓c, and peaks become visible around p approximately 0.5 and 0.95 confirming that
the banking system can be in two states, where either most banks are operative or
half of the banks are insolvent. These peaks cannot be observed for the frequency
distribution when the original interbank network is used.
Appendix D
Variable Description
Variable Variable description
↵ Connection probability of two nodes.
  Re-wiring probability for a link
in the Small-World network .
  Leverage ratio.
 min Minimum leverage to ensure a stable system.
✏i Random variable drawn from a standard normal
distribution.
µA Location parameter of total assets.
µAˆ Location parameter of non-interbank assets.
µL Location parameter of total liabilities.
µ Difference between location parameter of liabilities and
non-interbank assets.
✓ Fraction of interbank assets to total assets.
✓c Critical value of ✓.
 Constant.
 A Scale parameter of total assets.
 Aˆ Scale parameter of non-interbank
assets.
 L Scale parameter of liabilities.
  Scale parameter of the difference between the mean
value of liabilities and non-interbank assets.
X Adjacency matrix.
 ij Element of Adjacency matrix X .
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Variable Variable description
Ai(t) Total assets of bank i at time t.
Aˆi(t) Non-interbank assets of bank i at time t.
a Mean-field value of the difference between the mean
values of liabilities and non-interbank assets
divided by the variance of the distribution of the
difference of liabilities and non-interbank assets.
a1 Value of a, at which the banking system changes from
almost all banks insolvent to almost all banks solvent.
a2 Value of a, at which the banking system changes from
almost all banks solvent to almost all banks insolvent.
b Mean-field value of interbank lending divided
by the variance of the distribution of the
bc Critical value of b.
c Neighbouring banks of all bank i
in Small-World network.
difference of liabilities and non-interbank assets.
f Fraction by which the mean of Tier 1 capital
is multiplied to resemble  
fA Fraction by which the variance   is multiplied
to vary the occurrence of the fragile state.
fL Fraction that is multiplied to the mean value of
liabilities to reduce or increase the overall average
capital in the banking system.
f ⇤L Fraction that is multiplied to the mean value of
liabilities at which the fragile state occurs.
G Interbank exposure matrix.
gij(t) Interbank exposure of bank i to bank j
at time t.
g Average interbank exposure.
Li(t) Total liabilities of bank i at time t.
Lˆi(t) Non-interbank liabilities of bank i
at time t.
m Location parameter.
N Number of banks in the banking system.
Q Recovery rate matrix.
qij(t) Recovery rate of exposure of bank i
to bank j at time t.
q Average recovery rate.
s Scale parameter.
Si(t) State of bank i at time t.
wi Fixed point, with i 2 {1, 2, 3}.
xi Extrema of x  F (x).
z Average degree.
z¯ Average degree of Erdo˝s-Re´ny network.
zi Degree of bank i.
Appendix E
Abbreviations
Abbreviation Abbreviation description
C Cauchy distribution.
L Logistic distribution.
LL Log-Logistic distribution.
LN Log-Normal distribution.
N Normal distribution.
S Student’s distribution.
148
Abbreviation Abbreviation description
Annot. Annotation.
2011 H2 Year 2011, second half.
2012 H2 Year 2012, second half.
2013 H1 Year 2013, first half.
BoE Bank of England.
BS UK building society.
CB Other UK commercial bank.
CDS Credit default swap.
CoVar Conditional Value at risk.
ES Expected Shortfall.
FWHM Full width at half maximum.
IB Investment bank.
LB Large UK bank.
LHS Left hand side.
PDF Probability distribution function.
repos Repayment products.
RFIM Random Field Ising Model.
RHS Right hand side.
RWA Risk Weighted Assets.
OB Oversea bank; subsidiaries of international
banks regulated by the PRA.
OTC Over the counter.
QE Quantitative easing.
SES Systemic Expected Shortfall.
STD Standard deviation.
VaR Value at Risk.
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